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Contents

Message from the Editor-in-Chief Agile Stability: Relaunching Halduskultuur – The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance Wolfgang Drechsler	4
International Standards and ICT Projects in Public Administration: Introducing Electronic Voting in Norway, Estonia and Switzerland Compared Nadja Braun Binder, Robert Krimmer, Gregor Wenda, Dirk-Hinnerk Fischer	8
Public Administration in the Islamic World: Considering the Importance of Religion, its Values, and Culture Daniel Hummel	23
Do Bureaucratic Organizations Lobby? The Case of Ghana Immigration Service Abdulai Kuyini Mohammed	39
Co-Creation for the Reduction of Uncertainty in Financial Governance: The Case of Monetary Authority of Singapore Olga Mikheeva and Piret Tõnurist	60
Oscillation Of Public Administration Paradigms And The Management Of Public Service In Nigeria: Trajectory And Lessons Jide Ifedayo Ibieta	81

Agile Stability: Relaunching *Halduskultuur* – The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance

WOLFGANG DRECHSLER

“The new issue of *Administrative Culture* you are holding in your hand, dear reader”, would be a wrong opening to this introduction of the relaunch of our journal – unless you printed it out, and why would you, there is nothing to hold anymore, except the gadget on which you are reading this. Moreover, what used to be *Administrative Culture* for a while is called *Halduskultuur* again (the same meaning, but in Estonian), yet with a new subtitle that indicates also a new, or broadened, direction: *The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance*.

Started as the Estonian-language proceedings for the – now dormant – conference series of the same name when Tallinn Technological University branched into Public Administration as a scholarly discipline soon after the regaining of Estonian independence, *Halduskultuur* was revamped into an international, primarily English, peer-reviewed journal in 2003, when Professor Rainer Kattel (now University College London), hired from the University of Tartu to build up a genuine Public Administration department, took over as editor-in-chief. Under his leadership, *Halduskultuur* also emphasized beauty and formal quality on the outside, if you will – what a waste it was to have ugly journals with bad layout! *HK* was well-designed, with high-quality paper and a small Kafka drawing on the cover; more like a French philosophy journal.

The third iteration came when I took over as editor-in-chief, and at that time, the journal was already successful, certainly regionally – it had become one of the three or four leading PA journals in the former Second World (if by that we mean the former Soviet Union and its satellites, not including China), both by reputation and by the indicators that arose during that time, such as impact factor and especially the Google-based h-index.

But against such indicator-driven self-conceptualization, what was special about *HK* is that it was *consciously second-tier* in order to provide a platform to less formal(ized) papers. PA went and still goes through a phase of formalization and quantitative analysis that, e.g., Public Policy has left behind right now, and we thought, guided by the name, that *Halduskultuur* would offer space for articles that don't fit the method-driven self-referentiality that was needed to be published in the mainstream places. It was very enjoyable to shock colleagues by telling them that in *HK*, *method was not needed*, and that one could publish Geertzian thick narrations just like that (of course that's a legitimate method, too).

Yet, this never happened – not once. While I still believe that going consciously for second tier (which almost all PA journals are, anyway – if that) was a brilliant strategy and that much of the best pieces in *HK* are there because of that, in the end, we are so trained, or even “drilled”, in PA that the famous narrated case study was never submitted. But methodologically more mainstream (if emphasizing some degree of narrativity and English prose quality), what *HK* did was that contents-wise it offered a shelter for PA scholarship less mainstream and fashion-oriented – with giving space, e.g., to Non-Western, especially Islamic, PA and very much to Weberian and Neo-Weberian papers. In fact, despite the few papers of Islamic PA published in *HK*, given the small number of such pieces to begin with, it has become one of the main outlets for a topic that, in spite of the hard work of the global-Western and/or anti-Islamic crowd, will not go away. As regards the non- and even anti-NPM thrust, it is fair to say that during the last decade and a half, the mainstream has caught up with us.

But a certain greater mainstreaming than originally intended did happen. We are in a nice set of citation indicators, including *Scopus*, and that happened much to our surprise – but as an outlet for junior members, from PhD student up, to senior ones of our department, and given the profession's and especially Estonia's worship of indicators and rankings, the status to be in the top tier of Estonian publications – the famous ETIS 1.1. category – was helpful both to attract authors and to continue to receive funding from the department and higher university bodies.

A symptom of this mainstreaming was that the editors decided, after some discussion, to change the title of the journal from *Halduskultuur* to *Administrative Culture*, but that was just a mistake. Sociologically, it never happened anyway – the wishy-washy English title was never used internally, everyone still referred to *HK*; and the international “*HK* family” regretted the change, complaining about the old, catchy name being gone. It is, as you can see, back now.

But the current change is more than a labeling exercise – as in any decent innovation policy measure, it is premised on agile stability, i.e. it is an overall overhaul with the purpose to, Lampedusa-like, change everything in order to stay the same, the same in the sense of a decent, useful PA journal. It's not the 90s of the last century anymore (not exclusively a good thing, but things are as they are), but also not 2005. Printed journals are still held up as the gold standard, but more and more, what matters are citations, and anyway the printed copies of journal issues are wastepaper from the start. As the old anecdote goes,

Mrs M. comes to the bookseller and publisher Noah G. Elwert's shop and asks, “Do you have any wastepaper to wrap fish in?” Elwert replies, “Not right now, but I'm just printing a new Bible commentary by Professor X, so very soon I will again.”

People want pdf's, and pdf's only; nobody wants printed journal issues anymore. It's a storage, access, and search question – and to steal money from the public again by charging for expensive subscriptions makes, for a year or two or three more, sense for predatory, locust publishers but not for an in-house journal that is basically financed by grant. So, we needed to go open-access (for citations and ethics) and fully online (ecologically, pragmatically, and not to waste money), and we could then also restore the old title.

But digitization and digitalization (and to some extent, contrary to e-Governance, even digital transformation) don't only concern the medium, but also the message. The Ragnar Nurkse Department itself moved decisively away from PA-only by becoming the Estonian, and indeed Baltic, hub for Innovation Policy studies first – something reflected in other departmental publications, not here. And then, in line with outside interest, if you will *demand*, it also refocused, as a third large element of emphasis, on said e-Gov, now Digital Governance, which is what everyone wanted and expected. We first created a professorship (from our own revenues), later transformed into a chair; from the beginning, this initiative was given to, and led, by Robert Krimmer, one of our PhD's in the field, with a strong publishing and policy record. And contrary to the Innovation side, with the *Halduskultuur* transformation, discussions among the editorial board, department members, and the advisory board, it was clear that the inclusion of the digital side of our research was both necessary and beneficial.

So, altogether, we needed to change the name back; put the journal openly and freely online; add a focus on e-Government; and retain the old methodological and area emphases that had been so successful. In addition, it was clear that this created the necessity, and chance, to restructure both the editorial team and the Advisory Board – as should happen periodically anyway, but not so much. *HK* has been blessed by a world-class AB from the beginning of my takeover as editor-in-chief at the latest, but we were fortunate that this change was universally taken up with enthusiasm, and we have a genuine “dream team” of additional AB members who reflect PA and eGov – and who also broaden the scope from a decidedly European club (plus the United States) to more Non-Western, and especially Asian, representation, in line with our interests and research areas. Given the Estonian country emphasis we also had, and seeing what kind of positive label the “brand” had become, we also decided to include the national name into the title, and here we are now:

Halduskultuur – The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance.

We will of course keep the professional editing and layouting we are known for, and we have already internally upgraded the website and its architecture, thanks to our current Managing Editor, Shobhit Shakya, Junior Research Fellow at the Nurkse Department, who has an excellent IT and eGov background. The designer will change, but Ingbert Edenhofer will continue his tenure as language editor, assuring as he always does the highest standards of quality in his realm.

As regards the editorial board itself, after many years of service, and orchestrating their many duties in this and other realms, Tiina Randma-Liiv (Tallinn University of Technology) and Marleen Brans (Leuven) decided to retire, but they graciously consented to join the Advisory Board, so that their knowledge and advice will still be available for us. Professor Robert Krimmer almost automatically joined in order to oversee his sphere, and its establishment, at *Halduskultuur* as well. Together with myself as editor-in-chief, Veiko Lember (*pro tempore* Catholic University of Leuven, the former managing director of *HK* during the times when it was transformed into a global-level publication) and Eugenie Samier (University of Strathclyde) remain on board in every sense of the word.

If there is a change, sadly we have to witness some of our friends and supporters on the Advisory boards leave, *turnusgemäß*, as the German word has it, and we would very much like to thank them for their help, participation, and advice. They are

- Jörg Bogumil, Ruhr-University Bochum
- Fenwick E. English, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Agustin Ferraro, University of Salamanca
- Isabella Proeller, University of Potsdam
- Harald Sætren, University of Bergen
- Markku Temmes, University of Helsinki
- Frédéric Varone, University of Geneva

But we would also like to thank the Advisory Board remainers, those who gracefully consented to stay with us and continue their important work, just as much:

- Pertti Ahonen, University of Helsinki
- Geert Bouckaert, Catholic University of Leuven
- György Jenei, Corvinus University of Budapest
- Christoph Knill, University of Munich
- Vitalis Nakrošis, University of Vilnius
- Edoardo Ongaro, The Open University, UK
- B. Guy Peters, University of Pittsburgh
- Martin Potůček, Charles University in Prague
- Baldur Thorhallsson, University of Iceland
- Mirko Vintar, University of Ljubljana

Having thanked those those who left and the ones who remained, we would like now to extend an equal level of thanks, with our welcome, to the new members of the Advisory board, who truly confirm this list to be that of an All-Star cast of genuinely global PA professors:

- Caspar van den Berg, University of Groningen
- Yannis Charalabidis, University of the Aegean
- Mila Gasco, SUNY Albany
- Thad Hall, University of Utah
- Andrew Massey, University of Exeter
- Ines Mergel, University of Konstanz
- Akira Nakamura, Meiji University
- Reuben Ng, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
- Janine O'Flynn, University of Melbourne and ANZSOG (joined in 2018 already)

- Leslie A. Pal, Carleton University
- Theresa Pardo, SUNY Albany
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- P.S. Reddy, University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa
- Hiroko Shimada Logie, Kyoto University
- Ploy Suebvises, National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok
- Lhawang Ugyel, University of New South Wales at Canberra

There were lots of discussions, initiatives, efforts and labors involved in this relaunch, but no reader really cares, and rightly so. Efforts are not awarded in academe, and what matters is the result. We hope that the fruit of the old-new *Halduskultuur* is a unique, sense-making, specific journal that is wide but not too wide in scope, very Estonian and very Ragnar Nurkse Department in its twin foci on PA and eGov, and designed and technically presented in a way appropriate for the second decade of the 21st century. I hope you will agree, collaborate, submit, publish, and cite – that is the only way a journal can, and should, survive.

We hope you will enjoy the first issue, or some of its papers, of the relaunched *Halduskultuur*. We would be happy to receive any feedback on the new form and scope you might have. The main call, however, remains – please submit!

International Standards and ICT Projects in Public Administration: Introducing Electronic Voting in Norway, Estonia and Switzerland Compared

NADJA BRAUN BINDER, ROBERT KRIMMER, GREGOR WENDA, DIRK-HINNERK FISCHER

Abstract

This research focuses on the interrelationship between international standards and e-voting projects. With the rise of e-government activities, a multitude of new international standards is discussed or adopted in conjunction with such innovative reform steps. In order to gain a perception which role international standards dealing with legal, organizational and technical aspects play in national contexts and whether they are actually implemented, this essay specifically examines standards used in e-voting projects, as this area can be clearly distinguished from other e-government projects. Case studies in Estonia, Norway, and Switzerland show that there is a general interest in international sources and that real international standards are considered to be more important and "binding" than private organizations' standards or other documents. In all three countries, the Council of Europe Recommendation on e-voting, the only real international standard in this field, played a role in the respective e-voting projects, but did not coin all phases. Once the international standards were endorsed as national regulations, they only played a minor role for the continuation of the projects. However, they are used for orientation and evaluation purposes.

Keywords: *International standards, electronic voting, e-voting, Norway, Switzerland, Estonia, case study*

1. Introduction

Aim of the paper

Pioneering e-government (von Lucke and Reiner mann 2000) projects face multifaceted challenges. They often depend on interdisciplinary approaches, are politically delicate, contain a high potential for conflicts, and must deal with heterogeneous groups of stakeholders. A multitude of international standards are now being adopted in conjunction with such innovative e-government projects. These are directly or indirectly targeted at addressing one or more aspects of the challenges confronting these projects.

But how are such international standards actually implemented within public administrations? Are national Public Administrations aware of the existence of these standards? Do they actually help support public administrations with their work or are they perceived to be an additional constraint?

In order to gain a perception of how international standards are being implemented in national contexts, we examined international standards and their implementation in delimited fields. We chose to look into the topic of international standards used for e-voting, since e-voting is a project that can be clearly distinguished from other e-government projects (International IDEA 2011, 6). At the same time, e-voting is a very ambitious topic, bearing challenges and risks that are relevant in different countries. Hypotheses have been developed for further research on the interrelationship between international standards and innovative e-government projects based on three e-voting case studies.

The assumption is – alongside national principles – that international standards dealing with legal, organizational and/or technical aspects play a certain role in all phases of e-voting projects. Since these are confronted by various new challenges, national public administrations are likely to examine all the existing e-voting standards in order to obtain ideas of how to tackle their own challenges. Moreover, adherence to international standards may contribute towards establishing confidence in new technological solutions and the acceptance of innovations by various stakeholders. At the same time, we estimate that public administrations tackling e-voting projects have a considerable interest in bringing their experience to bear in the work of the international organizations which set the standards. Cooperation when defining international standards is an effective way of ensuring that a country's national e-voting solution is in conformance with and complies with the international standard.

The focus of this research is the interrelationship between international standards and e-voting projects. We consider whether the alleged effects actually exist. In this paper we will not look into the specific content of international e-voting standards, but will rather focus on the process of implementing the standards in a national context.

Structure of the paper

The paper is divided into two parts: in the first part (Chapter 2) we present the results of the three case studies, the second part (Chapter 3) contains preliminary conclusions and hypotheses with regard to developing a general research concept on the interrelationship between international standards and innovative e-government projects.

International e-voting standards

For the purposes of this paper, international standards are defined as voluntary regulations that are adopted by an international organization (defined as a form of intergovernmental cooperation established between states). International standards play an important role in the field of elections in general. They are generally accepted as qualitative criteria for running and assessing elections. The former Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 (Council of Europe 2004) and the new Recommendation Rec(2017)5 (Council of Europe 2017b) revising Rec(2004)11 are the only international legal documents specifying more detailed requirements for using electronic technologies in elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2012a; The Carter Center, 2012). Rec(2004)11 was still in force during the case studies. Besides, the Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs of the Council of Europe published two guidelines in 2010 that took account of developments subsequent to the adoption of Rec(2004)11 (Council of Europe 2010a, 2010b). Since an organ of the Council of Europe did not formally adopt the two guidelines, these did not fall under the category of international standards in the strictest sense. However, we still refer to them in this paper, since they were mentioned during the case studies.

A distinction must be made between international standards and standards from private organizations, with an international focus (e.g. ISO standards). Since the three case studies revealed that international standards as well as standards from private organizations can play a role, the latter will also be included in this paper. They will be referred to as "private organizations' standards".

Excursus: Update Revising Rec(2004)11

According to paragraph V. of Rec(2004)11, a review was needed after two years "in order to provide the Council of Europe with a basis for possible further action on e-voting". After the first review in 2006, the experts convened then decided to continue with reviews every two years (Stein and Wenda 2014, 1-6). With the passage of time and more review meetings to follow, it became obvious that updating Rec(2004)11 would be necessary. Academic discussions and research on new technological solutions as well as new social attitudes, practical experiences, and court decisions in a number of countries led the fourth review meeting in Lochau near Bregenz, in Austria, to conclude on 11 July 2012 that the Recommendation was still appropriate, but that in light of recent practical experiences, and despite the additional guidelines of 2010, a number of issues could no longer be dealt with. As a consequence, the representatives of the Member States "agreed to recommend that the 2004 Committee of Ministers' Recommendation ... should be formally updated." Based

on a report "on the possible updating of the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting", commissioned by the Council of Europe in 2013, several countries demanded updating Rec(2004)11 by "taking the issues listed in this report into account and the high probability that in the medium to long term, a number of electoral systems will comprise some electronic features." The Ministers' Deputies/Rapporteur Group on Democracy (GR-DEM) agreed that experts from the competent Election Management Bodies in different Member States should lead the updating process. Similar to the Ad Hoc Group of 2002-2004, work on Rec(2004)11 was not deferred to another existing committee or group but was put in the hands of the very experts in electoral matters. An "Ad-hoc Committee of Experts" was created, to be placed directly under the Committee of Ministers and whose Terms of Reference were approved on 1 April 2015. The objective of the new "Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Legal, Operational And Technical Standards for E-voting" (CAHVE) was to finalize a "draft Recommendation updating Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting" as well as the "explanatory memorandum to the updated Recommendation". Members were "representatives of highest possible rank from electoral management bodies with direct experience or specialised knowledge on e-voting" (nominated by the Member States). Each state had one voting right.

The first meeting of CAHVE took place on 28 to 29 October 2015 in Strasbourg. Approximately 50 participants from 25 countries, organizations, institutions, and academia were present. The Lead Expert presented the results of the questionnaire, and the Committee reached its initial decisions: The definition of e-voting should be extended to include all kinds of optical scanners. Provision with a much broader scope should be introduced to remind EMBs of their special responsibilities in e-enabled elections, taking into account specific features of electoral administration in each member state. Awareness of the challenges accompanying the introduction of e-voting should be stressed more strongly; accordingly, the updated recommendation should set out the difficulties that could be encountered when introducing e-voting. A new multi-layered structure was decided upon with regard to the actual update: The main aspects of e-voting, mostly of a legal, statutory and more "timeless" nature, should be put into a "core layer" and constitute the actual Recommendation. Complementary layers could be updated more frequently and could include guidelines, regional issues, and best practices. The Committee also considered that the revised, updated recommendation should formalize a review mechanism comparable to previous biannual review meetings. Within the context of this mechanism, complementary layers could be revised and updated more easily. The review mechanism should be based on the experience acquired by Member States in the field of e-voting and on the examples of best practice identified in previous review meetings. Pursuant to the CAHVE meeting, the Secretariat commenced the second phase of updating and revision work. In the summer of 2016, the draft document was eventually deposited onto a newly created online platform where CAHVE's participants are granted access to review proposals and contribute to the text of the final version. Another plenary meeting was held on 3 and 4 November 2016 in Strasbourg to finalize the documents. The Recommendation, an explanatory memorandum, and guidelines were finalized towards the end of 2016 and were officially endorsed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 14 June 2017. With the new Rec(2017)5 coming into effect, Rec(2004)11 and the old guidelines were no longer effective (Driza Maurer 2017).

Designing the case study

Various countries are conducting experiments with or are already using different forms of e-voting, but there are still only a few international standards, except of course the first attempt at a real European standard with the Council of Europe Recommendations Rec(2004)11 as well as Rec(2017)5 and its guidelines on implementing the Recommendation (Council of Europe 2017a, 2017b). Selecting countries for this study was based on theoretical sampling in order to find the best combination of both countries and cases. The three countries selected, Norway, Estonia, and Switzerland, each represent a rather different approach towards e-voting. They also conduct e-voting motivated by different factors, and their projects examine very different futures. In Switzerland, the initial motivation to conduct e-voting tests was the wish to provide voters with the means of voting that they use in their daily life, especially since Swiss voters can cast their vote in referendums at least four times a year. Furthermore, the

Swiss government wanted to facilitate voting for physically handicapped persons and for Swiss citizens abroad (Swiss Federal Council 2002).

In Estonia, the introduction of e-voting was part of a bigger e-governance strategy. Estonia, after its independence, was dedicated to using the benefits of the new technologies. The private sector and the political system work in the same direction, as it was continuously assumed that the positive economic development after 1989 was closely related to the development of the information technologies (Feldmann 2013).

In Norway, the Parliament approved the use of Internet voting in 2008, and trials were carried out in a small number of municipalities in both 2011 and 2013. The main goals were to provide better accessibility to voters, to ensure rapid implementation of elections and the efficient use of resources in municipalities, as well as to facilitate direct democracy (Barrat i Esteve and Goldsmith 2012a). Increasing the turnout was no objective for the trials in 2011 and 2013, but it played a significant role in re-introducing e-voting solutions in local referendums (no elections) in 2016 and 2018 (Bull et al. 2018).

The cases have thus been selected in order to allow a thorough insight and not just for a simple affirmation of the theoretical approach behind the paper. The objective of such sampling is to generate an elaborate data sample from the study, a sample that allows us to observe contrasts between countries and not merely unrealistically homogeneous results. This permits us to compare data via triangulation. The overall results of the study therefore become more reliable.

We chose these three member states of the Council of Europe for the case study, since the Council of Europe Recommendation is still the only international standard in the field of e-voting. One objective is to see how the three members deal with the international standard and what influences are derived from its introduction. Estonia and Switzerland were two of the few countries that started their e-voting projects before the Council of Europe Recommendation was adopted. Norway began developing e-voting some years later. In all three countries, e-voting encompasses the use of the Internet to transmit the vote to the polling station (also referred to as "remote e-voting" or "Internet voting").

This case study is hence an explanatory and comparative one. The objective of the cases is to show how international standards and international comparisons can impact the development of an e-voting project. A second and implicit concept is the idea that the cases can indicate in which direction the standards steer the projects (Yin 2013). The three cases were selected in order to provide the best information possible. The data was generated by different means. A study of the literature and legal fundamentals provided the basis for this paper, but the more profound results that distinguish this study from most other studies were derived from semi-structured interviews and from several background documents, such as election monitors' documentation from the OSCE/ODIHR. The three countries demonstrate three different approaches to the introductory process for e-voting systems, at three different times and exemplified the challenges with their introductions at different times and with different perspectives.

In order to gain relevant information, a semi-structured questionnaire was sent to the Section of Political Rights at the Federal Chancellery (the Swiss Electoral Management Body), the Election and Local Democracy Unit of the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation (the Norwegian Electoral Management Body) and the Estonian National Electoral Committee (Estonia's Electoral Management Body). They all returned completed questionnaires. The case studies are mainly based on their responses and are complemented by the analysis of additional resources.

2. Case studies

2.1 International standards & e-voting in Switzerland

Background

Swiss work on e-voting began in the year 2000 with the launch of the project "vote électronique". It commenced with a joint effort on a national as well as on a cantonal level. Three cantons developed their own e-voting-systems. They were closely accompanied by the Federal Chancellery to ensure that the cantonal systems could be used on the national as well as on cantonal and local levels and for coordinating the various efforts in the field of e-voting (Federal Chancellery 2018d). A permanent working group with cantonal and federal representatives also followed the work from the very beginning. In 2011 a steering committee was additionally established. It comprises decision-makers from cantons with e-voting systems as well as representatives from the federal administration and is headed by the Federal Chancellor. Its tasks include evaluating the results of the project and consolidating strategic proposals for the project made by the Federal Chancellery before they are presented to the Federal Council and Parliament (Federal Chancellery 2018c). All in all, the project is developed and carried out with a strong focus on coordination and cooperation between the various federal levels (Driza Maurer 2016).

The project "vote électronique" has been developed carefully and steadily since the year 2000: Over 300 e-voting trials have been carried out on a federal level. In addition, numerous trials have been realized at cantonal and communal levels. Besides the three initial cantons (Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich), several other cantons joined the e-voting project to make e-voting available for their citizens living abroad (Federal Chancellery 2018b). All in all a total of 15 cantons have allowed certain groups of citizens to vote online (Federal Chancellery 2018). In 2017 for example, up to 67 per cent of the population living abroad voted electronically (egovernment Switzerland 2018). The tests concentrated on using e-voting in referendums and, later, also in parliamentary elections. Further steps, including an electronic signature for popular initiatives, requests for referendums, and proposing candidates for parliamentary elections are still pending. However, the Swiss e-voting project also experienced some setbacks (Serdült et al. 2015). The following events can be mentioned as particularly drastic: the decision of the canton of Zurich in 2011 not to pursue its e-voting project for the time being – however, the canton of Zurich resumed e-voting trials in 2013 as a member of the so-called Consortium (Canton of Zurich 2018) –, reports in the press about allegedly hacked e-voting systems, the dissolution of one of the three consortia just briefly before national elections in 2015 and the decision of the Geneva government to stop its e-voting project in 2020 due to excessive costs. The Federal Council has adopted three reports in which the e-voting project was presented and evaluated, and in which proposals were made for further development of the project (Swiss Federal Council 2002, 2006, 2013; Federal Chancellery 2017). The reports did not require approval by Parliament, but Parliament took note of these reports. They were an important source of information during the process of adopting the legal basis for e-voting. In April 2017, the Federal Council asked the Federal Chancellery to install a group of experts in order to prepare for the transition from an e-voting-trial period to a mode of regular operation. In April 2018, the group of experts presented their final report (Federal Chancellery 2018a) in which they concluded that in Switzerland, sufficient technical know-how as well as the procedural requirements are available in order to introduce e-voting as a regular mode of voting. On 19 December 2018, the Federal Council opened consultations on an amendment to the Federal Act on Political Rights (Swiss Federal Council 2018). Until the end of April 2019, interested parties can submit their comments on the planned revision, which will offer the legal basis for e-voting as a regular mode of vote casting.

Legal basis

The current legal basis for e-voting in Switzerland can be found in two Federal Acts and in two Ordinances (Federal Chancellery 2017). Whilst the Federal Acts are being adopted by Parliament, the Federal Council (Government) enacts the Ordinance on Political Rights and the Federal Chancellery issues the Ordinance on Electronic Voting.

In the year 2000, no legal basis was provided for tests with electronic voting. Drafting legal fundamentals commenced in 2001; the Federal Council adopted its draft proposal of the relevant paragraphs in two Federal Acts in November 2001. The proposal was then discussed and adopted in Parliament. Drafting the relevant paragraphs for the Ordinance on Political Rights took place in parallel to the parliamentary debate on the provisions for the two Federal Acts. The Federal Council decided on e-voting provisions in the Ordinance on Political Rights on 20 September 2002. The relevant articles of the Federal Act on Political Rights and the Ordinance on Political Rights assumed legal effect on 1 January 2003. The Federal Chancellery Ordinance on Electronic Voting came much later; it became legally effective on 15 January 2014.

Influence of international standards on the work of the Federal Administration

Awareness of international standards and private organizations' standards within the Federal Administration

Several standards are regarded as relevant for the e-voting project within the Swiss Federal Administration. For more than 10 years, the Council of Europe's Recommendation Rec(2004)11 was perceived as *the international* standard. Accordingly, Switzerland supported the idea of revising and adjusting these recommendations to reflect the latest developments. Furthermore, the OSCE's recommendations were being considered, in particular as a consequence of monitoring the 2011 election (OSCE/ODIHR 2011). A series of technical standards can also be included: BSI Common Criteria Protection Profile, ISO 27001, WCAG2.0, FIPS 143-3, NIST, and ECRYPT.

The standards of an international organization are perceived as enjoying a higher degree of legitimacy, as an institutional author issues them. Private organizations' standards obtain their significance from the fact that they are respected by many organizations and are thus disseminated widely.

Influence on initial regulation of e-voting

There were no international standards or other model international documents available throughout the drafting phase of the first national legal regulation in Switzerland, which took place in 2001. Drafting the first e-voting regulation in Switzerland began more than one year before the Council of Europe started its work in the context of the Project "Making Democratic Institutions Work" (within which the draft Recommendation Rec(2004)11 was developed). The first exploratory meeting on e-voting by the Council of Europe took place on 1 and 2 July 2002.

Rec(2004)11 had *no direct influence* on the Swiss regulation that came into effect in 2003. Rather, it was the other way around: the Swiss regulation served as a model document for the Council of Europe working group (Swiss Federal Council 2006). Members of the e-voting team represented the Swiss Federal Chancellery during working group meetings of the Council of Europe from 2002 to 2004. There was direct communication between the national Electoral Management Body, the section for Political Rights at the Swiss Federal Chancellery and the people representing the e-voting project at the Council of Europe working group meetings. It was two-way communication: The Swiss representatives in the Council of Europe working group were able to share their information and know-how on e-voting and regulating e-voting with the Council of Europe working group and at the same time benefit from the know-how exchanged at working group meetings. So, even if the Council of Europe Recommendation was adopted after drafting the Swiss regulation, the exchange of information facilitated through working group meetings was very valuable. Thus, one could say that the Rec(2004)11 at least had *an indirect influence* on the Swiss regulation of 2003.

Influence on adapting a regulation for e-voting (2013/2014)

The legal foundations for e-voting were adapted in 2013/2014, based on the Federal Council's third report on e-voting (Swiss Federal Council 2013). This adjustment was made with respect to an extension of the electronic voting channel. The Federal Act on Political Rights has not changed. However, the provisions of the Ordinance on Political Rights have been adapted, and the Federal Chancellery has created a new Ordinance on Electronic Voting. This new Ordinance contains detailed provisions for implementation. These define the criteria for auditing the systems in place by a certified body.

When adapting the legal foundations in 2013 and 2014, and especially when drafting the Federal Chancellery Ordinance, the following standards were considered: Common Criteria, ISO 27001, WCAG2.0, and Regulation on Certification of Services, with reference to other international standards.

In addition, discussions about verifiability (and at the same time about the associated protection of the secrecy of voting) decisively shaped the revision of the legal foundations in the international environment and in the scientific arena. The basic components of cryptography were based on current international standards and recommendations (FIPS 143-3, NIST, ECRYPT).

Interestingly enough, the Federal Chancellery did not mention the two "Guidelines" developed by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe and a group of experts, dated 16 February 2011 (Council of Europe 2011), in their responses to the questionnaire. The guidelines did not play an important role in adapting the national regulations in 2013 and 2014. No reference is made to any of the standards adopted by the Council of Europe or its Secretariat in the final report by the group of experts that was considering introducing e-voting as a regular mode between April 2017 and April 2018 (Federal Chancellery 2018a).

Assessing the relevance of international standards in the field of e-voting

In the view of the Swiss Federal Administration, international standards are important for developing e-voting projects. They indicate a possible framework for designing a project. Accordingly, international standards must be updated continually. Otherwise they lose significance, and countries wishing to promote the digitization of political rights can scarcely make any use of them. In the current further work on e-voting (introducing e-voting as a regular mode), no explicit reference is made to international standards.

According to the Swiss authorities responding, international standards should be designed so that they can be translated into the specific context of each country. Political rights and entitlements of systems differ from country to country. International standards must take this into account. International standards are firmly embedded in a field of tension: on the one hand, they must be abstract in order to take country-specific circumstances into account. On the other hand, they must be specific enough to allow a reliable assessment of whether the standard is being met. One solution could be to work with different standards or regulatory levels. Thus, while fixed standards and norms could address key issues and could be evaluated in the form of principles, the technical provisions could demonstrate, for example, how these principles should be implemented. By describing the options for implementation, it would become clear which solutions must be considered suitable by the international community.

2.2 International standards & e-voting in Norway

Background

In 2004, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development appointed a working committee to examine fundamental questions with regard to e-voting (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 2004). This working committee, composed of representatives of the Ministry, several municipalities, scientific institutions as well as two private companies, recommended a step-by-step approach by which e-voting should be systematically tested (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 2006). The

Norwegian Government and Parliament decided to run trials on the use of e-voting in 2008. The first trial took place during local government elections in ten municipalities in September 2011. The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development was in charge of supervising and evaluating the trial. It commissioned several assessment and evaluation studies on the first e-voting test and invited the OSCE to monitor the trial with the objective of obtaining inputs for improvements (Barrat i Esteve and Goldsmith 2012b).

Following the positive experiences of 2011, the government decided to conduct another e-voting trial during parliamentary elections in 2013. The controversial issue was discussed at length in Parliament, and in April 2013 a narrow majority approved continuing with e-voting trials during the parliamentary elections. Twelve municipalities were involved in this second e-voting trial. The OSCE and the Carter Center monitored the use of e-voting during the 2013 parliamentary elections (Barrat i Esteve and Goldsmith 2012b; Gebhardt Stenerud and Bull 2012).

From an overall perspective, the 2011 and 2013 pilots appeared to be technically successful (Vinkel and Krimmer 2016). Although the trials in 2011 and 2013 were reported on positively, and no significant security concerns were raised, the topic remained politically controversial. In the discussions, fears that the security mechanisms for transmitting the vote over the Internet were inadequate and that casting a vote outside the polling station might endanger the sanctity of voting were alluded to. In the end the lack of broad political support for introducing Internet voting led to the government deciding not to conduct further e-voting pilot studies in Norway (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2014). Notwithstanding, several municipalities and one county deployed Internet voting solutions for local referendums in 2016 and 2018 (Bull et al. 2018). In contrast to the election trials of 2011 and 2013, the use of e-voting for these referendums did not require a national act of legislation but was merely based on local provisions.

Legal basis

Internet voting as such is not mentioned specifically in Norwegian legislation. The law regulating how elections are carried out, the Representation of the People Act (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 2017), makes no provisions for Internet voting. The Representation of the People Act (§ 15-1) contains a provision for trials where deviations from the law can be made. In these cases, specific regulations are drafted specifying the legal framework for deviations.

Special regulations were issued for both the 2011 and the 2013 Internet voting trials in Norway (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 2013). Deviations from the legal framework were specified in these regulations, and where no deviation is specified, the RPA applied. The first draft of the regulations related to the 2011 trials and was despatched for public hearing on 17 December 2010. It came into effect on 31 March 2011 and expired on 31 December 2011. New regulations were drafted for the 2013 trials. They were despatched for public hearing on 8 May 2013 and assumed legal effect on 19 June 2013. They expired again on 31 December 2013.

These regulations only covered the specific trials and expired once the trial had been completed. There were minor changes made from the first set of regulations for the trial in 2011 and the regulations for 2013. On both occasions, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development adopted the regulations. These did not require approval by Parliament.

Influence of international standards on the work of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development

The Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 is regarded as an important source of information for drafting e-voting regulations by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. A representative of the ministry was involved in drafting Rec(2004)11. When crafting the e-voting regulations for the 2011 and 2013 pilots, key aspects of the Council of Europe's Rec(2004)11 were considered (Barrat i Esteve and Goldsmith 2012a) and eventually incorporated. Little exception to the recommendation was actually taken (Carter Center 2014).

Apart from the Council of Europe Recommendation, the also referred to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters issued by the Venice Commission (Council of Europe 2002), the Council of Europe's e-voting handbook, (Council of Europe 2010c) as well as the Council of Europe's Guidelines on certification and on transparency. The security issues during parliamentary elections in September 2013 show that small issues or inadequacies in the source code can have a big impact on the integrity of an entire election. The encryption mechanism failed in this process to a large extent (Bull et al. 2016). The full case study is an example of how to learn from mistakes, and how and why international standards can and should be implemented.

Assessing the relevance of international standards in the field of e-voting

According to the ministry responding, professional standards issued by international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the United Nations, etc., are generally perceived as being more significant – in terms of being more (politically) binding – than standards issued by private bodies.

However, mention was also made that standards from international organizations are not necessarily more helpful than standards set by private bodies. This depends on the nature of and purpose for the standard. Professional standards from private bodies may be a useful source of inspiration and for learning. However, standards from international organizations would pull more weight in order to gain international support for certain views and assessments. Furthermore, mention was made that too many different standards could contribute to uncertainty as to which standard should be attributed the greatest validity.

Private bodies create standards which are not always useful to governments. International standards are, however, extremely useful when launching an e-voting project. Field of e-voting has moved on considerably during the last 15 years.

2.3 International standards & e-voting in Estonia

Background

Estonia was the first country to announce a full-scale electronic election in 2001. It was also the first country to introduce Internet elections on a national scale in national elections. The parliament voted in 2002 to delay full-scale introduction until 2005 (Drechsler and Madise 2004). This puts Estonia in a special position as a pioneer and frontrunner, and hence there were few opportunities for orientation or chances to exchange experiences. This frontrunner position has Estonia left in a continuous development process (Vinkel and Krimmer 2016). The latest example of this is verifiability, which at present is probably the most challenging aspect of e-voting.

Due to a growing discussion on the issue, verifiability measures were introduced in Estonian elections. These additions for the security of the system are supposed to detect whether a vote has been compromised. The changes were introduced without formal consultation of international standards, due to a lack of such standards. More recent developments, such as the IVXV framework, are targeted at improving the tabulation integrity of the Estonian system. The system was implemented for the municipal elections in October 2017. The parties handling implementation recognize that this is only one step and that development will continue for many years (Heiberg et al. 2017).

Legal basis

The Riigikogu Election Act is the central regulatory framework for electronic and Internet voting. It was passed on 16 June 2002 and assumed legal effect on 18 July 2002. Changes were also introduced before the 2005 municipal elections. The technical solution had been completed at that time, but the law needed changing to accommodate the changes. Further changes were also made following the OSCE mission report in 2011, based on the report's recommendations. The Electronic Voting Committee which has now become significant was also created at that time.

The Act has been updated several times since its introduction, and many newly introduced paragraphs cover the particular needs of Internet and electronic elections, such as § 60 introduced in 2006 and § 57 introduced in 2014 (Riigi Teataja 2014). It was last changed in 2016 and assumed legal effect on 1 January 2017 (Riigi Teataja 2018a). The Riigikogu Election Act (RT I 2002, 57, 355) included provisions on Internet voting, especially § 60.1. The 2016 changes clarified crucial aspects like §38 and changes related to the duration and modus of changing votes. Additionally, territorial polling districts have been abolished, and voting rolls are held electronically from now on (Riigi Teataja 2018a). The additions to the Riigikogu Election Act provide a solid and still developing basis for electronic elections in Estonia. The most recent signs for the continuous development are the changes added to the law in 2017, all of which will step into force in 2021 (Riigi Teataja 2018b). Other regulations that govern elections and Internet voting in Estonia are the Local Government Election Act, the Referendum Act and the European Parliament Election Act.

The Riigikogu Election Act was introduced at a time when no country had conducted legally binding elections on a national scale. Estonia was also a pioneer and frontrunner and had to establish a procedure first. The only references made are to the Council of Europe's recommendations not yet published at that time, which the Estonian election administration participated in.

Influence of international standards on the work of the Estonian authorities

The Estonian administration responsible monitors international standards and developments in countries where Estonia is represented. The developments in other countries and regions are taken into consideration and also the standards that private organizations use are in general not neglected, depending on the reputation and work of the particular organization. The most important international guideline for Estonia is the Council of Europe recommendation Rec(2004)11. A general guideline for the field of electronic elections, these are still the basic electoral principles applied for every election.

The legal changes implemented in 2016 were partially built on the OSCE report on the election in 2015 (OSCE 2015). One issue that the Estonian electoral administration perceives is the lack of stronger standards in the field. Administrations must be flexible and open-minded in order to find appropriate means to conduct their elections.

Assessment of the relevance of international standards in the field of e-voting

The question of international standards in electronic elections faces many obstacles. One of the most prominent issues is issuing certified Internet voting systems. Such certification is criticised as not being meaningful, or even as being impossible. Private-sector standards should also be established due to the numerous elections held in the private sector with the help of electronic means. Applying these standards to national elections on the other hand depends on many aspects.

One positive aspect of the current situation, where no real international standards exist, is that there are no conflicting or competing ones. This should also be prevented in the future, whilst there is no question of whether international standards should be updated. Technology develops and hence the standards should continue to develop further. International standards are seen as helpful, as they facilitate a systematic approach, and compliance with fundamental principles and potential risks are accounted for.

3. Conclusions

The three case studies offer several insights into the interrelationship between international standards and e-voting projects. It becomes clear that various international documents are of interest to national administrations when tackling e-voting projects. In conjunction with international standards in the strictest sense, standards set by private organizations are often taken into account as well as documents from international organizations that do not fall under the definition of international standards (e.g. OSCE/ODIHR reports or the two CoE Guidelines). In other words: inspiration and know-how is obtained from various kinds of

international sources, irrespective of their classification. However, when it comes to political significance, international standards are considered to be more important than private organizations' standards or other international documents. They are assessed as being "more binding". Furthermore, they also seem to be attributed a significant role in building trust amongst voters in e-voting systems.

None of the three authorities responding perceived international standards to be a constraining factor. The only disadvantage mentioned with regard to the Council of Europe Recommendation was the fact that by 2014 it was clearly out-dated. There could be no orientation guideline without attempting to formulate some form of international standard. If the lessons of other administrations and their mistakes are forgotten, countries will be bound to repeat them. Not adopting standards can also lead to underperforming systems due to a lack of understanding of the matter. Such unsatisfactorily performing projects could slow down and impede further the development of electronic voting as it would dispel the trust in electronic systems within a country, region or even globally.

Concerning the question of how international standards are being implemented in national administrations, it becomes apparent that the main focus is on implementing the standard into the national legal context. In all three countries, the international standard had, at least indirectly, served as a basis for drafting national legislation and statutory regulations. Having noted this, international standards played the most important role at the start of the e-voting projects. So, contrary to our preliminary assumptions, the international standards did not play a role in all phases of e-voting projects. Based on our three case studies, we can summarize that once the international standards have been endorsed as national regulations, they only play a minor role for the projects. The most prominent role remaining for them is to be used as a source for evaluation, and to be cited in official documents to enhance the acceptance of e-voting amongst stakeholders (Barrat i Esteve and Goldsmith 2012b).

Based on our three case studies, the following hypotheses for further research on the interrelationship between international standards and innovative e-government projects can be developed:

- i) Case studies are a useful way of gaining an insight into the interrelationship between international standards and e-government projects.
- ii) Research should not be limited to international standards in the strictest sense, but should include standards from private organizations as well as other international documents.
- iii) Since the major influence of international standards is supposed to be on national statutory regulations, a thorough analysis of the legal basis should be an integral part of case studies. The legal regulations should be studied in advance, whenever questionnaires are sent out or interviews are being prepared. This helps when formulating adequate questions.

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Public Administration in the Islamic World: Considering the Importance of Religion, its Values and Culture

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Abstract

A small but growing area of public administration scholarship appreciates the influence of religious values on various aspects of government. This appreciation parallels a growing interest in comparative public administration and indigenized forms of government which recognizes the role of culture in different approaches to government. This article is at the crossroads of these two trends while also considering a very salient region, the Islamic world. The Islamic world is uniquely religious, which makes this discussion even more relevant, as the nations that represent them strive towards legitimacy and stability. The history and core values of Islam need to be considered as they pertain to systems of government that are widely accepted by the people. In essence, this is being done in many countries across the Islamic world, providing fertile grounds for public administration research from a comparative perspective. This paper explores these possibilities for future research on this topic.

Keywords: *Religion; Ethics; Values; Public administration; Islam; Comparative PA*

Introduction

According to research at the Religions and Development program at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom there have been three tracks in public management research that consider the role of religion in government. These include an indirect reference through an emphasis on values, the influence of culture and context and a specific focus on certain religions (Shah et al. 2007). This article considers these directions with a specific application to the Islamic world.

Religion continues to be an important topic in public administration because "the modern secular state has had difficulty disengaging itself from the embrace of established religion" (Dwivedi 2005, 26). Despite this importance, the academic literature has rarely considered the role of religion in public administration. This is a claim voiced by Lowery (2005), when he noted that "the academic discipline of public administration has paid little attention to the role that religious and spiritual values play in the professional lives of public administrators" (324).

Deontology, which is the study of the duty and moral obligation to others, applies to those public service values that are considered important to be an effective public administrator. This is an interest in the common good with a focus on service to others and social equity values. Many of these public service orientations are deeply rooted in a profound love for others and a communitarian impulse. To them serving is about meeting their own emotional and spiritual needs as well as those of others (Houston et al. 2008; Lowery 2005; Cunningham 2005). These values are rooted heavily in a religious worldview and inform public administration ethics, which Menzel (2015) calls a "values-driven enterprise" (357).

Public administration ethics encompass rights, obligations and principles which, as Rohr (1976) explained, encompass the "regime values". In his interpretation the values of freedom, property and equality are the "regime values" of the United States, for example. These values progenerated from Europe, as the United States is the product of European political thought,

with the foundational scholars John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau having profound influence on the ideas in the US Constitution. The modern forms of public administration in the United States evolved under Woodrow Wilson, who was heavily influenced by German political theorists such as Bluntschli and Stein. Rosser (2010) argued that "it hardly seems to be an exaggeration to say that during the closing years of the nineteenth century, the whole of American political science – of which public administration cannot be separated at this time – was under great influence by German political theory" (549).

It is for these reasons that these "regime values" with their roots in religion have ensured some level of interaction between religion and government in Europe and the United States. European political thought following the Enlightenment considered religion a private matter and sought to expunge religion from government. Despite this push, the European nation-states that developed along with their constitutions still recognized a cooperative relationship between church and state. This has typically entailed religion as a source of cultural belonging, but moral issues are also pertinent in some contexts. In the modern-day European Union there has been debate over the role of religion, in particular Christianity, in its constitution. In the United States, where religious salience is much higher than in Europe, this intersectionality is more pronounced between religion and government (Hennig 2015; Schlesinger and Foret 2006).

The inability of Western secular government to escape the pull of religion is evidenced in the need to establish a replacement for it through a civil religion. It represents a need to create a cohesive society based on a nucleus of values in which tension over these values in an increasingly diverse and individualistic world has attenuated divisions. The rising interest in public administration in "value pluralism" indicates the importance of this subject for sound and stable government (Molina 2015; Ferrari 2010; Gedicks 2010; Spicer 2014; and Overeem and Verhoef 2014).

In this context, there is the comparative approach to public administration, which is the study of administrative concepts and/or processes across a wide or narrow range of organizations, nations and cultures. Comparative public administration (CPA) started in the United States during the Cold War, when many former colonies had achieved independence and began to create their own states. This approach has widened the boundaries of public administration scholarship to understand the forms and functions of public administration in different contexts. It has helped in understanding the commonalities and the differences as well as the reasons for these differences (Hou et al. 2011; Jreisat 2011).

In the wake of ensuing differences between nations and cultures and the failure of international development organizations to affect real and sustainable change in non-Western governments a new approach to CPA has emerged that focuses on the indigenization of administration. This approach recognizes the unique aspects of administration that can be found in individual nations or cultures. Although many have applauded this movement as a further expression of a de-ethnocentrism in public administration that focuses on Western public administration, some have also felt that this has led to further fragmentation and a defeat of one of the goals of CPA, which is to find best practices (Samier 2014; Jreisat 2005). Rutgers (2004) called this dichotomy between a local and a global perspective of public administration the problem of sailing between Scylla and Charybdis in Greek mythology or a rock and a hard place.

The continued focus of recent research in CPA on European or Western countries may be an indication of a subtle realization of these very real differences, especially between cultures. The continued lack of inclusion of culture as a factor in these studies may also be an indication of this realization. Those that have accepted the differences between cultures as a real and important aspect of public administration have increased research on non-Western public administration (Fitzpatrick et al. 2011; Drechsler 2014).

One important area of the world merits more attention, given its inability to construct stable states. The Islamic world has a rich history of public administration, from the city-state of Medina under the Prophet Muhammad to the Caliphs and Sultans of the great world-wide and regional Islamic kingdoms that stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. In many ways

Islamic government simply acquired the governing traditions of the previous non-Muslim administrations, which could range from Roman and Persian to Hindustani. In other ways it added many elements to those traditions, transforming those governments into Islamic governments. These additional elements can be associated with the unique aspect of Islam and its impact on different societies around the world (Lewis 2008; Çaha 2003).

This article is not only focused on the continual relevance of religion in public administration from a general perspective, but on the Islamic world and its continual conflict over the role of religion in the state. The developed world is largely secular, but the literature in public administration finds that religion and the values and culture that inform, and are informed by, it have mostly informal roles. This discussion has relevance for the understanding of the pogroms in the Islamic world, where it has been accepted for some time that religion and the state are not separate even formally and in so-called secular states. This is due to the lack of distinction between the sacred and the secular in Islam. The next section considers the conjoined concepts of religion, the development of a civil religion to supersede it and a discussion of public administration values and ethics.

Religion, civil religion and public administration values and ethics

There has been some research on specific religions, their values and public administration. For example, Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism have been explored as they apply to public administration (DeHaven-Smith 2003; Yanow 2003; Subramanian 1967). There is also a growing literature on Islam (Drechsler 2014). This research considers religion to be an important factor in the function of government while also recognizing that there are important differences between religions.

Casanova (2003) argued that religion is both behavioral and institutional. The behavioral aspect of religion influences individual values and can contribute to a public voice. The institutional aspect of religion is more formal through faith-based initiatives and religious interest groups. These aspects are apparent in democratic and secular societies, such as the United States, where religious beliefs and values can inform support or opposition to a policy. Religious groups have also become involved with policy implementation via government funding for specific programs and projects. In electoral politics religious groups have become important lobby groups for various initiatives.

Dwight Waldo made the case that religion could contribute to the development of an administrative theology (Waldo 1980). This acceptance of the role of religion in public administration is not an acceptance of a theological perspective of government. Instead, it is a contributor to a more secular religion of public service. This recognizes a spirituality of public service in which "its secular dimension is crucial in governance, especially with respect to public service ethics and values" (Dwivedi 2005, 27-28).

Rousseau accepted the important contribution of religion to cohesion in a society. He developed the concept of a civil religion which still relied heavily on theological concepts found in traditional religion. In the United States, where religion has traditionally been seen as fostering republican virtues, religion, culture and political institutions are closely related to each other (Ward 2014; Olehla 2010; and Ferrari 2010). The increasing role of the government in providing public welfare has created a re-delegation of responsibilities from the religious institutions to the government. The "good works" of government increases the salience of the association between religious values and public service. As defined by Moots (2010) a civil religion is a "set of moral imperatives expressed in religious language and intended to frame and motivate public policy" (80). In essence, government has become so large and encompassing that it has naturally overlapped the domain of religion and this has required an impetus to frame public service by those same values that motivated religious institutions to provide those services.

Collective and social decisions are based on explicit and implicit moral values. Even professional ethics in public administration contain abstract values like achieving social justice. Those institutions construct the social environments in which governments operate, and these are defined by social values, norms and realities. Apparently, these values and ethics do not have to be based within a religious orientation, but they are often based within this reality. Public administrators are confronted with a wide range of these social and cultural values. These values are societal insofar as the organizations that operate in these societies must be consistent with these values (Molina 2015).

Molina (2015) defined public service values as having a professional, ethical, democratic and human basis. This includes the values of honesty, integrity, social justice, efficiency, innovativeness, reliability, transparency, lawfulness, benevolence and inclusiveness. The crossover of religious values and some of these values is clear. Secularism and pluralism place emphasis on the need for a secular religion of public service or a civil religion that would allow a consensus on values for societal cohesion.

In contrast, research on value pluralism encourages a lack of unity on these values as an aspect of a healthy democracy. Values conflict not only between systems, but within systems, as well. A choice between values involves difficult decisions. As noted by Overeem and Verhoef (2014), "value pluralists argue that in the course of our lives (and particularly when we are involved in public decision making) we encounter deep conflicts between different values that all appear to have intrinsic moral worth, but cannot all be realized simultaneously" (991). This discussion highlights that values are of intrinsic importance, whether they conflict in public service or not, and that these values inform public administration ethics. Waldo (1984) referred to ethics and their underlying values as criteria for action. It also highlights that understanding different value systems is critical in understanding how others govern and that those same dynamics are at play in those societies. This places importance on approaching public administration from a comparative and global perspective. The next section is on comparative public administration and the importance of understanding local culture and its influence on different approaches to government.

Comparative public administration and culture

CPA takes into consideration the role of culture in determining managerial practices; however, only 38 percent of articles written between 2000 and 2009 considered it in their analyses (Jreisat 2005; Fitzpatrick et al. 2011). Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) added that despite this scarcity of research on culture in CPA culture needs to be a significant variable in these analyses, especially since it can impact the implementation of an administrative innovation or intervention. Further, Jreisat (2011) noted that the effects of culture and value systems on managerial practices are largely unknown, especially in public administration.

The importance of understanding the role of culture in public administration is critical to the purpose of research in CPA. One of the goals of this research is to gain knowledge of others for a balanced perspective in which it focuses on the diversity and uniformity of administrative practice across different contexts (Jreisat 2005). Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) stated that "comparative perspectives allow us to move from an ethnocentric, parochial view of public administration in the United States and the goal of identifying the single best approach to a problem to recognizing that theories and solutions must take into account the context and culture in which they are introduced and implemented in order to determine what outcomes will be achieved" (827). In addition, Jreisat (2011) added that "cross-cultural comparative research has had a transforming effect on the field of public administration. Opening up to the experiences of other countries encouraged a transition from a traditional ethnocentric view of the field to a global subject of human learning, teaching and research" (834).

In the field of public administration historically there has been a failure to appreciate non-Western contributions and an under-appreciation of local traditions. This lack of appreciation is embodied by an ethnocentrism in public administration focused on Western forms of government. There has also been a growing realization that forms of public administration in

the United States, for example, may not work outside of that context (Dwivedi 1990; Meacham 1999; Heady 1995; Hood 1989; Riggs 1991; Riggs 1998). Jreisat (2011) also included that "significant attempts to study the rest of the world outside Europe and North America have to evolve if research is to respond to demonstrable needs" (835).

Hou et al. (2011) went a step further and advocated for a Public Administration with a Global Perspective (PAGP) paradigm, in which the current focus on Western forms of government would no longer be adequate. They note that public administration needs to expand to include cultural contexts and acceptance of inter-dependent problems across national boundaries. Despite this call Jreisat (2011) lamented that "regardless of need, however, in the short run, it seems that CPA will persist in concentrating its research on Europe and the United States for some practical considerations related to cost, language, knowledge of culture, and the state of existing data. Regrettably, we cannot rule out consideration of ingrained and subtle biases in the social sciences in general that disfavor certain countries and cultures" (836).

The general lack of focus in CPA research on culture and the developing world has been met with increasing research on indigenous administration, particularly in the developing world. According to Samier (2014), CPA was most dominant in the 1960s and 1970s, when most of this research was focused on the developing world. The goal was the identification and clarification of universals in public administration to compare developed and developing countries (Jun 1976). This has now been followed by internationalization and indigenization. Indigenized public administration is focused on each jurisdiction as an individual and unique entity. This is a step further than traditional CPA, which attempts to understand the role of culture in facilitating or impeding generally accepted global administrative practices. It argues that culture is critical in the managerial development of a country and remains unique outside of global administrative practices (Samier 2014).

In an article on Brazilian public administration, Candler (2002) described scholarship on public administration in Brazil that has emphasized local models. The author found that there were many unique aspects of culture in Brazil that had real implications for public administration. These were not entirely positive, such as the dominance of private interests over the state. Reform efforts in Brazil have mirrored neo-liberal frameworks while still emphasizing the importance of local models of administration. The author argued that despite the importance of local culture in developing the norms of administration there also existed the need for a more empirical assessment of global administrative practice and its application at the local level.

In Europe public sector reforms and the expansion of the European Union have led to a discussion on public values and ethics in individual countries. In Denmark, for example, Vrangbæk (2009) surveyed public sector managers in the country and found that the top five values are innovation, professional standards, accountability, transparency and due process. These values exemplify more hierarchical values, such as rule-following and the politics-administration dichotomy, except for innovation, which is more market-based. These values are not unique to Denmark, but their prioritization is different from other countries. In this case despite the connection of Denmark to the wider Western norms of public administration there is still a local tradition that is important for the structure and function of their government.

The Islamic world provides a unique case in the discussion of comparative public administration. It is quite diverse even within a single country with national identities barely competing with religious and tribal identities. The modern era has seen more successful adaptations in the Muslim world to the concept of a nation-state and complete failures on the other hand. In general, the Islamic world post-colonialism is experiencing an identity crisis that merits new thinking and applications that consider the interconnections of religion, public values, ethics and contextual factors which can all be facilitated through a comparative public administration lens. The next section explores this topic in more detail, particularly as it applies to the application of public ethics and values.

The development of public administration ethics and values in the Islamic world

The first 13 years of the early Muslim community in Mecca coincided with a period when the Muslims were weak, oppressed and struggling for a base of control from which they could practice their religion freely. After the migration to Medina, which is the basis for the Muslims calendar, the people of Medina instated Muhammad as the head of the city-state, and for the next ten years before the death of the Prophet the interpretations and applications of the Qur'an became more oriented towards the task of maintaining a separate political and administrative entity under near continuous conflict with the neighboring tribes, internal tribes in Medina and eventually the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. The legacy bequeathed by this period does not list injunctions about the theory of political governance, but moral principles about it (Çaha 2003).

In less than a century the Islamic empire spread from China and India in the East to West Africa in the West under the first Caliphs. The Muslims were incredibly adaptable to their new environments, establishing new cities, standardizing soldiers' pay, maintaining initially Byzantine and Persian administrative systems while Islamicizing them 50 years later, incorporating the present tax and public finance systems and developing their own ones based on Islam, implementing free trade across the empire along with a commodities exchange, establishing a merit-based system inside an increasingly developing civil and military bureaucracy, and instituting the concept of personal responsibility on behalf of the ruler for his people (Lewis 2008; and Drechsler 2014).

The Islamic empires developed a bureaucratic system that enforced the law, raised revenues and supported the economy. For example, Mughal administration in India emphasized maintaining a healthy treasury, a strong army and law and order (Kinra 2010). A key aspect of upholding the law was the maintenance of a robust judiciary.

Islamic judges or *qadis* were a critical arm of the state. In the Ottoman Empire the judicial order was headed by the *Shaykh-ul-Islam* (the religious leader of the Islamic world), who was also head of the *ulama*. Beneath him was the head of the judiciary named the *qadaskar*, and beneath the *qadaskar* were the various judges who headed the judicial districts throughout the empire. At its peak these judges also served as mayors and chiefs of police, but primarily they implemented the *sharia* (Islamic law), oversaw marriages, dealt with orphans, maintained records of judgements, resolved local disputes and oversaw contractual relations. The importance of these courts remained in the Ottoman Empire up until the First Constitutional Period, when these *sharia* courts operated alongside regular courts. This dual legal system has been maintained in many modern Islamic countries like Malaysia, although largely relegated to family law (Hanioğlu 2010; Ergene 2004; Akgündüz 2009).

Islamic empires also had a sophisticated system for generating revenues for the government. One of the earliest sources on public finance in Islam is Yahya ibn Adam's *Kitab al-Kharadj*, developed during the Abbasid reign. This book focused mainly on the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions and therefore relied more on political-ethical standards (Kallek 2001; Fritschy 2008; Tomic 2010).

In more concrete terms Cosgel (2005) described output and input taxes in Islam, labeled *muqasama* and *misaha*, respectively. Cosgel (2005) also asserted that there is an enterprise tax in Islam labeled a *maqtu*. A strict interpretation of Islam only allows the *zakat* (Islamic tithe), the *ushr* (10 percent on agrarian revenue) and 2.5 percent on liquid personal property (*zakat-ul-mal*) for Muslims (Fritschy 2008). There was also the *jizya*, which is a non-Muslim poll tax.

The Ottoman Empire, for example, had developed a public financing system with standardized rates. They relied on lump-sum taxes and production taxes on output. They also relied on land taxes. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire there was a reliance on tax farmers who bid for tax districts to secure the right to collect the taxes called *malikanes*. They began a debt market through the *malikanes* (advances on tax revenue) and *eshams* (percent of tax

revenues) (Hummel 2013; Hummel and Goud 2017).

In addition, the Islamic empires were focused on expanding social welfare and developing the economy. As stated by Oberauer (2013), "for the early Muslim community, one of the most pressing tasks was to mobilize resources for military self-assertion and – later – expansion. With the evolution of the conquest society, other tasks came to the fore, most notably the provision of basic welfare within increasing complex social structures – a task that called for a much more sophisticated allocation of public and charitable funds" (23). One tool developed by the Islamic empires that expanded social welfare and economic development was the *waqf*. The *waqf* developed a little later, possibly 100 years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. It is essentially a religious endowment in which most public goods provided in the Islamic world were provided through this institution (Joseph 2014; Kuran 2001).

The *waqf* fostered an Islamic civil society that focused on increasing socio-economic equality. These endowments provided education, utilities, charity and healthcare to name a few of their functions. Specifically, in the Ottoman Empire, where a large percentage of land was endowed, the *waqf* were focused on eliminating poverty, financing building projects, caring for the elderly and disabled, promoting urban development, financing public works and spreading Islam (Setia 2014; Joseph 2014; Kuran 2001).

Interestingly, as society Islamicized, non-Muslims also played a role in these empires. As noted by Sirry (2011), "non-Muslim elements of society have been at the very centre of government administration. Without attention to their role, it is hard to understand the place of non-Muslims in the early development of the Muslim 'state'" (187). Sirry (2011) described a number of non-Muslim viziers and secretariats in the Abbasid and Fatimid empires. In addition, Kinra (2010) described a similar dynamic in the Mughal empire.

Over more than a thousand years of Islamic administration a number of scholars produced well-cited works on government and leadership. Some of these figures include al-Mawardi, al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Kindi, Ibn Rushd, al-Farabi, Ibn Zafar, Ibn Adam and al-Mulk. Some of these figures were influenced by Arab-Islamic thought and some were influenced by Hellenic-Islamic thought couched within pre-Islamic administrative and cultural practices in the region. These works focused on the development of government as a religio-socio-political organization that included robust discussions of the Caliph, Islamic legal norms and consensus (*ijma*) in the community (Rizvi 1981; Hillenbrand 1988; Dekmejian and Thabit 2000). In addition, there was a focus on the personality, character and values of leadership. For example, physiognomy was an important practice in Islamic empires. This was a focus on selecting the right people for administrative posts based on the moral qualities of the individual. As noted by Lelić (2017) it was the, "technique for extrapolating concealed truths based on outward hints and prior knowledge of the meaning of those hints" (618). Caliphs were trained in this practice.

Those works that combined Islamic and Hellenistic thought focused on the convergence of Islamic norms and the work of Plato and Aristotle. A prominent example of this type of work is *The Virtuous City* by al-Farabi (Hall 2015; Khalidi 2003). Al-Farabi influenced Ibn Rushd, one of the prominent figures of the Islamic Renaissance, who wrote a commentary on Plato's Republic. He placed emphasis on the importance of the philosopher king who is virtuous and just. He added that the ruling figure must have a deep knowledge of the law (Martin 1996).

These early scholars on Islamic government had a major influence on 20th-century scholars that focused on Islamicizing the modern-day nation-state. These scholars include Rashad Rida and Abul Ala Maududi, to name only a few. Rashad Rida developed the concept of the natural law in Islam, where reason and revelation were complementary much as with Ibn Rushd, and emphasized the concepts of *ijma* and *shura* (consultation). Abul Ala Maududi conceived of Islam and God as having both temporal and ephemeral meanings and consequences (Seferta 1985; Afsaruddin 2006; Ahmad 2009).

Islamic history as well as fundamental concepts in the Qur'an and *sunnah* (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) assert that religion and government are closely related to each other. This is the case today. Fish (2011) found through various secondary data sources using different quantitative statistical approaches that Muslims are unusually religious, believe that politicians who do not believe in God are not fit for office and are more likely to support religiosity among their political leaders. Despite these affinities for religiosity it cannot be ignored that Muslim countries have issues with corrupt leadership, which is an apparent contradiction.

Potentially as a catalyst for these issues Hamid (2016) added that Islam and its system of laws known as *sharia* bound Muslims together historically, and nothing has replaced it with the same veracity, including anything from the local culture or the colonial legacy. This has left a hollow legacy, where the demand for religious leadership is there, but the law is absent. In Turkey, for example, the founders wanted to disconnect the new state from Islam by secularizing the institutions of the state, education and the law while adopting the symbols of Europe. In addition, it tried to secularize the personal life of its citizens through a new type of religion, the "Cult of Atatürk" (Kucukcan 2010). This has altered the culture in Turkey, but Islam is still a powerful force there, as proven by the fact that an Islamic political party has been in control since the early 2000s. This control is wavering due to accusations of corruption and autocratic behavior.

Samier (2014) noted that public administration is undergoing a process of Islamicization which is cultural, institutional and instrumental. The instrumental changes are most important because they include the norms of practice and the structures and functions of the organization that emerge from them. Samier (2014) further added that these values are based on a continuation of a tradition that is based on the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, along with a robust interpretive and hermeneutic tradition that is also influenced by a cultural and colonial legacy.

According to Cusack (2010) religion is not independent from its social and cultural context. Islam is not different in that "the conquest inaugurated a civilizational process in which Arabs and non-Arabs together reconceptualized and reworked the legacy of the past within the framework of Islam" (Darling 2014, 408). The Prophet Muhammad decentralized many responsibilities to the local community, officially making Islamic governance local with a resistance to centralized control. At this level there were disputes over following the Qur'an and incorporating local culture and customs. The concept of *rukha* (concessions) along with the *madahib* (schools of thought) with different interpretations of the role of human reasoning (*qiyas* and *ijtihad*) allowed an adaptation and flexibility to social circumstances. This created local diversity which simultaneously transformed society i.e. Islamicizing it while accommodating local culture (Hursh 2009).

Given these existential realities regarding the role of culture in Islamic society the Muslim countries naturally represent a diversity of approaches to public administration in the Islamic world. Still, Islam is the most salient factor that unites these incredibly diverse populations even within a single nation-state. A fact that initially was quite inclusive of everyone within the state including non-Muslims. This is a foundational concept, as the "Constitution of Medina" during the time of the Prophet Muhammad initially defined the *ummah* (community) as Muslims and non-Muslims living together under mutual protection (Arjomand 2009).

The conundrum is that there is no blueprint for an Islamic government. Afsaruddin (2006) noted that the Qur'an contains concerns over the proper ordering of human affairs, but not specific legal rulings on the topic. There are only moral principles and guidelines. There appears to be a large amount of freedom to determine the structure and function of government in the Islamic world so long as that structure and function considers the objectives of Islam (Popa 2012). Popa (2012) argued that Islamic government is theoretically not a theocracy where the leaders are divine or invested with some spiritual authority. It is more of a nomocracy in which a state is subsumed under religious laws and morals.

There is still an active discussion in the Islamic world and beyond on whether government can be purely secular along Western lines. It is likely that the context determines the vociferousness of these arguments. Traditionally, Islamic government is very limited (Ahmad 2009; Popa 2012). In his discussions of Maududi, Ahmad (2009) added that, "given the radically interventionist role of the modern state and the manner in which it shaped the daily lives of Muslims, he equated Islam with the state" (155). The point made earlier regarding the increasing role of the state and its intersection with the traditional role of the church is particularly relevant here.

This point is interesting because it is assumed that Islamists would accept a secular government if that government remained aloof from the personal lives of its people. The experimentations with secularism in the Islamic world so far have been quite interventionist, thus increasing frictions in those societies. A liberal form of secularism could work in these countries. The fact that most Islamic political parties in the Islamic world today are moving away from the idea of establishing an Islamic state and imposing Islamic law is a testament to the fact that it is not an enshrined ideology. Increasingly, Islamic political parties support the notion of citizenship and the will of the people over the concept of the sovereignty of God. They have progressively moved away from the notion of the Islamic utopian state (Gerges 2013). This is not discounting the model promoted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which represents a fringe movement in the Islamic world.

This has become apparent in the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. This party has refocused on emphasizing individual rights, including religious freedom, over establishing an Islamic state. This has created a dynamic where moderate secularists and moderate Islamists have found common ground (Kanra and Ercan 2012). The point is that some limited form of government that embodies those values and ethics considered Islamic is more tenable in the Islamic world than the current form which is heavily centralized and considered aloof from these values and ethics. The question is, what are these values and ethics?

The core values and ethics in Islam are best understood through a discussion of the *maqasid al-shariah*. This approach to understanding Islamic law emphasizes a rigorous interpretation and application of the Qur'an with a focus on public interest, which is known as *maslaha*. As explained by Rane (2012), "the *maqasid* approach emphasizes public interest and well-being (*maslaha*), rejects literal readings of sacred texts, and gives priority to the spirit of the message of the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions" (497). The purpose of this approach is to engage in *ijtihad*, which is legal reasoning in Islamic law, allowing jurists to solve issues in society creatively while obeying the Will of God. This relies on an application of the value system of Islamic law and its deeper meanings.

The classical Islamic scholar al-Ghazali developed this concept by deriving the five general protections in Islamic law from the Qur'an and *sunnah*. These are the protection of religion, life, intellect, family lineage and wealth. An additional protection of dignity and honor was later added to these core protections. These have since been expanded on to include the protection of life and property, general equality, the social contract, the preservation of the rights to reason, procreation and religion. If anything, these represent the generally accepted regime values in the Islamic world that would form the basis for an Islamic public ethic.

Al-Shatibi, another classical Islamic scholar, created a theory of *maqasid* by focusing on *maslaha*. He created three levels of *maslaha* starting with these core protections and expanding outward to include the needs and luxuries of society. This relied on an inductive reading of the Qur'an to understand the objective of the verses. This also challenged the *usul al-fiqh* approach, which is Islamic jurisprudence based on the Qur'an and *sunnah*. *Usul al-fiqh* is a study and understanding of the texts of Islam and its legal rulings largely based on 12th-century legal theory (Johnston 2007; Auda 2011; and Rane 2012).

His theory was based on the concept that every ruling had an objective or legal aim which in general was to achieve good and prevent harm. The rulings in the Qur'an focused on worship, customs, interpersonal relations, transactions and punishments. The jurist was expected

to differentiate worship from the rest of these areas to determine the level of flexibility in interpretation. As noted by Johnston (2007), "the crucial step made by al-Shatibi is to be able to concede that humans, by virtue of their intellectual endowment by the Creator, can tell good from bad and know what is to the interest of humanity (*maslaha*) and what detracts from it (*mafsada*)" (161).

Modern Islamic scholars like Ibn Ashur and Jasser Auda have developed this concept further in which there is a realization that rules had general principles and purposes. This emphasized the concept of the public good and the flexible relationship between law and society (Safi 2010). For example, two modern Muslim scholars (al-Alwami and al-Qaradawi) developed the concept of *fiqh al-aqalliyat*, which is the jurisprudence of Muslim minorities based on the *maqasid al-shariah*, to reconcile Islamic law with Western law and values. As explained by Parray (2012), "*fiqh al-aqalliyat*, which deals with the daily problems that arise for millions of Muslim individuals living in the West, tries to reconcile conflicting practices with the culture and values of the host societies from within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence" (89).

This ongoing discussion has historical roots in the Islamic world in the conflicts between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites. The Mu'tazilites believed in the concept of ethical objectivism in which human reason could discern right from wrong and these ethical values were above the divine law. Reason, in this case, was given privilege to make legal rulings according to the values in Islamic law. This approach clearly separated worship from civil life. The Ash'arites believed that human reason could only discover the rulings in divine law in which ethical values were defined by the revealed text, which is known as theistic subjectivism (Johnston 2004; 2007).

The approach of al-Shatibi and his predecessor al-Ghazali as well as their modern descendants like Muhammad Abduh is a mix of Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite conceptions. The *maslaha* is grounded in the texts of Islam and scholarly consensus which is considered immutable while legal reasoning and analogy are still possible and allow a certain level of flexibility. Utility is still important, while Islam focuses the community towards the afterlife. The division between the moral and legal in Islamic law is not clear, and the traditional approach is that all aspects of life are defined by religion (Setia 2016; Safi 2010).

This area of scholarship is highly contentious and is at the center of reform movements in the Islamic world. For example, Setia (2016) is a critic of the modern development of *maqasid al-shariah* by declaring "in effect, we are witnessing a steady march towards the systemic and structural secularization, fasad-ization, disintegration, and dissolution of the *maqasid* ..." (128). The term *fasad* means corruption. This statement more than any other indicates that there are core values and ethics contained within the texts of Islam that clearly separate it from other systems and that these are important to preserve in Islamic society. In addition, to the extent that the governments in Muslim countries drift from these ethics and values, the population will increasingly become disillusioned by them.

The core values established by al-Ghazali and further developed by later Muslim scholars are general, but each Muslim country relying upon that foundation can add to these values within the framework of the *maqasid al-shariah* approach. In addition, through these values and an appreciation of the public interest and well-being (*maslaha*) public ethics can be established and inculcated within these governments, not only based within Islam, but global best practices as well. An appreciation of this along with a deliberative process for establishing the constitutions in these countries and continual engagement as these countries govern will be a more sustainable course. In addition, this will require a smaller central government with considerable autonomy and power given to local governments and governing networks.

The long history of Islamic governance along with its intellectual history merit attention by scholars and practitioners. As previously mentioned, surveys confirm that the Islamic world is uniquely religious and accepting of the mixing of religion and government. The secular regimes that have filled the void left by outgoing colonial governments have little legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This is a problem and one that is not easily addressed by Islam, which does not have a solid blueprint for an "Islamic" government. The *maqasid al-shariah*

approach is the most promising to taking a local and global perspective that would have more legitimacy among the people in these countries. The next section explores the implications for this shift in approach in the Islamic world. It also considers future directions of research for scholars in CPA, in particular considering the importance of culture and religion in determining legitimate forms of government, especially as it pertains to the Islamic world.

Discussion and Future Research

CPA scholars have an appreciation of culture in understanding administrative systems of government. There are reservations on accepting cultural peculiarities without some international standard and best practice for government. Many would criticize public administration from an Islamic perspective for its many gaps and pitfalls; however, those scholars that approach public administration from an indigenized and global perspective do not negate the importance of international best practice. This is particularly true for the assessment of goal achievements. The one-size-fits-all paradigm of public administration in the early stages of the development of public administration theory embodied by the "science of administration" movement has largely been replaced by more nuanced understandings of the field.

The de-ethnocentrism of public administration is another realization of this nuanced understanding of the field. The continual problems of instability in the Islamic world while applying purely Western standards of government merit a fresh perspective. The religion of Islam is not easily dismissed within this context. As noted by Hamid (2016), "the only long-term solution is to find a place for Islam, in its varied political forms, within the democratic process" (257). The concern is whether democracy has a place at all within this worldview. Samuel Huntington famously wrote that Islam does not encourage democracy; however, recent research indicates that religiousness and democracy are not opposites in the Islamic world (Huntington 1984; Ciftci 2010; Tessler 2002; Rahman 2013).

The decentralization of power in the Islamic world seems more in line with the history of the region (Hamid 2016). Despite this being considered best practice globally, there are concerns about the local application of law and the provision of services. Many of these concerns mirror general concerns with polycentric forms of government all over the world, but some of these challenges are unique to the Islamic world. For example, *zakat* (Islamic charity) administration in places like Pakistan and the control of social welfare by privately managed and communal organizations like the *waqf* (foundations) and the *mahalla* (neighborhood) systems also introduce problems of inequality in service provision (Urinboyev 2014; Kuran 2001; Clark 2001). These are problems that need to be retooled to fit modern expectations for government.

One of the concerns is that a focus on the local context would lead to a rejection of an idea simply because it is "Western". Candler (2002) noted in his study of Brazil that administrative particularism led to a rejection of universal lessons in preference of local practices. However, in the past the Islamic world was able to successfully co-opt other systems as exemplified by most successful movements. Its push into Europe from Islamic Spain in the West and the Ottoman Empire in the East created lasting exchanges that impacted those societies. As expressed by Schlesinger and Foret (2006), "from the point of view of religions, European history can hardly be written without acknowledging the centuries-long interplay between Christianity, Judaism and Islam" (60). Given this history and the reality of globalization it is unlikely that the Islamic world would embrace a strict particularism that would cause them to reject universal lessons in public administration.

It also needs to be recognized that the Muslim world is unique in the world. At the heart of this uniqueness is the religiosity of Muslims and their focus on the religion of Islam as a way of life. At its core is the lack of separation between the sacred and the secular. The past few decades have seen more exploration of Islamic models of government, and most recently it has garnered more academic attention as the field of public administration begins to appreciate indigenized forms of administration. The combination of indigenized

administration and more globalized/international administration is probably best suited to the Muslim world, as it continues to develop these governmental institutions. In this regard the Muslim world will continue to exhibit both administrative concepts that are familiar to the West and ones that are entirely unique to it. This is considered critical to the stability in the region, as Hamid (2016) explained, "... the postcaliphate order will have only truly begun when something inclusive, legitimate, and lasting takes root" (267).

Research in CPA can contribute to this understanding. As this develops, future CPA research needs to include comparisons between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, either country-to-country or region-to-region, to understand the similarities and differences with regard to governmental institutions. Many times these comparisons are not within the frame of public administration. A public-administration focus for these comparisons is necessary in the CPA literature.

Research in this area also needs to fully understand the failure of many Muslim countries to embrace some of the ideals of Islam. For example, Kalantari (1998) noted that, "Islamic society builds a comprehensive system of social justice, economics, legislation, jurisprudence, administration, and international relations within its domain which are closely related and support each other through the meta-values of Islam" (1827). However, it can be confidently stated that most Muslim countries have failed to embrace these ideas. A critical research question is, why have these values failed to effect these changes?

Abu-Nimer and Kadayifci-Orellana (2008) argued that the failure of Muslim states to find peace which may inhibit these other values from coming to fruition is due to a colonial legacy, problems with education and problems with organizational development and sustainability. In addition, Hüsseyin (2008) noted that this may be due to Muslims thinking their religion is the problem, but nothing has replaced it that has had as big an effect on the Muslim population as Islam. Either way, some scholars have concluded that Muslim societies that are starting to reconnect with these Islamic values in a progressive fashion have seen some success, such as argued by Drechsler (2014), who stated that the Turkish economy has only flourished after its society began to reconnect with Islam. Still these relationships need to be understood further, such as the recent study on the potentials of Islamic banking to increase financial inclusion in the Islamic world by Naceur et al. (2015).

The continual relevance of religion in government not only in the Islamic world indicates that more research needs to be devoted to understanding how religion affects how people govern themselves. A good starting point is understanding how those values inform public ethics. A comparative perspective enriches this discussion. In particular, the Islamic world needs more research devoted to this topic. The next section focuses on this point as a concluding statement for this paper.

Conclusion

This paper maps the connections between religion and values with public ethics and the continual relationship between religion and public administration. It is not an argument for a pre-Enlightenment return to church-state relations, but a post-Enlightenment understanding of its continual relevance in how people think individually and collectively, especially as it pertains to public decision-making and behavior. In particular, this perspective is expanded to include a comparative public administration approach that focuses specifically on the Islamic world.

The conception of government in the Islamic world is unique in some aspects. It is argued in this paper that a thorough understanding of the values that derive from Islam and their relevance for government is needed to develop a broad theory of Islamic government. The *maqasid al-shariah* and its accompanying *maslaha* is a good starting point for this development. A comparative public-administration approach along with an indigenized and global perspective of public administration could help further define Islamic government. This discussion would appreciate local variety and diversity even within the Islamic world while

also considering globally accepted best practices and goals. Ultimately, the establishment of a legitimate form (or forms) of government in the Islamic world is not merely of academic interest, but of geo-political interest, as well.

Academically and otherwise, knowledge of the Islamic world is desperately needed, whether in public administration or in other fields. Jreisat (2011) observed that there is the possibility of bias in disfavoring research on certain cultures and countries in CPA research, and the Islamic world is likely one of those cultures. Hopefully future research addresses these issues and helps to expand knowledge in this critical area.

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Do Bureaucratic Organizations Lobby? The Case of Ghana Immigration Service

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Abstract

Information from seventy interviews and secondary evidence was used to investigate the relationship between Ghana Immigration Service's (GIS) lobbying and the outcomes it produced. The focus of the investigation was on four areas: the strategies and tactics of lobbying employed; intermediate outcomes achieved; final outcome attained; and the effect of GIS's lobbying on politics-administration relations. The evidence showed that the strategies succeeded in achieving the desired policy reforms. In addition to this final outcome, GIS's lobbying also succeeded in attaining intermediate outcomes: increased attention; increased knowledge; and persuasion. Among others, the study's contributions are the following: it has explicated the overlooked conditions under which bureaucratic lobbying or influence is likely to occur; it has shown that lobbying impact should include not only final outcomes but also intermediate effects. Moreover, it has shown that politics-administration relations is a dynamic rather than a static category that is not explained by one best-practice model but rather a best-fit model or a combination of models that is contingent on factors producing changes in the relationship.

Keywords: *GIS, Bureaucratic lobbying, Strategies, Tactics, Support and Opposition, Outcomes*

Introduction

The idea of the politics-administration dichotomy where elected officials design policy and appointed officers implement the policy thus derived has long been challenged. There is now agreement in the literature that the bureaucracy influences policy-making not only at the implementation stage but also at the development and evaluation stages (Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Anderson 2006). For example, agencies initiate proposals for legislation in such countries as the US, UK and Australia. Agencies are not only sources of policy initiatives but they also lobby and otherwise seek to exert pressure for their adoption (Anderson 2006). This is made possible because of the technicality and complexity of many policy matters, the need for continuing control, and the legislators' lack of time and information. This has led to the delegation of much discretionary authority to appointed officials. As a result, the bureaucracy makes many decisions which have far-reaching political implications (Anderson 2006). In terms of the implication of this for Ghanaian policy-making, it is reported that for the first few months after the military National Liberation Council's coup of 1966 Ghana was virtually managed by civil servants, and this role expanded over time. Similarly, under the National Redemption Council military government (1972-1979), and the subsequent civilian government of the Progress Party (1969-1972), technocrats were drafted externally, including those who had worked with the World Bank and the IMF, onto the policy making terrain and were particularly influential in economic policy-making (Mohammed 2018). Likewise, although successive Ghanaian governments lambasted the bureaucracy for its inefficiency and ineffectiveness, they nonetheless found it indispensable in the overall governance process, particularly in policy-making (Mohammed 2018).

However, little is also known about the conditions under which bureaucratic agencies' lobbying or influence is likely to occur. Scholars from various research traditions acknowledge that bureaucrats are potentially influential players in the policy process (Bradley and Haselswerdt 2016). Bureaucrats have the ability to shape not only the actions of their outfits but also the legislation that approves and funds those programs and projects. As policy experts with valuable information, agency officials can influence the public agenda and the decisions that legislators make through direct advocacy or information sharing (Bradley and Haselswerdt 2016). For example, Howard (2001) evidences that in Australia senior bureaucrats within the federal Department of Social Security, who aptly were described as policy entrepreneurs, played an important role in promoting reforms which increased the generosity of the means test on unemployment payments. Similarly, in the US the influence of bureaucratic agencies is exemplified by the choice of most weapons system by the Department of Defense and the development of air-safety regulations by the Federal Aviation Agency (Anderson 2006).

Appointed officers can also exert influence on the legislature in an indirect fashion by leveraging the lobbying power of interest groups. This tactic, which Bradley and Haselswerdt (2016) describe as indirect bureaucratic lobbying, is employed by agencies in dodging legal or normative restrictions on bureaucratic lobbying and may increase the likelihood of realizing their preferred legislative outcomes (Bradley and Haselswerdt 2016, 2). There is no evidence of the systematic use of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. This study adopts the direct pathway to assessing the influence of the Ghana Immigration Service in the passing of the Ghana Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908). This is because interest groups in Ghana are nascent, underdeveloped and less grounded in immigration issues to do the bidding for the GIS. Moreover, direct bureaucratic lobbying has not yet been the subject of a systematic investigation, either in the immigration service policy subfield or in general. This study contributes to the literature by: explicating the conditions under which bureaucratic lobbying takes place; arguing that political oversight is both an instrument of bureaucratic control and bureaucratic influence; establishing that lobbying outcomes consist of not only final outcomes but also intermediate outcomes; and revealing that politics-administration relations is a dynamic rather than a static category.

By adopting the direct pathway this article asks a number of questions, answers to which will ascertain the manner and extent to which bureaucratic agencies influence legislative policy decisions. These questions are: 1) Why is the adoption of a new immigration service law important? 2) Why is direct lobbying the preferred tool for getting the Immigration Service Bill passed into law? 3) What strategies and tactics are employed in lobbying the legislature and the executive into passing the bill? 4) How effective are these strategies and tactics? 5) What are the outcomes of the lobbying of the Ghana Immigration Service?

The study is organized such that after the introduction, part two expounds on three perspectives of bureaucratic lobbying, while part three adopts and explicates a theoretical framework which construes lobbying as a communication process. The fourth part gives a background of the Ghana Immigration Service. In the fifth part the methodology of the study is sketched, while the evidence of GIS's lobbying is presented in the sixth part. The final section is devoted to discussion and conclusion.

Perspectives on bureaucratic lobbying

Broadly, three perspectives on bureaucratic lobbying are discernible in the literature. These are the political-science perspective, the public-administration perspective, and the integrated perspective. These perspectives are reviewed in turn below in order to bring out their strengths and weaknesses and thus bridge their gaps so as to make them useful for guiding this study.

The political-science perspective on bureaucrats' influence on policy

The political-science perspective assumes that politicians are always superior in the hierarchical relationship between political and administrative executives. Thus, public administrators are subordinate to elected executives in both law and practice (Cook 2010, 276). Elected officials and administrators occupy separate spheres and have distinct roles and norms of behavior (Svara 2006, 954). In terms of policy-making functions, politicians decide on policies, while administrators implement those policies (Verschuere 2009, 23). Decisions on policy are to be taken by the political executives in parliament and government. Politicians and ministers are supposed to set the goals and determine the instruments of policy. The involvement of administrators is more limited in scope, including the bringing of facts to the policy process and the provision of policy advice. Appointed officers, as neutral specialists, are expected to advise and outline the pros and cons of alternative courses of action. They are expected to quietly cooperate with politicians whether they agree or not (Rashid 2014). Then, once a policy path is chosen by the political executives, bureaucrats are required to implement the policy and monitor the results. Therefore, their role is more supportive, providing important information and analysis for political actors. This view is based on the well-recognized "politics-administration dichotomy" or "separate-roles model", which proposes a clear distinction between politics and administration (Svara 2006, 956).

This perspective worries about the specter of bureaucratic dominance without political control. Such fears have variously been expressed as significance of bureaucrats' professionalization and resulting policy preferences (Ayee 2013), bureaucrats' purported desire to maximize the size of their agencies (Johnson 2016), and their possible capture by interest groups (World Bank 2004), among many other concerns. In order to deal with such fears, recent works have focused on understanding how politicians can overcome the information asymmetry inherent in the politician-bureaucrat relationship. Strands of this research include interpretive accounts and theoretical models of political controls (Johnson 2016), empirical investigations of bureaucratic response to political principals (Mohammed 2018) and studies of delegation to agencies (Huber and Shipan 2002). All these works accept that legislators, and other principals, should determine the direction and scope of bureaucratic activity.

Although these assumptions are reasonable they ignore the fact that relegating bureaucrats to the role of agents has also limited how most of these works conceptualize bureaucrats and their behavior. In particular, construing appointed officers as agents "reduces their actions to reactions and limits their political agency" thus, "leaving us with an underdeveloped sense of bureaucrats' power to shape both the legislature-bureaucracy dynamic and outcomes of the policy process" (Bradley 2014, 8). Despite the fact that politicians can use ex-ante control measures to direct bureaucratic behavior in preferred ways, this viewpoint overlooks appointed officers' ability to step out of their prescribed role. For example, works on procedural control of bureaucratic behavior, such as Klimenko and Zhulin (2009) and Shapiro and Guston (2006), tend to overlook the unwillingness of bureaucrats to wait until rule promulgation to

influence policy. This paper argues that bureaucrats are proactive and their influence starts much earlier in the proposal stage, right down to the legislative stage and beyond.

Public-administration perspective on bureaucratic activism

Academics that come from a public-administration perspective imbue bureaucrats with influence and autonomy. Examples of these influences in the policy process come from bureaucrats' contact with legislators and clientele groups (Bradley 2014); engagement in both direct legislative lobbying and indirect coalition lobbying with interest groups (Bradley and Haselswerdt 2016); manipulation of legislative principals to achieve mutual ends (Keiser 2001); lobbying both on behalf of the executive and their own interests (Baumgartner et al. 2001); mimicking behavior of private sector lobbyists (Thurlow 2016); devoting more time to policy development, originating legislation, building public support, contacting legislators, than spending time on administration (Bradley 2014); and influence over legislative outcomes is rare but is a reality when they demonstrate higher capacity or professionalism (Nicholson-Crotty and Miller 2012).

Undoubtedly, the public-administration perspective has challenged the view that bureaucrats are passive, reactive, or not involved in the policy process prior to the rules stage. Yet they overlook the fact that political controls have some effect on agency behavior (Bradley 2014). Politicians can often control administrators with the aim of substantially diminishing the "incorporation of independent professional contributions in policymaking" (Svara 2006, 955). Political control can also be expressed in the form of costs of attempting to influence legislative decision-making. These costs include the potential to anger principals, the opportunity cost involved in political activity, and the cost of spending political capital on a particular policy issue. By far the most important of these is the risk of angering principals, of being seen as insubordinate. This risk could accrue to either the agency as a whole or to the individual bureaucrat (Bradley 2014, 28).

Because this study focuses on bureaucrats' attempts to influence legislative and executive decisions, bureaucratic political engagement has the potential to anger either legislators or principals in the executive or both. Yet GIS bureaucrats were prepared to risk the anger of political principals by influencing the GIS policy in their preferred direction. But few public-administration studies acknowledge this fact. Rather the majority of studies subscribe to the view that agencies are essentially reactive bodies. By taking a principal-agent vantage, scholars in this camp argue that exerting influence on the legislative process is outside of bureaucrats' contractual bounds. The cardinal supposition in this literature is that legislatures influence agencies, not the other way around (Huber et al. 2001). Legislatures pass laws to direct bureaucratic activity; the degree and limits of agency policy authority are, theoretically, for legislators (and other principals) to determine (Huber and Shipan 2002).

The public-administration perspective also fails to consider the reality that bureaucrats may directly and unorthodoxly (proactively and using unusual tactics) seek to influence both the legislature and the executive if the policy affects their interest. This joins Poppelaars' (2009) view that agencies have reason to lobby for proposals they support. The propensity to lobby the executive is high in a political system that is characterized by the concentration of political power in the presidency (Ayee et al. 2011). The GIS chose to lobby the executive because in Ghana several factors have led to the overconcentration of power in the executive, and this has resulted in its dominance of the public-policy process. These include power of appointment; fusion of legislature and executive; president's power in financial matters;

president's subtle influence on the judiciary; and president's majority party (Ayee et al. 2011). For example, in terms of the president's majority party, executive power is exercised in Parliament through the president's majority party, of which he becomes leader by virtue of his position as president. The strong executive power gives the president strong influence on party politics and legislators. Because the success or failure of the president's policies affects the electoral fortunes of the party, the president's parliamentary party collectively and individually becomes a strong advocate of his policies and programs. All party-based representative democracies have elements of party loyalty. What may be observed in Ghana, however, is that the system allows the president, as an individual, exceptionally strong influence (Ayee et al. 2011).

Bureaucrats also attempt to influence legislative decision-making in at least two important ways. First, bureaucratic heads, that is principal secretaries, must provide technical and policy information in response to legislators' request for policy advice. Contingent on the wording of the advice presented, bureaucrats can influence legislative thinking even while maintaining a reactive stance (Bradley 2014). Second, bureaucrats can engage proactively in legislative decision-making, in either of two ways: they can use their personal connections to legislators and legislative staff to lobby directly, or they may ask interest groups for lobbying help (Bradley 2014). This article focuses on the former which is called "direct bureaucratic lobbying". Lobbying is an underdeveloped activity in the policy process in Ghana, and bureaucratic lobbying is even acutely underdeveloped. Moreover, to the author's knowledge, direct bureaucratic lobbying has not yet been the subject of a systematic investigation, either in the immigration service policy arena or in general. This study is therefore a modest attempt at addressing this gap.

Integrating the Legislator-and Agency-Based Perspectives

The integrative perspective recognizes that the interface between civil servants and politicians imbues both actors with power in the policy-making process. One of the insightful works that integrates the political-science and public-administration perspectives discussed above is Krause's (1996) dynamic-systems model of bureaucrat-politician relations. Theoretically and empirically, and focusing on the interplay between administrative outputs and politicians' budgetary signals, Krause found politicians and bureaucrats as roughly equal players in the policy process.

Carpenter's (2001) research is another in the integrative perspective that examined sources of agency autonomy during the Progressive Era. Carpenter demonstrates that certain administrative agencies have developed the reputation for expertise which they employ to locate themselves in sundry political networks that serve as a source of power. Autonomous agencies build support coalitions that politicians are reluctant to challenge; instead, politicians defer to the expertise of those agencies. Carpenter's view on the efficacy of bureaucratic expertise is insightful for this study because it features in the repertoire of instruments the GIS used in influencing the GIS policy. The Ministry of Interior has oversight responsibility for the GIS, and the latter sees political oversight not only as control of bureaucratic behavior but also as a means for agency officials to use their informational advantage and expertise to influence policy.

Several empirical studies advance facets of Carpenter's theory. These embrace research on the effects of agency autonomy on innovation (Verhoest et al. 2014) and on the impacts of agencies' concern for their reputations on their attempts to seek publicity (Moffitt 2010),

to improve customer service (Corrêa d'Almeida and Klingner 2008), or to deliver high-quality policy advice (Krause and Douglas 2005). Alcañiz (2010) examines bureaucrats' network formation in technical agencies in Latin America, but limits these networks to trans-governmental linkages with other expert bureaucrats. Meanwhile Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2012) investigate how agency reputation conditions the ability of state-level bureaucrats to influence legislators. The integrative perspective is akin to Svava's (2006) overlapping roles and complementary models and Dasandi and Esteve's (2017) collaborative model. These models highlight the shared influence of politicians and bureaucrats. They envision governments as cooperative relationships between officials who reflect distinct values and perspectives (Svava 2006).

A re-appraisal of the models

The models that have been discussed here are based on two dimensions along which the relationship between politicians and administrators can be conceptualized: separation and autonomy – following Svava (2006). Separation denotes the extent to which the political and administrative realms are distinct. Autonomy means the extent to which bureaucrats have the space or freedom to go about performing functions they are assigned without political interference (Rashid 2014). It is argued here that although each one of the models explicated above, which either center on separation or autonomy or a combination of the two, captures a certain dimension of reality about politics-administration relations, none fully explains the whole picture. This is especially so in developing countries, where the institutional and governance structures differ from those of advanced industrialized nations. In developing countries, literature is expanding on the process of reform, highlighting the importance of politics-administration interactions in reform processes (Andrews 2013). This research points to the extent to which the politics-administration relationship in many developing countries differs from the Weberian ideal. Besides, it highlights the huge dissimilarities in the nature of the politics-administration interface across developing countries. The civil service in some developing countries "has power rivaling that of the political establishment" (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 60-61), while in others, governance is mired by the absence of a coherent bureaucracy (Evans 1992). In such scenarios, the Weberian model does not resemble the realities of politics-bureaucracy relations (Dasandi and Esteve 2017).

It is in the light of this reality of the politics-bureaucracy interface in the Third World that this paper argues that there is no best-practice model of politics-administration relations in that region. Rather it is contended that the elements of the different models that are relevant to a particular context or decision process are usually combined with local nuances to co-act to produce a best-fit model. It also claims that although proponents insist on the explanatory power of their models, almost all of them are silent on whether politics-administration relations is a static or a dynamic category. Examples of the few exceptions are Krause's (1996) and Dasandi and Esteve's (2017). But they too are mute on how changes in politics-administration relations in particular contexts actually occur and the dynamics of the factors that cause changes in the relations. They are also quiet on how these factors interact and which of them has more explanatory power in a specific jurisdiction or specific episode of interaction. Static situations are fairly predictable over time compared to dynamic phenomena. But since real-world phenomena are hardly static, it means politics-administration relations continually changes. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by focusing on the dynamic nature of the politics-bureaucracy relations in Ghana as a developing context. It does this by investigating how changes in the politics-administration relations occur as a function of the recurrently shifting interests of politicians and bureaucrats; power structure; information

asymmetry; salience of issues; and strategies and tactics of interaction.

The interests of politicians and bureaucrats (personal, professional and organizational) in a particular policy issue will determine the type of relations that will develop between them. Where there is interest convergence there is a tendency for reciprocal exchanges between the two categories of officers, and the relationship that will develop will look more like the complementarity model. On the other hand, where there is interest divergence the political actor tends to exert control, making sure its interests override those of the bureaucrat. Accordingly, the relationship shifts and becomes the separate-role model. Further, where the interests of some political actors converge with those of bureaucrats while those of some other politicians diverge from them, an overlapping model emerges – where a combination of the separate and responsive models operate. As the interests of the parties shift so will the relations between them shift accordingly. This means the latitude of the politics-administration interactions could be dotted with spells or episodes of control or adversarial and reciprocal or cooperative relations for any given period of time. This dynamics in the politics-administration relations is hardly, if ever, recognized in the literature.

In respect of the salience of issues, citizens who care about an issue are especially likely to take elected officials' actions on that issue into account on Election Day (Ansolabehere and Sorocco 2015). This makes politicians responsive to highly salient issues. High political salience may lead to increased political control, thereby increasing the interaction between the spheres. So immigration service being a salient security service, especially in the era of global security threats like terrorism, has increased interaction between GIS, and the Minister of Interior and legislators.

In regard to power structure, most African countries have witnessed (some still do) the crisis of political turmoil, intolerance and harsh dictatorship; others have a military regime or imperial presidency with highly centralized government processes. To name a few, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, and Uganda are in dire straits, resulting in a marked degree of social disintegration and economic stress throughout the continent. In this scenario of authoritarian ideology, public administration merely administers commandments and decrees (Vyas-Doorgapersad 2011, 238). Even in the current democratic dispensation most African governments are still characterized by executive dominance of governmental power (Prempeh 2008). In such a climate the bureaucracy defers to the executive, and this makes bureaucrats passive suppliers of policy advice as in the separation model (Rashid 2014).

In reference to information, there is a fundamental asymmetry in experience and specialized knowledge that undermines the formal principal-agent relationship between the elected principal and the administrative agent (Johnson 2016). Public-choice theorists argue that administrators act in terms of their own interests or their own perception of the public interest rather than the public interest as translated by elected officials (Johnson 2016). Carpenter (2001) claims that bureaucrats have earned a reputation for expertise, which represents a source of power. Thus, the politician defers to the former because of his expertise and reputation – mimicking the autonomous administrator model (Svara 2006). The information asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats that arises from bureaucratic expertise has been the subject of considerable attention (Moe 2006). Expertise represents the key source of power for administrators and can be the cause of conflict between them and politicians – a conflict between hierarchy and expertise. This is particularly true in developing countries that have been grouped into Dasandi and Esteve's (2017) intrusive model where bureaucrats are "often said to monopolize the knowledge and expertise relevant to government" (Smith 2009, 135). Thus, expertise gives bureaucrats an urge or influence in the policy process. Nevertheless,

politicians also have knowledge of the broader political context and specific policy issues, which they use to shape their interaction with bureaucrats. Chung (1989) concurs when he argues that the influence of presidents and bureaucrats in South Korea's decision-making process depended largely on the extent of the president's knowledge of a specific issue.

The communication process as a framework of lobbying

This study adopts a framework which views lobbying as a communication process. In this process a messenger (usually an interest group or untypically a bureaucratic agency) transmits a message to a receiver (policy makers) via a medium, within a given context and with a certain effect (Bruycker 2014). Viewing lobbying as a communication process permits its examination as a sequential process in which the use of different tactics are interrelated (Bruycker 2014).

The messenger characteristics influence the type of tactics and their interrelationship in affecting lobbying. The characteristics include organizational resources; the type of constituencies represented; and forged alliances. For example, being part of a coalition has several advantages: group accessibility to a wider range of policy makers; accessibility to more exclusive lobbying channels and policy makers; lobbyists' ability to draw from the same pool of arguments and information when approaching policy makers; ability to cover a wider array of lobbying tactics; and ability to mobilize the resources (like information, language skills, and networks) of the other coalition members (Bruycker 2014).

The second component of the lobbying communication process is the lobbying message. A lobbying message refers to the content the lobbyist communicates to policy makers. The lobbyist may strategically include or exclude specific issues, information and arguments in their message. However, the role and nature of the lobbying message varies depending on the interaction mode that is employed. There are three modes of interaction: information exchange (which aims at gaining access to decision makers and influencing them); arguing (which seeks to change policy makers' mind about what they think is right); and agenda setting (which signals which issues are important and need to be dealt with) (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Klüver 2013).

The third component of the lobbying communication process is the channel – the medium through which the message is conveyed to policy makers. There are two kinds of channels, namely public and private. The content of the message is affected by whether a public or private channel is used. A private channel provides for direct transmission with sufficient details to policy makers. A public channel, on the other hand, concedes to journalistic routines and standards for news values and thus sacrifices sophistication, technical nature and detail of message (Bruycker 2014, 9-10).

The fourth component of the lobbying communication process is the target. A target can, for instance, be a policy venue, such as an institution or a group in society which has the authority to make decisions concerning an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 2015, 31). Three types of targets are identifiable: friendly policy makers who help to represent the lobbyist's case on the basis of information and arguments received; "fence sitters" or legislators who are undecided; and policy makers who oppose their view in order to persuade them to vote differently (Hall and Daerdorff 2006). In practice, lobbyists lobby both allies and opponents (Braun 2012). A persuasive mode of lobbying is suited for opponents because they can adjust their arguments to, for example, take account of political ideology. The agenda-setting mode

is suited for both allies and opponents because their attention needs to be drawn before they can be informed or persuaded (Bruycker 2014).

The final component of the lobbying communication process is the effect or outcome of lobbying. Lobbying success is usually seen as the extent to which lobbyists influence public-policy decisions. Usually this is measured by legislative outcomes (Dür 2008). However, this approach ignores outcomes at the intermediate level connected to the three modes of lobbying interaction: increased attention; increased knowledge; and persuasion.

First, in the agenda-setting mode lobbyists strive to increase the attention policy makers give to specific issues and mobilize them and other stakeholders to advance their cause. Second, in the informing mode lobbyists inform policy makers and expect certain policy outcomes in return. Policy makers learn and gain knowledge given by lobbyists, while the latter anticipates that this will translate into the desired outcome at the level of policy outcomes. The third mode, arguing, is aimed at persuading policy makers to generate favorable policy outcomes (Bruycker 2014, 13).

All these lobbying modes can influence policy outcomes, yet the underlying mechanisms that spark influence may differ. Thus, lobbying success is mediated through communication effects situated at the level of policy makers. These "communication effects are, in other words, an important intermediate step between lobbying communication and lobbying success" (Bruycker 2014, 13). For example, although a lobbyist may not have been successful in influencing policy outcome he nonetheless succeeds in drawing attention to a certain issue. For repeat players this means that an intermediate success at a previous episode can affect lobbying success at future engagements (Lowery 2013, 13). So studying this intermediate success is critical to ultimately influencing policy making.

Methodology

A case-study design was used to investigate the influence that the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) had on the Legislature in the consideration and passage of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908). The empirical basis of the study are interviews with 70 respondents made up of 60 officials from the GIS and 10 legislators. The GIS officials were chosen because of their roles connected to the development and implementation of the Immigration Service Act, 2016. The respondents included 10 from senior management, 25 from middle management and 25 from junior management. This stratified sampling method enabled the solicitation of the views of senior, middle and junior managers. The 10 members of parliament included members of the Defense and Interior Committee reflecting the political divide. The primary information was complemented by secondary evidence.

The GIS was chosen for a number of reasons, first a number of trends have made immigration issues and problems more salient now than ever. The September 11 2001 terrorist attack in the US; mobility changes in the world; the ease in the movement of people, particularly investors; and the trans-nationalization of crime have prompted governments across the globe to begin to pay serious attention to migration issues. Accordingly, Ghana has to adopt the most robust, sound and dynamic legal frameworks and policies for immigration. This study will therefore contribute to such an endeavor. Second, the actions, commissions and omissions of the GIS have implications for both domestic and international security, investments and employment, as well as bilateral and multilateral relations. So studying the GIS will inform policy reforms that will improve these dimensions of national development. Finally, the roles

and responsibilities of the GIS are ubiquitous, spanning the length and breadth of the country. Understanding the nature and scope of such a broad mandate is the key to effectively carrying it out. Moreover, carrying out such a huge mandate implies that different strategies and tactics need to be devised to address the unique issues and problems pertaining to particular contexts. This study can be a starting point to unearthing what the appropriate strategies and tactics might be.

GIS's lobbying for the passage of the Immigration Service Act, 2016

The presentation of the evidence on GIS's lobbying of the legislature and the executive in the enactment of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908) is done under a number of themes. These include: the need for a new GIS law; direct lobbying as a preferred tool of influence; strategies and tactics of lobbying; efficacy of lobbying strategies; and outcomes of lobbying.

Need for a new GIS law

The promulgation of the Ghana Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908) was prompted by the inadequacies inherent in the previous laws: Provincial National Defense Council (PNDC) Law 226 of 1989 and the Immigration Service Act, 2000 (Act 573). According to a respondent senior manager, "the shortcomings of the previous laws included: the lack of power to bear arms to protect the country's territorial borders (which exposed the country to illegal migration with its attendant security threats)." An informant from the junior management of GIS agreed, arguing that, "we are on the ground at the entry points to the country and I can tell you that the absence of power to make arrests feeds illegal migration and emboldens illegal migrants to enter the country." An interviewee from middle management added her voice, saying that "the existing GIS arrangements have limited operational structures, which prevent the effective discharge of the organization's mandate." She added, "we need additional departments, organizational restructuring and pay and grading reclassification, which can only be done by a new law." Other reasons for a new GIS law included: the organizational structure and the associated grading system of the GIS, which are inconsistent with international best practice and analogous Ghanaian security agencies like the Armed Forces and the Prison Service, which debased the status of the GIS; the usurpation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of GIS's power to post personnel to serve as consular officers in foreign missions, which led to a conflicting oversight mandate of GIS between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the existing designation of Board of Directors for the GIS instead of a Council whose policy-making powers are circumscribed.

Direct lobbying as a preferred tool of influence

According to a majority of 83 percent of the respondents, direct lobbying was the most popular way of lobbying. When asked to explain why they thought direct lobbying was the preferred way to influence political decisions, one Commissioner of Immigration elucidated that "associational life in Ghana is nascent and underdeveloped and therefore getting a credible interest group to do the bidding on behalf of the GIS was very difficult." On his part an Assistant Commissioner of Immigration argued that "we had to engage in direct lobbying because the matter was of great interest to us both personally and professionally." Personally, he said "our livelihoods, our career progression, and our prestige were all at stake because the old law circumscribed all these aspirations." Professionally, he averred, "the old

law circumscribed our power to do many things, for example to make arrest and to bear fire arms, and without these powers I wonder how we can effectively discharge our expanding and complex mandate." He concluded that "no other person or group understands or can explain these matters better than GIS itself to policy makers, and that is why we decided to lobby directly."

A Senior Inspector of Immigration argued that direct lobbying was preferred because "it was the most effective way of building relationships with elected officials and educating them." He said, "if we even had a credible interest group to lobby on our behalf, they and not the GIS staff would have made the personal contacts with legislators." They would have also made "the personal phone calls and physical conversations with secretaries and personal aides, and the business meetings with the decision makers." All these interactions we had with the political executives and legislators, he added, "helped us build familiarity with them, and influenced their decisions." These opportunities, he concluded, "would have remained foreclosed had we allowed interest groups to do the lobbying on our behalf."

Respondents were asked why they decided to lobby both the legislature and the executive. In response, one Commissioner of Immigration intimated that "since the inception of the fourth republic in 1993 Ghana has been operating a majoritarian parliament." In such a system, he explained, "the legislature defers to the executive enabling the latter to have an urge in the policy making process." A responding legislator agreed, arguing that "because the success or failure of the president's policies affects the electoral fortunes of the party, the president's parliamentary party collectively and individually becomes a strong advocate of his policies and programs." Another responding member of parliament expanded that "because the President is required to appoint the majority of his ministers from parliament, legislators who do not have a ministerial portfolio yet are more inclined to favor the executive." Nevertheless, votes of opposition legislators were also critical to winning Parliament's approval of the GIS law.

Strategies and tactics of lobbying

The respondents said different strategies and tactics were used by the GIS to influence policy. These included meetings with relevant parliamentary committees and individual legislators, special briefs with influential and outspoken legislators across the political divide, phone calls made by senior management to individual legislators, seminars and workshops as well as discussions on media platforms such as TV. In addition to these, a Commissioner of Immigration intimated that "the Head of GIS held meetings with the chairperson and ranking members of the Defense and Interior Committee of Parliament." These meetings, he iterated, "afforded the opportunity for the GIS boss to not only educate them on the new and arduous mandate of the GIS" but also the "powers that it requires, the tools and equipment it needs, and the training and development and motivation it demands to intervene effectively in relation to immigration service delivery." A Senior Immigration Officer also said that, "there were one-on-one interactions of some senior members of GIS with legislators at the lobby of Parliament on the day of voting on the Immigration Service Bill." A deputy Commissioner of Immigration moreover intimated that "good rapport was established between the GIS and some of the personal aides and secretaries of parliament." This, he said, "facilitated quick access to the legislators, allowed for quick rescheduling of meetings that could not be held for genuine reasons, and permitted furnishing of updates on the bill which informed GIS's strategizing."

The Ministry of Interior has oversight responsibility of the GIS, and the latter saw this control arrangement also as an opportunity to influence the former to support the GIS bill. This view is reflected in the comments of one Commissioner of Immigration that:

We ceased the opportunity granted by our encounters with the Minister to not only speak truth to power about our challenges but also articulate same cogently into an agenda for legislative and policy reforms which the Minister accepted.

Another respondent said, "during our several meetings and encounters with the Minister he reiterated he would crack the whip where necessary to ensure that officers who are under-performing and those who are acting unprofessionally are brought into line." He added, 'but the meetings also gave us an opportunity to educate the Minister about immigration issues and the appropriate legal, logistic and economic as well as administrative frameworks we need to effectively discharge our mandate.' An Assistant Inspector of Immigration added that "it was during this education process that we succeeded in convincing the Minister to support the GIS Bill which was coming up for a decision in parliament." Another respondent said we educated the Minister to understand that "contemporary immigration issues and problems are complex and therefore demand a multi-pronged approach to their resolution." One of the solutions, the minister was told, "is to adopt a new GIS Law that will sufficiently empower the agency to bear arms to accost illegal immigrants", and that will enable it to "combat crime, expand services, and professionalize the service as well as motivate staff and adopt international best practice."

Effectiveness of the strategies and tactics

In terms of meetings, a strategic workshop was organized for members of the Defense and Interior Committee of Parliament in Accra. This committee was responsible for deliberating on the Immigration Service Bill and making recommendations to the full house. It was therefore imperative for the GIS to win their support for the bill. Prepared materials explaining the present challenges and inadequacies of the GIS, measures for dealing with the problems and the rationale for the new Immigration Bill, were presented to them. For example, one resource person of the GIS explained that "the GIS had a circumscribed mandate which was making it difficult to deal effectively with contemporary immigration issues." Another elucidated that "in this contemporary time a new approach to immigration that takes into account the global patterns of both regular and irregular migration and the increasingly sophisticated methods of identity fraud and abuse of immigration laws was critical." Yet, he explained, "it is quite formidable for the GIS to rise to the challenge because the existing law does not allow it to use arms and make arrests, especially in border patrolling." A third resource person added that, "GIS does not have cooperation agreements with other Immigration departments in other jurisdictions for information sharing." Nevertheless, he bemoaned, "border security and border management are significantly enhanced by cooperation and collaboration, as well as the use of reasonable force to accost criminals and illegal migrants." A fourth resource person revealed that, "a similar workshop was also held in Koforidua to clear outstanding issues, strengthen arguments already made and to build more support for the new Immigration Service Bill."

The general consensus among respondent members of parliament was that the workshops were educative and built a solid rationale for the new bill. For example, one Member of Parliament (MP) said, "I did not know that Ghana has as many as 43 formal borders and myriad unapproved entry routes into the country." He added, "undoubtedly it should be a

herculean task to police these borders without the power of immigration officers to bear arms and country vehicles for effective coverage." A second respondent MP averred, "I learned from the workshops that immigration laws are important to protect the health and safety of Ghanaians, to maintain the security of its society, and to promote international justice and security by refusing access to its territory to persons who are criminals or security risks." A third MP affirmed that from the workshops he gathered that "greater cooperation through the exchange of information between the GIS and counterpart agencies in other jurisdictions can make the actions of cooperating countries in achieving service objectives more effective."

According to a Deputy Commissioner of Immigration, "the special briefs with most influential and outspoken MPs did the trick of persuading them to support the bill." This, he said, "is because the briefs gave them simplified, cogent and concise as well as abridged arguments for why a new immigration service bill was warranted." Equipped with the relevant information, as the special briefs afforded, "MPs rehearsed and presented eloquently on the floor of Parliament without difficulty reasons for why a new immigration law was warranted."

According to the GIS respondents the phone calls made by senior immigration officers to ranking members of the Defense and Interior Committee and other influential MPs helped build familiarity of agency officials with the legislators. As one Senior Inspector of Immigration revealed, "it also helped to explain the issues comprehensively in private to the MPs and address their reservations which they did not feel comfortable to express at the workshops." He added, "these afforded the opportunity for friendly but frank discussions of issues, particularly those on which support was difficult to garner." Another GIS respondent agreed, acknowledging that "it was initially difficult convincing sympathizers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was also an MP but did not support the bill." He added, "she did not support it because the bill proposed hiving off consular services from the mandate of her outfit and placing same under the GIS." He said further that "this potentially meant losing prestige and budget, which she could not come to terms with." He concluded that "the phone calls therefore individualized, privatized and de-formalized the conversation which the workshops and special briefs could not do." A Deputy Commissioner could not agree more when he intimated that "ultimately, the phone calls succeeded in convincing those who were originally opposed to the bill to support it." Thus, he added, "the phone calls were a tactic to turn opposing MPs into supporters, supporters into champions and undecided MPs into backers."

A Commissioner of Immigration said that "the meetings the Head of GIS held with the chairman and ranking members of the Defense and Interior Committee psychologically signaled the importance of the Immigration Service Bill." One MP commented that "if the head of the GIS has taken it upon himself to organize meetings with MPs to persuade us to support the bill", then "it means the needed reforms contained in the bill must be ones that will make his outfit to discharge its mandate efficiently and effectively." He concluded "that is why my colleagues and I supported the passage of the bill."

The good relationship that agency officials established with personal aides and secretaries was important. This, according to one Immigration Officer, "is because it enabled the sourcing of information to enable the GIS to determine who the target of their lobbying activities should be." He said further that "without the good rapport with personal aides and secretaries that information would have remained inaccessible." The good relationship with personal aides and secretaries, another GIS respondent argued, "is an asset for repeat players because of the familiarity and informational advantage it will afford them over opposing lobbyists to their stand."

Outcomes of GIS's lobbying

The effects of the GIS's lobbying are twofold: final outcome; and intermediate effects. The final outcome refers to the influence of GIS on legislators and the political executive in passing a new immigration law. The implication of passing of the GIS Bill into law, as a respondent legislator argued, meant "the hiving off of counselor duties from the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and placing those under the Ministry of Interior; the granting of power to immigration officers to bear arms; changing the grading and ranking structure of the GIS; the establishment of the Immigration Service Council with more powers than the erstwhile Immigration Service Board; and the establishment of new functional units."

In terms of influence on legislation, GIS lobbying, according to a Commissioner of Immigration, "canvassed support among legislators across the political divide for the bill." This is highly unusual in a country that is profoundly polarized along party lines. The division typically is such that no matter the merits of an issue before the House, Government Party legislators and their Opposition Party colleagues always appear on different sides of a coin (Oquaye 2000). Not surprisingly, the unusual consensus across the political divide on the Immigration Service Bill enabled it to be passed into law – the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 906).

As noted earlier, a number of benefits attended the passing of the Immigration Service Bill into law. First is the bearing of fire arms, in reference to which a respondent immigration officer said, "the new law has not only empowered the GIS staff to wield arms but it has also specified the variety of arms they can use." GIS respondents said the types of fire arms the GIS staff can bear under the new law include a gun, rifle, machine gun, cap gun, flintlock gun or pistol revolver, canon or any other fire arm and an air gun. The rest are air rifles or air pistols, whether whole or in detached pieces. The power to bear fire arms and make arrests, a senior management respondent of GIS said, "has repositioned the GIS to respond to current threats such as the Asian onslaught." The new law, another respondent said, "has now better prepared the GIS for stringent checking of who actually enters Ghana in order to ensure that criminals and other undesirable elements are denied entry." A third interview intimated that "the power to bear arms and make arrests has elevated the status of GIS to a law enforcement agency which is now in line with trade and investment policies of the government."

Second, pertaining to the changed ranking system, a Commissioner of Immigration said, "hitherto the head of the GIS was ranked *Director of Immigration*, which was a lower position compared to analogous positions in the other security agencies like the armed forces and the police service." A respondent Inspector of Immigration elucidated further, bemoaning that, "whenever there was a state function it was difficult placing the Director of Immigration among the heads of the security agencies." The new law, he was delighted to say, "has elevated the head of GIS to a Comptroller General, which is in line with the ranking in the other security agencies and international best practice." Another respondent added that, "the remuneration and fringe benefits as well as other terms and conditions of service associated with the new elevated rank of the Head of the GIS and all ranks below it have been enhanced." Thus, he concluded, "the new law has improved the incentive structure of the GIS, which human resource management scholars have argued is critical to achieving a high employee retention rate in organizations."

Third, in relation to the establishment of the Immigration Service Council, the new law has substituted the existing Board of GIS with the GIS Council. The council has more powers than the erstwhile board. For example, the new law has empowered the council to "make recommendation to the Minister on bilateral and multilateral co-operation with foreign

countries in matters relating to migration and related issues" (Ghana Government 2016, 3). This power was not available under the old laws – The Immigration Service Act, 1989 (PNDC Law 226) and the Immigration Service Act, 2000 (Act 573).

Finally, in reference to the establishment of new functional units, one Deputy Commissioner of Immigration said, "the new law has expanded the operational structures of the GIS by setting up more departments, sections and units to support the three existing directorates." The three existing directorates are Finance and Administration Directorate; Legal, Research and Monitoring Directorate; and Command Post and Operations Directorate. The new departments, divisions and units in the new GIS structures, an Assistant Inspector of Immigration Officer revealed, are, "a Border Patrol Unit, Document Fraud Expertise Center, and a Migration Management Bureau". He agreed that "the establishment of the new departments has better positioned the GIS to respond to the changing trends in the delivery of immigration services, especially the global rise in terrorist."

The intermediate level effects of GIS's lobbying are connected to three modes of lobbying interaction: increased attention; increased knowledge; and persuasion. In these regards, the GIS succeeded in increasing attention to immigration issues and increasing the knowledge of the Minister of Interior and legislators about immigration issues, particularly those relating to the intricate global environment in which the agency must now function. In addition, it persuaded all categories of policy makers: supporters, undecided minds and opponents of the bill to vote for it. Moreover, the experience it gained in this particular lobbying episode has become an asset for it to intervene most effectively in relation to future lobbying episodes.

Discussion

This study conceived GIS's lobbying as a communication process. As a communication process lobbying had a messenger, that is the GIS, which acted as a single advocate rather than in coalition with other like-minded agencies or interest groups. The literature posits that as messengers of lobbying communication, interest groups can give more traction to their demands by forging alliances with other like-minded stakeholders (Servaes and Malikhao 2012). Contrary to the literature, the GIS solely carried out the lobbying and succeeded in influencing the passage of the Immigration Service Bill into law. This suggests that coalition-building may not necessarily be the most effective or appropriate strategy in influencing policy in all situations or may even be inaccessible or unavailable. As in the case of lobbying for the passage of the Immigration Service Bill, there were no like-minded advocates with whom the GIS could coalesce, and that is why it adopted what Bruycker (2014) called a direct lobbying strategy.

In terms of locating the direct lobbying of GIS within the three perspectives of bureaucratic lobbying explicated earlier, the public-administration perspective best describes this behavior. This is because GIS was proactive in exercising agency in terms of the initiation of the policy, the canvassing of support for the proposal across the political divide, and the education of decision makers about immigration issue, as well as the persuasion of minds through phone calls, and the convincing of legislators in the lobby of parliament and at the workshops and seminars. This evidence ties in with Bradley's (2014) view that bureaucrats allocate substantial resources to policy development, originating legislation, building public support, contacting legislators, and other activities that might be considered political. But it undercuts the political science perspective's claim that public administrators are passive, reactive, or not involved in the policy process prior to the rules stage (Bradley 2014). In other

words, GIS's agency in influencing the adoption of a new immigration law challenges the view that the bureaucrat's role is limited to bringing facts to the policy process, providing of policy advice, and quietly cooperating with politicians whether they like a proposed policy or not (Svara 2006; Rashid 2014).

Nevertheless, the GIS had the receptive ear and support of politicians because of the salience immigration issues have assumed in the changed global environment. Today, the threat of terrorism is closer to home than ever for all countries, and the role of GIS in identifying, tracking and preventing criminals from entering Ghana is acknowledged. The good reception and approval GIS received for its immigration service policy reform proposals from politicians are unlikely to occur to the same extent, if at all, for its other issues or those of other bureaucratic agencies. Moreover, there is no guarantee that in the future even those very GIS issues that currently have received approval will continue to have the same level of support, if at all, of politicians because the salience of the issues will not remain the same. Accordingly, the engagement of politicians and bureaucrats with each other in relation to these issues may change in the future.

In line with lobbying as a communication process, GIS also had a message which it eloquently articulated in a simple, comprehensible and concise manner to policy decision makers. The content of the message gave justification for a new Immigration Service law on grounds of economics, investment, and security as well as tourism, law enforcement, and synchronization of policies. The interaction modes for conveying the message to decision makers were also carefully chosen by the GIS and embraced the three categories identified in the literature. These interaction modes included information exchange, argument, and agenda-setting. In its encounters with the Minister of Interior, agenda-setting had preponderance in application and was followed by information exchange. This is because the GIS first had to convince the Minister of the salience of the proposed Immigration Service reforms in order for him to accept it as one of his agenda items at cabinet meetings. This is in line with the belief of some writers, who argue that lobbyists first have to communicate the importance of policy issues to policy makers for the issues to get placement on the government agenda (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The information exchange mode contained the justification for the new law, which the GIS very well enunciated in the message. This gave GIS management access to cabinet sessions whenever the Minister of Interior felt the need for them to furnish details or buttress points. This evidence supports the view that lobbyists give information to policy makers in return for access to the corridors of power or influence (Klüver 2013).

It also reflects information asymmetry, where bureaucrats are "often said to monopolize the knowledge and expertise relevant to government" (Smith 2009, 135). With its informational advantage, GIS was able to influence the passing of the Immigration Service Bill into law. It did this by highlighting: the increasingly complex and difficult environment in which it must now operate; the expanding scope of the mandate it must now grapple with; the upgrade and revision it must make to its training curricular; the motivation it must give to its staff; the level of automation of processes, procedures and techniques it must introduce; the emphasis it must put on the interconnectedness between immigration services and security, investment, tourism, employment and diplomatic relations; and the collaborations it must forge with sister agencies across the world, particularly developing countries. Olsen (2007) believes that although expertise is a key basis of power for bureaucracies it can also be at the root of conflict between politicians and bureaucrats – a conflict between hierarchy and expertise. In this case, however, the informational resources GIS gave to politicians did not become a source of conflict between hierarchy and expertise, it rather became a tool for the two spheres to interact more intensely and cooperatively. This evidence has helped towards filling

the lacuna in the literature that "the precise nature of the relationship between bureaucratic expertise and political-bureaucratic interactions is somewhat unclear" (Dasandi and Esteve 2017, 239).

Apart from the Minister of Interior the GIS also lobbied legislators. The interaction mechanisms the GIS used for the legislative decision makers included workshops organized for members of the Defense and Interior Committee of Parliament, special briefs, one-on-one encounters of senior management with legislators and personal phone calls. These interaction tactics involved all the three interaction modes either applied separately or simultaneously. All the interaction types named above can be described as private channels of communication because the public and the media were not invited. Neither the proceedings nor the outcomes of the workshops, special briefs and other interaction arrangements were advertised or made available for public consumption. According to Bruycker (2014) this manner of lobbying guarantees a certain degree of discretion, where the contact between policy makers and interest groups or lobbyists is transacted in private. It also afforded the GIS the opportunity to furnish detailed and technical information that pertained to the Immigration Service Bill. This contrasts with public lobbying (also known as outside lobbying), where the lobbying message attracts public attention, concedes to journalistic practices and standards deemed apt for news reporting (Bruycker 2014). Thus expert reports are readily circulated and shared through direct (private) communication channels rather than public (Beyers 2008).

The extraordinary mode of lobbying strategies which GIS employed especially in organizing workshops and seminars outside Accra, the national capital at Koforidua, and getting legislators to attend was a hyper activity beyond the level anticipated by the public-administration perspective. This is because it defied all three types of risks anticipated for bureaucrats to incur in an attempt to lobby political decision makers. The greatest of these risks or costs was the potential to anger legislators, which the GIS was prepared to incur. As neutral advisors, few, if any, bureaucrats are prepared to be that assertive on their political principals, as this can be misconstrued as insubordination. So to the extent that the GIS could reveal its preferred policy position to political principals and went beyond that to invite them to meetings outside the seat of government in Koforidua purposely to make them think differently, to influence their decisions, to let them select the agenda or issues that GIS thought was important, smacks of bureaucratic autonomy. These GIS machinations did not generate disagreement between bureaucrats and politicians. Rather its tactics brought politicians and bureaucrats closer together and made them interact intensely and cooperatively and thereby built consensus. This contradicts the political control of bureaucratic behavior literature that posits that legislatures influence agencies, not the other way around (Kim 2008).

In terms of the target in the lobbying communication process, GIS's lobbying was directed at all categories of policy decision makers: friendly ministers and parliamentarians, undecided legislators, and opposing law makers. For example, the workshops did not discriminate among legislators in terms of their initial stand on the Immigration Service Bill. The arguments presented by resource persons and prepared materials the legislators were supplied with cogently explained the merits of the new law, which persuaded the opponents of the bill. The arguments also succeeded in winning the support of the undecided MPs, while also strengthening the resolve of those MPs who had already pledged their support. This strategy is consistent with the view of several scholars who argue that in practice, lobbyists lobby both allies and opponents (Braun 2012).

However, GIS's strategy departs from those who think that lobbying represents an exchange wherein lobbyists furnish information and arguments to friendly policy makers only so that they could champion their cause (Hall and Daerhoff 2006). The GIS's strategy is also incongruent with others who contend that the target of lobbying should be undecided policy makers (Hall and Reynolds 2012). Yet still it is largely at variance with those who believe that lobbyists should chiefly aim at policy makers who oppose their position so they can persuade them to vote differently (Schnakenberg 2016). This was true for some MPs but not for the MP who also doubled as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The GIS did not care to persuade her because it was clear she would not be persuaded. This was because the new law was taking some functions away from her ministry and placing them under the Ministry of Interior. This, she felt, would debase her and her ministry in terms of prestige, staff and budget, so she vehemently opposed the policy. The addition to the literature here is that two types of opponents are identifiable: those who can be persuaded; and those who cannot be persuaded. Those who cannot be persuaded are those who will incur high costs in variety of forms for voting differently.

The unwillingness of the GIS to persuade some legislators and political executives because it thought they would not be persuaded underlines one of the costs in bureaucratic lobbying, that is the potential of angering political principals (Bradley 2014). It also reflects divergence of interest between administrators and some politicians. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had a lot to lose from the new policy, so if GIS had attempted to lobby her it would have not only infuriated her but it would have been an attempt at reconciling irreconcilable interests between politicians and bureaucrats. However, the fact that GIS was willing and actually did persuade the Minister of Interior but not the truculent Minister of Foreign Affairs, both members of the ruling government, means there can be co-existence of interest convergence and divergence, and for that matter a cooperative and adversarial relation between politicians and bureaucrats in any given episode of lobbying. These contradictory outcomes for any given bureaucratic effort to influence a political decision are hardly, if at all, identified in the literature.

The posturing of the Minister of Foreign Affairs joins what Johnson (2016) describes as the self-interest model, which is a predication on the notion that all policy actors pursue their own self-interest. On the other hand, the support for policy reforms that GIS garnered from the Minister of Interior and legislators across the political divide feeds the policy model, which posits that actors have specific policy goals based on their assessments of good public policy (Johnson 2016). It also underlines the role of values in influencing public attitudes and motivations in developing countries. Furthermore, it highlights the desire to help society and its citizens. It also shows how "important unselfish motivational components like loyalty, identification, and good-spirited cooperation are in overcoming collective action problems, such as free-riding, moral hazards, and opportunism" (Vandenabeele et al. 2014, 780).

In respect of the outcome of the lobbying communication process, it is evident that the GIS succeeded in influencing the Minister of Interior to not only place the proposed Immigration Service reforms on the government agenda but also got him to support it in parliament. The GIS also succeeded in winning bi-partisan legislators' support for the new bill and eventually influenced them to pass it into law. The other achievements of the GIS were that it was successful in increasing attention to immigration issues and broadening the knowledge of the Minister of Interior and legislators about immigration matters, especially about the changed global environment in which the agency must now operate. Moreover, it persuaded all categories of policy makers: supporters, undecided minds and opponents of the bill to vote for it; and it gained experience in lobbying which could be used for future lobbying.

This evidence supports the view that the effect of lobbying should not be limited to only the final outcome, that is the extent to which lobbyists influence public policy decisions in the preferred direction. It should extend to cover intermediate outcomes, such as drawing attention to an issue or informing or persuading some policy makers (Bruycker 2014). These intermediate outcomes are important because although lobbyists may not have succeeded in tipping policy in the preferred direction, they would have nonetheless gained experience which is crucial for repeat engagement. They also would have made new allies which could prove critical in achieving profound policy reforms in future lobbying episodes (Bruycker 2014).

Conclusion

This study investigated the relationship between the lobbying of GIS and the outcomes it generated. The focus of the investigation was on four areas: the strategies and tactics of lobbying employed; assessing the intermediate outcomes achieved; determining the final outcome attained; and ascertaining the impact of GIS's lobbying on politics-administration relations.

The strategies and tactics GIS adopted, such as workshops, phone calls and one-on-one private meetings with politicians, succeeded in achieving the desired policy reforms. It also achieved intermediate outcomes like experience, networking and acquaintances, which will be invaluable in future lobbying episodes. In respect of the impact of lobbying on politico-bureaucratic relations, the paper has made several minutiae worth noting. These are: the scant attention being paid to politician-bureaucrat relations in the Third World, especially as it pertains to practical policy-making and the development process; the silence on whether the politician-bureaucrat relation is a dynamic or a static category; the muteness on the factors that cause change in the politician-bureaucrat relation; and the factor(s) that has more explanatory power in relation to the changes in politician-bureaucrat relations. This lacuna in the literature has led to the adoption of donor-inspired best-practice approaches from developed countries to undergird development policy and governance in the Third World. This study fills these gaps by highlighting that the politics-administration relation in developing countries and elsewhere cannot be explained by one best-practice model. Rather it is explained by a best-fit model that combines elements of different models and local nuances that are relevant to any specific context or decision-making process.

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Co-Creation for the Reduction of Uncertainty in Financial Governance: The Case of Monetary Authority of Singapore

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Abstract

Traditionally financial governance has been perceived and studied as a closed system. Yet, increasing sophistication of technology facilitates the emergence of new organizational forms of collaboration between the state and corporate actors. The study argues that co-creation becomes the way for public sector to mitigate new types of uncertainties, coming from increasing technological sophistication of the financial sector. Thus, new insights can be gained from looking at co-creation in financial governance, which is a unique setting for co-creation as state's partners are large and capable corporate organizations, especially in regards to financial innovation. Such an approach also brings new insight into co-production literature. To exemplify the argument, a closer look at how co-creation has been effectively applied by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in financial regulation and supervision as well as in policies related to promotion of the financial sector is provided.

Keywords: financial governance, co-creation, uncertainty, financial innovation, Singapore

1. Introduction

Governance is increasingly recognized as an evolving and dynamic set of multi-level structures which goes beyond a set of institutionalized relationships: "actors themselves influence the development of governance arrangements and the workings of governance" (Capano et al. 2015, 11-12). Financial governance, as a distinct policy domain, can be characterized by simultaneously relevant capacities to restrain (risks, systemic vulnerability) and to enable (competition, economic growth)¹, thereby operationalizing the so-called "finance-growth" nexus (Woo et al. 2016). Unlike most other policy areas, financial policy-making is dominated by closed communities as well as a close alliance between state and non-government actors (Underhill and Zhang 2008; Underhill 2007; Kregel and Tonveronachi 2014) and is contingent upon the existence of a "politically sustainable balance of power between public authorities and private interests" (Zhang 2006, 169). The latter are usually represented by internationally active financial institutions that increasingly influence financial architecture (Underhill 2015). These institutions are typically large and capable organizations with their own R&D departments, innovation labs and substantial investments in ICT.

¹ Regulatory choices shape the speed and variety of transactions, types of business models and the pace of technology-driven financial innovations (Cainey 2014).

The need for a dynamic governance of the financial sector comes from the inherent fragility and cyclical uncertainty which characterize financial systems (Minsky 1985, 1993, 1994, 2008). Financial governance has to continuously evolve to be effective as there is "a pervasive nature of incentives to circumvent regulations" in financial systems (Kregel and Tonveronachi 2014, 6; also Hubbard and O'Brien 2012). Avoidance of regulation in the sector – be it simple evasion, engaging in activities that do not technically violate existing regulation, or something more sinister – is part of how the sector evolves, innovates. Hence, financial governance can be characterized as rather reactive and incremental (Anheier and Fliegau 2013), with uneven balance of powers and a non-reciprocal relationship among policy actors (Woo and Howlett 2015). Besides avoidance of regulations, another distinct driver of novel financial instruments is fast technological advancements, which have substantially increased with the digital revolution and resulted in ever growing investments in FinTech (Financial Technology) (Mackenzie 2015). Technological and market innovations have made national (international and supranational) regulatory actors heavily rely on industry expertise, which can be portrayed as a "closely-knit

transnational policy community [that] constitutes a typical case of Michael Moran's 'esoteric politics' (Moran 1984), wherein an elite group works out the management of its own vital interests without wider public involvement" (Underhill 2015, 479). In other words, there are two major incentives for financial innovation identified as relevant in the context of this study: avoidance of regulations and technological advancement, which are interrelated but can also occur irrespective of each other and both contribute to the evolution of the financial sector.² In the aftermath of the recent Global Financial Crisis, public authorities are increasingly becoming aware of the discrepancy of technological power as a result of the surge of computational complexity in the financial sector. Technology-aided financial innovation is one of the strong drivers of complexity that financial regulators face (Cerny 1994a, 1994b), but this particular problem did not receive relevant attention in the financial governance literature. Economics and, more recently, legal scholarship have conceptualized "knightian" uncertainty of financial innovations and the reactive nature of financial regulations (Minsky 2008; also Pistor 2013) but literature on financial governance makes no mention of such characteristics of financial systems. Technological capacities have been analyzed in regard to the administrative capacity of public-sector organizations (e.g. Lember et al. 2016) or economic policy makers (Hallerberg and Wehner 2013), yet very few studies have analyzed capabilities of financial regulators in dealing with technology-driven innovations. While Karo and Kattel (2014) discuss the co-evolution of public- and private-sector capabilities in light of technological change, they do not differentiate between the sectors or policy domains.

Consequently, this article brings together concepts of financial innovation, fragility and uncertainty articulated mainly in economics literature and notions of technological capacities and modes of policy-making discussed in public administration and policy studies. References to economics and theories of financial instability provide an important *conceptual starting point* – namely, that innovation-related uncertainty is endogenous to any financial system and, as a result, to the governance thereof. Therefore the main focus of current study deals with capacities of policy actors to deal with such inherent uncertainty. While looking at how various

² In addition, a broader notion of financial innovation exists, which is related to the process of economic development and financing of innovative productive activities. A synthesis of Schumpeter's theory of innovation and Minsky's financial fragility hypothesis investigates how uncertainty of any innovative activity translates into related uncertainties in the financial sector, which finances it, thereby identifying a distinct source of financial instability as well as a particular type of uncertainty (Burlamaqui and Kregel 2005).

strains of public-policy literature discuss policy actors, the article aims to empirically show that public-sector organizations can demonstrate organizational dynamics and particular modes of policy-making – e.g. co-creation – as a response to uncertainty of financial innovations and in order to facilitate the development of technological competences. The paper emphasizes that the increasing sophistication of technology is one of the main forces behind such dynamics among financial policy actors. More precisely, the study builds on Woo and Howlett’s (2015) assertion that dynamics in financial policy-making are not necessarily contingent on policy change and argues that *policy-making dynamics can also be characterized by changes in organizational forms of governance rather than changes in processes of policy-making only*. Further, such organizational change can be related to the evolution of particular competences on the part of government actors, such as expertise in financial technologies. In the context of this article, co-creation is understood as an active and often proactive relationship between both state and non-state actors who organizationally or individually contribute to the creation or implementation of public policy. While usually in co-creation the relationship between citizens and government is studied (Brandsen and Honingh 2015), we extend the perspective to include also corporate citizens and private, non-profit organizations, as in most cases also citizens are “organized” to some extent.

Literature on financial governance and regulation, especially post-crisis, highlights various aspects of policy design and formulation, and the importance of expert advice. Yet it remains policy-biased, that is, the actual skills, competences of policy actors as well as processes and forms of policy-making remain largely understudied, despite explicit recognition of the relevance thereof (see, for example, Bakir and Woo 2016). The main objective of the paper is to bring concepts of uncertainty and financial innovation into discussion of financial governance by looking at technological competences of policy actors and organizational forms involved in the policy-making process. *Looking at dynamics within organizational structures helps us locate such competences and the role they have in the policy process* as the first step to analyzing their effects. Without dealing with the latter in detail, the article brings forth the notion of technological competences and their relevance to a) incentives actors have to participate in the policy process, and b) organizational forms that exist in financial governance. In line with the growing insistence of scholars to study policy design (Bakir and Woo 2016), the article argues that organizational patterns and their evolution contribute to the understanding of competences of actors. Consequently, due to rapid technological advancements within financial industry, co-creation is increasingly applied in (previously more closed) financial policy communities by regulators to mitigate uncertainty and to maintain or further develop respective technological skills and competences in the public sector. This introduces a new dimension to the incentives to co-create and also puts co-creation into the new sectoral dimension, namely financial governance. This line of argument also expands financial-governance literature by extending the notion of actors’ capacities and by introducing an additional, technological (technology-driven) logic thereto.

To exemplify the emergence of co-creation as a new form of organizational dynamics within a policy process in the financial sector, the case of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is analyzed. More precisely, the case of the recently established FinTech and Innovation Group (FTIG), which includes the FinTech Innovation Lab, launched by MAS in August 2015, is presented.³

³ Consisting of three divisions, FTIG is responsible for “regulatory policies and development strategies to facilitate the use of technology and innovation, to better manage risks, enhance efficiency, and strengthen competitiveness in the financial sector” while its FinTech Lab “scans the horizon for cutting-edge technologies with potential application to the financial industry and works with the industry and relevant parties to test-bed innovative new solutions” (<http://www.mas.gov.sg/About-MAS/Overview/Groups-and-Departments.aspx>).

One of the main rationales for launching a collaborative facility was to leverage on the private sector's technological competences in order to better address risks and legal aspects of financial innovations, which would both further facilitate the promotion of the financial sector (developmental policy goals) and feedback into policy-making (regulatory and supervisory policy goals).

The study is based on qualitative exploratory research and traces the evolution of interaction between state regulators and non-government actors within a given policy domain: financial governance and financial regulation in particular. Given its dynamic nature and the emphasis on novel aspects of financial governance – technology-driven innovation and related uncertainty – exploratory case-study methodology (Yin 2003) is employed to gain new insights into how policy actors interact on a national level. The case study relies on both primary and secondary sources: extensive review of archival materials, such as MAS annual reports since the year of

inception onwards (1971–2015), press releases and media records (non-systematic search in major national media archives from the 1970s–1980s based on keywords related to MAS and financial governance), as well as contemporary statements and reports. Secondary sources for empirical data collection consisted of accounts of financial history of Malaya and Singapore.

The article is organized as follows: after having introduced the literature analyzing financial governance, the following section examines theoretical discussions of policy actors and related capacities in co-creation, followed by the empirical part. The article gives a contextual account of how financial governance evolved in independent Singapore (that is, from 1965 onwards), discusses the dynamic relations between state and non-government actors therein and organizational forms thereof. The final section concludes by summarizing empirical findings and listing suggestions for future research.

2. Theoretical background

Changing nature of financial governance

Despite a small consensus in financial-governance literature (e.g. Underhill and Zhang 2008; Underhill 2007; Kregel and Tonveronachi 2014) that a close alliance exists between private and state actors in the financial domain, how financial governance structures are organized is discussed largely in regard to financial architecture (Goodhart 2002, 2007; Sheng 2009), the role of Central Banks (McNamara 2002; Montanaro 2016; Goodhart 2011), and financial bureaucracy (Nee and Opper 2006; Juuse et al. 2018). Nevertheless, such a close alliance or "public-private partnership" nature of financial regulation and supervision – as an essential part of financial governance – has been implicitly reflected in studies of financial history (e.g. Cameron 1961; Cassis 1992, 2006), in literature on International Financial Centers (e.g. Lee and Schmidt-Marwede 1993; Budd 1995), and in more recent studies focusing on socio-political elements of financial policy and governance. Literature on the regulatory state refers to various non-state actors involved in policy-making (Majone 1997), how such relations are becoming increasingly formalized (Levi-Faur 2005) and how international regulatory standards such as Basel Accords explicitly promote cooperation between public and private financial actors (Lütz 2004), but rarely are capacities of actors examined. Further, literature on policy sub-systems

incorporates both state and non-state actors (Woo 2015a; Woo and Howlett 2015). However, it does not delineate between the types of actors and subsequent capacities involved in the way(s) actors collaborate. Hence, policy studies tend to highlight the multiplicity of actors – state, non-state, individual, corporate, networked etc. – involved in policy making, but the agency and capacity of these actors have not been well outlined, particularly in the context of financial policies.

Globally, regulatory authority is getting more dispersed with formal rules superseded by informal norms that emerge not from legislation but rather from everyday conduct: power is now more dispersed between state and societal actors (Cohen 2008; Tsingou 2015). While more traditional field-scoping practices exist, OECD (2010) refers to collaborative national practices (both formal and informal) as a recommended approach to financial governance in order to enable better coordination, oversight and control over financial institutions. At the same time, interaction with corporate financial actors varies greatly, and a multitude of mechanisms are usually at work: from strictly top-down and formal (e.g. monetary policy, exchange rate regimes) to more collaborative and formal/informal mixes (e.g. prudential regulation and supervision) to more inclusive practices through direct collaboration with either organized groups (associations) or selected actors. In addition, the dynamic nature of the regulatory process is reflected in the changing organizational forms involved therein: the recently growing formalization of collaborative initiatives.

This brings forth the notion of co-creation in the financial sector. In the private-sector literature co-creation in financial systems has been analyzed from the perspective of marketing and customer loyalty (e.g. Eisingerich and Bell 2006; Auh et al. 2007), while in the context of public sector, co-creation has been previously examined from the perspective of social innovation and direct input into service delivery to citizens. The latter – softer forms of coordination and provision of policy inputs by non-state actors – are entering the financial policy domain as financial supervisors have to draw upon external partners to stay on top of financial innovations. Consequently, given that financial regulatory governance is characterized by a close public-private alliance, co-creation appears as a valuable conceptual tool to “unpack” collaborative practices between the actors – incentives, agency, organizational structures – to assess them critically and to inquire about capacities from a collaborative perspective. As a form of collaborative governance, which is more loosely defined than other dominant theories of the policy process (e.g. advocacy coalition framework, policy subsystems, epistemic communities), and given a variety of applications in public policy and administration studies, co-creation allows for a wider approach by bringing new elements into public-private collaboration in financial governance: to capture the role of technology and uncertainty, which forces regulators and innovators to interact in new ways.

Co-creation: explaining new forms of policy collaboration

Traditional public administration literature puts an emphasis on a clear distinction between private and public interests and accountability settings. However, in the previous decades, the new governance research has increased, including a growing significance of “governance-beyond-the-state” (Swyngedouw 2005), “indirect government” or “government by proxy” (Brudney 1990), “collaborative governance” (e.g. Ansell and Gash 2008) and more recently co-production/co-creation (Bovaird 2007). While collaborative governance refers to a broader notion of increasingly interactive governance mechanisms, more narrow concepts of co-

creation and co-production⁴ refer to the engagement of citizens in the policy-making process (Voorberg et al. 2015). These complex governance mechanisms blur the distinction between public and private sectors in order to enable transformative changes (Joshi and Moore 2004). While the aforementioned approaches can be slightly different from one another (being more or less market-oriented, bureaucratic (expert-based) or collaborative (involvement of autonomous stakeholders) (Künzel 2012; Hartley et al. 2013), they all rely on the idea of interdependence between sectors (e.g. Lecy and Van Slyke 2013, 197) and resource integration (Vargo and Lusch 2004; 2008), meaning that policy outcomes cannot be reached without the direct involvement of the intended target group.

Public sector's motivation to coordinate and to co-create with non-government actors has been connected to both cost efficiency and the need for better quality services (Vangen and Huxham 2003, 61-62) but also with increasing the legitimacy of government (Pestoff 2006).⁵ The basic assumption is that without the involvement of private partners it is difficult to reach the desired policy/service outcomes (Bovaird 2007). Typically this is associated with gains from combining resources, capabilities and also shared risks between different sectors (Gazley 2010, 53; Park and Rethemeyer 2014, 351-352; Calanni et al. 2015, 905) to "carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished" (Emerson et al. 2012, 2). Co-creation, therefore, relies on the idea of interdependence between sectors (e.g. Lecy and Van Slyke 2013, 197) and resource integration (Vargo and Lusch 2004, 2008).

Similarly, following financial governance logic, which is traditionally somewhat advisory, regulatory authorities can no longer be effective without the ever growing input from the private sector due to substantial changes in financial industry and the role of technology therein. At the same time, academic attention to co-creation has usually involved studies of welfare services, social innovation and citizen participation (e.g. Callahan 2007), and thus, the emergence of co-creative practices in other sectors has received very limited attention. The participatory feedback loop to promote co-creation policies has also started to emerge in other sectors (e.g. in informatics and e-government – see Mergel 2015). Thus, the input of citizens in developing ICT solutions – and hence limiting uncertainties connected to the latter – has entered the topic of co-creation (Lember 2017).⁶

Co-creation is mostly studied from an actor-based approach (Voorberg et al. 2015) discussing both organizational factors (risk-averse/legalistic public-sector culture; attitudes of civil servants (professionalism); incentives; compatibility of the public sector) and citizen-relevant factors (willingness; feeling of ownership; social capital). The organizational capabilities on the citizens' side – also when they participate through non-profit organizations – are usually left unexamined. At the same time, the need to manage relationships in the collaborative governance setting is very important when incentives to collaborate – resources and power – are not equally divided between partners (Ansell and Gash 2008, 555). For collaboration

⁴ In the context of this article, the concepts 'co-creation' and 'co-production' are treated as synonymous. Meanwhile, co-production is more relevant to policy areas where public service delivery takes places and end-users are identified (usually citizens) whereas in such broad domains as financial policy there is neither a service nor could end-users be defined with the same clarity, and therefore "co-creation" seems to be a more appropriate term.

⁵ Government tries to increase participatory legitimacy when confronted with dissatisfaction with traditional governance methods.

⁶ Similarly, experimental policy-making involves methods of dealing with uncertainty faced by policy-makers. Literature on experimental policy is rich and includes various domains. Among them are regulatory experiments including regulatory sandboxes and adaptive regulation (Guihot et al. 2017).

to effectively take place between state and non-state actors several conditions have to be fulfilled (see, for example, Sørensen and Torfing 2016). Among these, state and non-state actors need the capabilities to interact and process information. This is, however, a relatively underdeveloped area of study in the field of co-creation. Usually the assumption is that state actors are in a better position in terms of capabilities (if not knowledge), compared to their non-state counterparts. This might not be the case in financial governance and financial regulation. Hence, other theoretical streams need to be utilized to expand our understanding. For example, literature on policy capacities provides a useful toolkit for assessing policy actors, which are viewed as strategically behaving, since the analysis of such behaviors (micro-perspective) enables a better understanding of what practical governance actually is (Capano et al. 2015, 12).

Literature on policy capacity in the public sector is advanced and often differentiates between the types thereof (e.g. Painter and Pierre 2005 distinguish between state, policy and administrative capacities). Wu et al. (2015, 166) define policy capacity as a set of skills and resources – competences and capabilities – necessary to perform policy functions, and differentiate between individual, organizational and systemic levels. Various non-government actors possess their own capacities, which affect the government's own capacity to perform, that is, "the skills and resources of governments have counterparts in policy-oriented non-governmental organizations and need to exist or be built up if either of these actors is to be effective in their policy roles" (ibid., 167). Howlett (2009, 2015) refers to analytical capacity as the ability of governments to analytically process information, apply research methods and advanced modeling techniques while Hsu (2015) notes varying abilities among governments to do so. When coping with complexity and uncertainties, policy-makers appeal to analytical capacities prevalent in domestic regimes: referring to the Asian Financial Crisis, Woo et al. (2016, 275) observe "low analytical capacity in domestic regimes, given the inability of policy-makers to accurately perceive financial risks and at best, the presence of only moderate operational capacity." In other words, policy-makers should aim for close-to-optimal analytical skills and competences but those are also defined by broader national (regional, supranational) regimes. Meanwhile, uncertainty is inherent in financial activities, and financial systems are characterized by inherent instability or "stability that destabilizes" (Minsky 2008). Therefore operational or analytical capacity of financial policy-makers can never be optimal while the potential to learn in co-creation, especially if co-creation aims to minimize uncertainty, becomes essential to effective policy process. This, in turn, can be reflected in organizational dynamics and potentially results in novel organizational forms through which policy actors interact.

Learning has been an essential part of the policy subsystems approach and coalition framework (Sabatier 1988; Weible et al. 2011; Henry 2011; Montpetit 2011), while Ostrom (2005) claims that learning occurs more easily when opportunities for repeated interaction exist even when contrasting beliefs are present. In other words, "if collaboration is causally prior, then over time networked actors will learn and arrive at consensus in their policy-relevant beliefs" (Henry 2011, 380). Meanwhile, collaboration may take various organizational forms, which, as the article aims to demonstrate, are also non-static and evolve along with dynamic capabilities of policy actors. In existing literature learning is discussed through the prism of scientific information available to policy-makers and supplied by epistemic communities (Haas 2004; King 2005; Marier 2008; also Pahl-Wostl 2009). Yet it contains a constructivist approach, that is, the

assumption that science should be “translated” into usable knowledge that, in turn, would be politically feasible, in order for scientific insights to make their way into the policy process. This is also discussed in studies dealing with analytical capacity of government actors (Howlett 2009), but technology-driven innovations represent expert knowledge and can be better categorized as technical capabilities, which regulatory bureaucrats need to comprehend. With the increasing use of financial technologies – described above – the need for soft coordination and strategic partnership with corporate actors increased. In certain areas, such as regulation and supervision, this has been “framed” as co-creation. This gets reflected in new organizational forms established within “conventional” public authorities such as Central Banks, as the case of Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) demonstrates.

3. Financial governance in Singapore

Singapore, where the financial sector currently contributes 13.1% of nominal gross value added (Statistics Singapore 2016), has had long-standing aspirations to become one of the International Financial Centers. Financial industry at large has been regarded as one of the national development priorities since the 1970s, and this is explicitly stated in the Monetary Authority Act (1970). Moreover, Singapore’s financial system contains a clear “dichotomy”, for the demarcation line between foreign (offshore) and domestic financial activities has been long maintained through a set of effective policy measures.

In terms of governance structures, MAS has been the sole regulator, maintaining a reputation of a pro-active and highly competent public agency, thereby reflecting the general tradition of competent national civil service as well as a peculiar practice of rotation among top officials between public and private organizations⁷, which (in addition to continuous emphasis on human capital development) contributed to the development of capable and effective bureaucracy in the government. Larger formal consultation mechanisms with corporate actors at the national level have been present since the 1990s, when the Economic Review Committee was established (during the post-Asian Financial Crisis recession) and more recently through the Committee on the Future Economy.⁸ Policy-wise, MAS has been actively consulting corporate actors both on formal and informal grounds, and recent studies claim that the corporate sector provides a real policy input, including the possibility to exercise a veto-power (Woo 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Among the most recent organizational innovations within MAS is a FinTech Lab, imitating already existing labs in large commercial banks, recently launched as part of the MAS FinTech and Innovation Group, in order to directly collaborate with financial industry. Among the policy initiatives designed and implemented by the Group are the “regulatory sandbox”, which provides temporary flexible regulatory space for testing newly created FinTech solutions; Project Ubin, which aims to explore the viability of distributed ledger technology for interbank payments via multi-phase collaboration between MAS, a blockchain company R3 and a consortium of financial institutions. In addition, MAS is chairing the Payment Council launched in 2017, which

⁷ E.g. a formal policy was adopted in the late 1960s when civil servants were seconded to sit on boards of industrial corporations. This was meant as a tool to increase their pay but “the directorship system also had the advantage of giving the top civil servants some experience in industrial management. It is now estimated that about 100 public officers hold directorships on the boards of most Government and DBS-owned companies such as the shipyards, the airlines, and manufacturing industries” (New Nation 23 July 1971). For more recent accounts, see Hamilton-Hart (2002).

⁸ <https://www.gov.sg/microsites/future-economy/about-us/about-the-future-economy-council>.

consists of various financial institutions and representatives of industry associations. The injection of government funds in 2015 through the Financial Sector Technology and Innovation Fund (S\$ 225 mln during 2015–2020) was meant to assist the development of FinTech industry and foster such public–private collaboration, which is also reflected in the official rhetoric of acting officials (as well as former MAS top executives) who refer to “policy co-creation” in both the regulation and the promotion of financial sector. These developments make Singapore a somewhat extreme yet rich case study, which altogether provides a valuable opportunity to look closer into new and dynamic ways of organizing national financial governance.

To better understand the empirical context, the section first briefly outlines some of the key historical developments in Singapore’s financial sector and the role MAS has played therein; second, it refers to ways of interaction between MAS and corporate actors throughout the years; and finally it looks into the most recent organizational change, that is, the newly created FinTech and Innovation Group. Given the exploratory nature of the case study, historical accounts help better understand capabilities dynamics among both state and corporate actors, as well as evolving organizational structures embedded in the process of governance and policy-making that leads to co-creation.

Overview of financial policies and financial-sector development

Financial policies in Singapore should be viewed in the following context: a city-state with no rural areas; higher standards of living already in the 1950s as compared to the rest of the region (Hicks 1960); prioritized economic growth with no explicit distribution policies attached; emphasis on human-capital development; no explicit political opposition to foreign financial and commercial interests and historical “interconnectedness” between foreign and local banking communities⁹; long presence of foreign banks; and peculiar culture of the governing elite, which comprises the pool of top officials rotating between private, public and quasi-public organizations, such as statutory boards (Hamilton–Hart 2002).

It is from this context that the long-standing commitment of Singapore comes to become a regional financial hub and one of the International Financial Centers, which is reflected in MAS’s formal mandate to “foster a sound and reputable financial centre and to promote financial stability” and “to grow Singapore as an internationally competitive financial centre” (MAS Act 1970). To achieve this, Singapore has been maintaining a “dual” financial system “intended to be world-class competitive for offshore transactions yet heavily *dirigiste* domestically” (Walter 1993, 109; see also Giap and Kang 1999). Indeed, foreign banks were encouraged to set up offshore operations¹⁰ through a set of incentives (e.g. concessionary tax rates for a 20-year period; tax exemption for certain financing activities, such as syndicated lending, non-resident securities transactions) and by 1993 the foreign banking sector accounted for 45% of local-currency nonbank customer deposits, 57% of local-currency nonbank customer loans and 73% of local-currency trade financing, thereby contributing to the development of the domestic banking sector – the highest rates in the world (Walter 1993, 94–95). A turn towards liberalization

⁹ The then economic advisor, Albert Winsemius (in office 1961–1984) advocated for non-hostility to existing foreign businesses owned by a former colonial power and Goh King Swee, the Deputy Prime Minister (in office 1974–1984), refers to “*the quiet manner in which European business has merged into the political and economic landscapes of Singapore*” and that “*the manner in which European financial and commercial interests have continued their roles from the colonial era to the stage of independence, is surely a remarkable phenomenon*” (Swee 1972, 112–116, emphasis added). This course held true even during the most politically turbulent times of 1960–1963, when despite fierce political disagreements no political party had the abolition of European business on its agenda. For more on colonial banking, see recent collections of historical cases in Bonin and Valério (2015) and Bonin et al. (2016), also Mackenzie (1954), Drake (1969).

¹⁰ Offshore banking is generally characterized by such restrictive measures as inability to raise interest-bearing deposits from residents and certain restrictions on domestic lending.

and recognition of the need to “go regional” followed the first serious recession in 1985–1986 and was reinforced by the consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis (Lai 2013; MAS 2003). To facilitate the regional expansion of domestic financial institutions the government encouraged industry consolidation, and the number of banks was reduced from 10 in 1998 to 5 in 2003 (Tan 2005).

In parallel to this, Singapore has been maintaining non-internationalization of the dollar until the present day; although in 1998 the official non-internationalization policy has been substituted for lending restrictions in local currency, which apply both to resident and non-resident financial institutions. The policy has its rationale in the use of the exchange rate as the principal tool of monetary policy used by MAS¹¹ (MAS circular, *20 December 2000*¹²). Despite continuous and gradual liberalization measures, the regulation of domestic institutions continued to be more stringent: in the 2000s domestic banks were subject to greater capital adequacy requirements than foreign ones (MAS 2003), while nowadays MAS keeps capital adequacy ratios for locally incorporated banks at a level that is 2% higher than recommended under Basel III¹³.

Value-added created in financial industry is often considered highly policy-elastic, that is, it can be strongly influenced by policy measures (Walter 1993). Singaporean government has been effectively proactive and capable of utilizing various policy measures, both in regulating and promoting the financial sector, and its Central Bank (MAS) has been the single authority responsible for both. In terms of policy design, representatives from industry have been consulted on a continuous basis, while formal consultation was broadened when MAS introduced consultation papers in 1998. Woo (2015b) reports upon interviewing the currently acting MAS Managing Director, Ravi Menon, that almost all new policy issues now go through the process of public consultation. The most recent study concludes that the influence of industry actors on policy-making is substantial (including the possibility of exercising veto power), and both MAS and the private sector can initiate consultations (Woo 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Apart from consultation papers available through the MAS website, another mode of interaction in a collaborative manner with the industry takes place through Nominating Committees. As stipulated by MAS during another round of liberalization measures in 1999, to strengthen corporate governance, local banks now had to appoint five-member Nominating Committees within their board with members appointed by the board, and subject to MAS approval. The aim of the committee is to ensure that only competent and qualified persons are appointed to the board and to important management positions, while MAS may ask the committee to submit record of its discussion so as to verify that it has tried to find the best person for an appointment (Tan 2005). Among the most recent policy initiatives is the FinTech Lab, launched as part of the FinTech and Innovation Group (FTIG) enabling MAS to tap further into the competences of financial industry. In a few formal talks and commentaries surrounding the initiative, MAS officials referred to the rationale of the new approach to legal and technological aspects of finance within the overall reference to the “Smart Financial Center”, as follows from MAS Managing Director’s keynote address at the Global Technology Law Conference in June 2015.¹⁴

¹¹ Despite a clear demarcation between dealings in foreign and domestic currency, deposits were freely convertible between the two, and therefore capital could be mobilized through arbitrage; hence domestic interest rates were largely determined by both foreign rates and expectations of future strength of the Singapore dollar (Giap and Kang 1999).

¹² <http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulations-guidance-and-licensing/commercial-banks/circulars/2000/internationalisation-of-the-singapore-dollar.aspx>.

¹³ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/media-releases/2011/mas-strengthens-capital-requirements-for-singapore-incorporated-banks.aspx>

¹⁴ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/speeches-and-monetary-policy-statements/speeches/2015/a-smart-financial-centre.aspx>.


MAS as the sole regulator and promoter of the financial sector

MAS has never been independent from the government and in its own turn has been in charge of the developmental agenda in the form of providing various incentives to develop the financial sector. Yet, with its current 25 departments and one more additional Group officially working since May 2016 (FinTech and Innovation), it is a *de facto* Central Bank by any standard. Besides incentives to attract foreign banks and encourage them to set offshore operating centers in Singapore, MAS was proactive in identifying niche markets as a source of new competitive advantages. This strategic approach required more collaborative relations with the banking community – both domestic and foreign – in order to stay responsive towards industry needs

and changing the economic environment (Woo 2016). Quoting both acting and former MAS officers, Woo (2015a) refers to the official rhetoric of “policy co-creation” to emphasize a distinctly strategic and proactive way of effective engagement with the corporate sector in regulation, supervision and financial-sector promotion.

Currently, the overarching organization structure of MAS is as follows: the three Deputy Managing Directors are responsible for: 1) Financial Supervision; 2) Corporate Development; and 3) Monetary Policy, Development, and FinTech and Innovation. As Figure 1 illustrates, the following groups: Economic Policy, Markets and Investment; Development and International; and FinTech and Innovation report to the same Deputy Director. The supervision function is carried out by separate departments operating in accordance with different acts (e.g. Banking Act, Finance Companies Act, Securities Industry Act, Futures Trading Act), thereby resembling a multiple-agency system, as argued by Walter (1993, 107), while housing all the “agencies” in MAS ensures better co-ordination and allows supervision to be conducted on a consolidated basis more effectively while keeping up with changes in the financial market structure. Given the long history of effective coordination and regulatory practice of MAS, a new collaborative facility – Fin Tech Group and Fin Tech Lab – serves as an extension of existing competences of MAS, which has simultaneously performed both regulatory and promotion functions in regard to domestic financial industry.

Figure 1. Organizational structure of MAS (as of 2018)



Source: <http://www.mas.gov.sg/About-MAS/Overview/Organisation-Chart.aspx>

As becomes evident from earlier annual reports (1970s-1980s), various consultation initiatives were implemented through surveys, committees and working groups with financial industry actors, whenever specific guidelines, new products or market niche segments were to be identified and set up.¹⁵ With domestic financial industry becoming more mature, regulators' collaborative efforts have been moving towards even greater responsiveness. Despite co-creation being the official rhetoric, which might carry a certain “promotional” connotation, the most recent FinTech and Innovation Group is explicitly meant for direct collaboration with the industry. At the same time, MAS continues to attract new private FinTech ventures through “conventional” incentive measures: currently there are 7 different types of grants offered by MAS, National Research Foundation, IMDA and SPRING agencies.

From a supervisory perspective, MAS relies on financial institutions and their boards of directors to demonstrate ownership of decisions. At the end of the 1990s MAS adopted a similar approach in its “disclosure-based” framework, which moved away from an institutional focus towards systemic supervision: to encourage innovation and to facilitate the development of a more sophisticated body of consumers (MAS 2004, 14), which also reflects the reformulation of financial citizenship triggered by increasing financialization (Lai and Tan 2015).

¹⁵ E.g. Guide to Conduct and Market Practice in Foreign Exchange and Currency Deposit Transactions (1978/1979); development of an automated cheque clearing system for Singapore (1979); a survey to assess the interest in a financial futures market in Singapore and a working group performing feasibility studies (1981) (MAS annual reports, various years).

MAS FinTech and Innovation Office

A series of initiatives was announced in Summer 2015 signifying Singapore’s public commitment to working on financial innovation jointly with the private sector:

the newly launched FinTech and Innovation Group included three sub-units:

- Payments and Technology Solutions Office (formulates regulatory policies and develops strategies for simple, swift and secure payments and other technology solutions for financial services);
- Technology Infrastructure Office (responsible for regulatory policies and strategies for developing safe and efficient technology-enabled infrastructures for the financial sector, in areas such as cloud computing, big data, and distributed ledgers);
- Technology Innovation Lab (scans the horizon for cutting-edge technologies with potential application to the financial industry and work with the industry and relevant parties to test-bed innovative new solutions).¹⁶

Financial Sector Technology and Innovation Fund of \$225 mln (for the next 5 years) was set up by MAS to finance strategic initiatives with industry while further developing Singapore into a Smart Financial Center.¹⁷

These measures were part of a broader Smart Nation initiative¹⁸ launched in 2014 where digitization of finance was named as one of the elements of digital society and economy (Infocomm Media Development Authority 2018; Ministry of Communication and Information 2018) which Singapore should strive to achieve. Recently, the Smart Nation and Digital Government Office was formed, and together with the Government Technology Agency (a former statutory body under the Ministry of Communications) the Smart Nation and Digital Government Group was placed

under the Prime Minister’s Office in 2017. Therefore in the context of “cashless society” and “smart financial center” MAS has been working in close coordination with the above-mentioned agencies.

The new FinTech Office was designed to serve as a one-stop platform for all FinTech-related activities, including the promotion of Singapore as the regional FinTech hub. The office is co-led by the MAS Chief FinTech Officer, a former corporate executive, and a CEO of newly established agency SG-Innovate¹⁹, a former deputy chairman of Singapore’s Infocomm Development Authority²⁰ (IDA). Other members of the Office include representatives of MAS, Economic Development Board (EDB), IMDA, Infocomm Investments Pte Ltd (an investment arm of IMDA), National Research Foundation and SPRING agency. Meanwhile, the Fund targets start-up and tech companies with projects aiming to build industry-wide infrastructure, which are supported by financial industry. Non-financial institutions can also apply, although their eligibility is assessed on a case-by-case basis by MAS.

The first policy output of the MAS FinTech Office were the “FinTech regulatory sandbox” guidelines, issued in November 2016 after a round of public consultation. Following recommendations of the

¹⁶ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2015/MAS-sets-up-new-FinTech-and-Innovation-Group.aspx>.

¹⁷ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/speeches-and-monetary-policy-statements/speeches/2015/a-smart-financial-centre.aspx>.

¹⁸ <https://www.smartnation.sg/why-Smart-Nation/pillars-of-smart-nation>.

¹⁹ A new agency established as part of the 2016 budget that operates under the National Research Foundation, and aims at bringing entrepreneurs, industry leaders, venture capitalists and researchers together to help build companies in the three key sectors: finance, energy and healthcare. Within partnership with MAS, its first acting partner, SG-Innovate is tasked with advising the Authority on FinTech funding.

²⁰ IDA has been recently succeeded by Infocomm and Media Development Authority (IMDA).

Financial Center Advisory Panel²¹ and emulating an initiative launched by the British Financial Conduct Authority together with Project Innovate in 2015, the MAS FinTech Regulatory Sandbox allows FinTech solutions to be tested after sufficient laboratory tests within a limited customer base, following a limited timeframe and given lighter legal and regulatory requirements valid during the specified timeframe – all subject to formal agreement with MAS. The regulatory sandbox is displayed and implemented by an applicant company and operates in the production environment – where actual products and services are delivered to customers. All stages of the regulatory sandbox, including the exit stage, are closely monitored and assessed by MAS while upon additional request, the sandbox timeline can be extended.

The regulatory sandbox aims to encourage firms and extend their willingness to further develop FinTech solutions. Following the current supervisory approach outlined above, financial institutions are free to launch new ideas without first seeking MAS’s approval, as long as they are satisfied with their own due diligence, since the concept “time to market” comes into play, which is crucial to competition. MAS puts an explicit emphasis on “*innovation through co-creation*”:

... co-creation is particularly relevant for developing rules or guidance on new technologies whose benefits and risks are not fully known and where a more flexible approach may be desired. A further possibility in co-creation might be MAS and the industry working together to develop common technology infrastructure that meets regulatory requirements. The aim is to clarify and address issues and uncertainties upfront during the course of development (Ravi Menon, June 2015).²²

4. Discussion

One of the conclusions of systematic literature review on policy co-creation and co-production was related to the need for more empirical studies “to find out to what extent the policy field in which co-creation is implemented is influential with respect to the type and effects of these processes” (Voorberg et al. 2015, 18). In its attempt to bring the concept of co-creation to the domain of financial regulation, the current study reviewed developments in Singapore’s financial policies and governance and argued that co-creative practices resulted in the emergence of organizational dynamics and new organizational forms, which should be regarded as an integral part of the policy process. The study is based on theoretical premises that for informed and evidence-based policy-making there is a growing need to conceptualize competences of public sector, especially when technical expertise is essential to the effectiveness of policies and to the very understanding of how the regulated sector works, as in the case of the financial sector, which at times invests in ICT on par with national governments.²³

The study relied on historical-empirical material in order to demonstrate that collaborative practices in financial governance are not entirely new, but they have been increasingly

²¹ Launched in July 2015 to advise MAS on recent and future developments in finance, the Panel consists of 26 executives from financial industry and runs biannual meetings chaired by MAS’s Managing Director.

²² <http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/speeches-and-monetary-policy-statements/speeches/2015/a-smart-financial-centre.aspx>.

²³ The Development Bank of Singapore alone now spends some S\$600 million on technology every year as compared with S\$2.8 billion that Singapore’s government spent on ICT tenders during the fiscal year 2017 (<https://www.imda.gov.sg/infocomm-and-media-news/buzz-central/2016/6/investing-in-ict-for-smart-nation-growth>).

formalized and manifested in novel organizational forms. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has been an effective regulator and promoter of domestic financial industry. Despite the general notion of financial regulation being rather reactive (Anheier and Fliegau 2013), MAS has been serving "developmental" goals by proactively implementing policies conducive to growth: maintaining the "dual" financial system that effectively differentiates between domestic and off-shore sub-sectors, thereby making the national financial system more resilient to external shocks; effectively maintaining the non-internationalization of domestic currency despite a lack of capital controls and a small open economy, thereby keeping incentives for currency speculation at bay; initiating industry restructuring (consolidation in early 2000s) in order to encourage the internationalization of domestic financial firms. The prevailing regulatory culture among financial bureaucrats has been also described as "cooperative, less confrontational and antagonistic", which should not be equated with "regulatory capture" but rather related to trust and confidence (Lin 2009, 303). As the industry matures and financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, start competing closer to the technological frontier (FinTech), regulators are challenged by the sophistication and speed of financial innovations and related uncertainty. Recognizing this, MAS shifted from prescriptive merit-based supervision towards a disclosure-based principle at the end of the 1990s (Maysami and Tan 2003). From the governance perspective, however, scholars and practitioners emphasize the general conflict between existing rigid top-down bureaucracies and modern private financial organizations "that must respond quickly and flexibly to multidimensional changes in markets and social needs" (Sheng 2009, 405).

In recent years a growing number of FinTech Labs has been launched by commercial financial institutions worldwide, but it is in Singapore that a similar organization has been recently established within the Central Bank. Strategic collaboration between MAS and financial industry has been evolving since the 1970s but it is becoming increasingly direct and formalized through collaborative facilities such as FinTech Lab, "regulatory sandbox", and the recently inaugurated

Payment Council. For public authorities a more collaborative approach provides an opportunity to leverage on corporate sector's knowledge and expertise and potentially speed up the process of intervention, should such a need occur in case of a systemic risk. One may further suggest that by attracting foreign financial institutions MAS would tap into the pool of global financial technological expertise – and the dynamic capabilities it presents – more effectively and at lower costs. Indeed, such an aim is explicitly stated in MAS's response to the Parliamentary question regarding limited knowledge and skills related to digital finance (6 February 2018).²⁴ Following the capabilities approach, corporate actors with the greatest resources and expertise will be probably more active and more preferable as partners, which may raise concerns over which interests get best representation, which, in turn, is directly related to a broader national socio-economic agenda. There is also a delicate balance between nurturing innovative competition and ensuring financial stability (Cainey 2014), and although Singaporean financial bureaucracy has been known for being business-oriented, highly proactive and remarkably effective, to what extent MAS is capable to collaboratively shape brand new business models, products and technological solutions while keeping up with related risk assessment and technological sophistication remains to be seen.

²⁴ <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Parliamentary-Replies/2018/Reply-to-Parliamentary-Question-on-talent-and-skills-in-the-financial-sector.aspx>.

Meanwhile, increasingly formalized collaborative facilities appearing within financial-governance institutions, as the case of MAS suggests, represent *new organizational forms that become part of the dynamics within a policy process* through enhancing input from (selected) non-government actors and transforming a feedback mechanism into co-creation. Such organizational dynamics, however, have not received relevant attention in scholarly literature, which tends to emphasize either policy change or policy dynamics, i.e. to remain “policy-biased”. Yet organizational dynamics, as a response to technological change, should be viewed as part of policy design studies because organizational forms reflect either existing competences or the need to develop new ones, as has been argued in the case of dealing with the uncertainty of financial technologies. In other words, despite the exploratory nature of the study, it contains an explanatory element: new forms of (closer) interaction emerge due to technology-driven complexity. The article further argues that by combining theoretical insights from literature on collaborative governance and co-creation, policy capacity, and by emphasizing the notion of technological capabilities, it would be possible to move further towards unpacking the constraints experienced by local bureaucracies while dealing with global finance, as was problematized by Sheng (2009). Moreover, by introducing the notion of technical capabilities – as complementary to analytical and administrative capacities – into the general discussion on financial regulation and supervision, the article suggests that putting policy design on the research agenda (Bakir and Woo 2016) implies a more deliberate approach to technological skills and competences of policy actors. Accordingly, avenues for future research may be outlined as follows:

- Further research on co-creation initiatives involving corporate actors with a well-established knowledge base (esp. in the financial sector and other sectors where governments are confronted with escalating technological change);
- Additional empirical studies on the engagement with non-government actors in financial policy-making, with specific reference to the issues of technology and the regulation thereof, including particular ways of interaction / co-creation and operational routines;
- Empirical research on modes and mechanisms of industry consultation in other international financial centers with a special focus on bureaucratic capabilities to perform and maintain such policy dialogues;
- Further empirical work, especially through interviewing public regulatory authorities and private actors, would be an important step towards process-tracing collaborative practices and pointing to more defined forms and outcomes of such practices; more rigorous empirical analysis would also make it possible to develop more narrowly defined conceptual frameworks within a wider notion of “co-creation” applied in the current study;
- A broader discussion of capabilities of financial bureaucracy (e.g. Nee and Oppen 2009) would benefit scholarship on public administration, especially in regard to development studies.

To conclude, the article has highlighted that through outside pressure – dynamic technological change in the financial sector – even more traditional policy communities have opened up and embraced co-creation as the means to draw in the expertise and knowledge needed to fulfill core policy tasks. However, due to the needed capabilities to participate in this collaboration, there are high barriers to entry within these practices. Consequently, the extent of the influence and power of corporate actors in this collaboration should be analyzed in greater detail.

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Oscillation of Public Administration Paradigms and the Management of Public Service in Nigeria: Trajectory and Lessons

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Abstract

This paper chronicles various Public Administration paradigms and juxtaposes them with the management of Public Service (as an institution) in Nigeria. Attempts at making the public bureaucracy an effective instrument of development in Nigeria can be located in Public Service Reforms, and it is observable that the country has a long history in this. This study adopts the qualitative approach with a reliance on secondary data which were textually analysed, using the Neo-Weberian State Model as the theoretical framework. It is obvious that Nigeria's experience with administrative reforms typifies an obsession with the traditional Weberian practice, as well as a half-hearted romance with SAP-induced/NPM reforms which labelled the country as a "hesitant reformer". The paper emphasises a re-discovery of the values of Public Service in Nigeria based on the tenets of the NWS model. Other recommendations can also address the issues raised by the paper.

Keywords: *Lessons; Management; Oscillation; Paradigm; Public Administration; Public Service; Trajectory*

1. Introduction

Extant literature in public administration presents scholarship and practice in the field as dynamic in recent times. This may be attributable to the field's a-disciplinary status (Raadschelders 2012) in terms of theoretical and epistemological orientations, or the contextless nature of public administration especially in developing countries (Haque 1996; Jreisat 2010). These underscore public-sector reforms as policy experiments and organisational practices arising from OECD countries, which create "a discrepancy between the thrust of ... reform efforts ... and wider shifts in the nature of governance and contemporary approaches" (Robinson 2015, 1) to the study and practice of public administration.

It is also noteworthy that there is an unsettled debate in Public Administration on the inception of the discipline. For instance, while some scholars represented by Thornhill (2006) traced the origin to the pioneering enterprise of Lorenz von Stein in 1855, there is also the argument that the credit given to Lorenz von Stein is misplaced and that reference and respect should rather be accorded the huge scholarship on the State and Public Service by Christian Wolff, who lived between 1679 and 1754 (Drechsler 1997; Drechsler 2001). Yet others credit Woodrow Wilson through his seminal article on the Study of Administration published in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1887 (Denhardt and Denhardt 2007; Uwizeyimana and Maphunye 2014; Ikeanyibe et al. 2017). Maserumule and Vil-Nkomo (2015, 451), however, argue that Wilson's contentions centred on Administration without the adjective or prefix "public".

The intellectual curiosity and engagements emanating from the above, and the alleged failings of the Weberian practice, fed into the expansive discussions that laid the basis for the oscillation of paradigms, or what Pollitt (2010, 293) pungently refers to as "paradigm wars in which scholars attack the very foundations of each other's work." He expatiated by identifying the construction (in recent times) of "magic concepts ... [that have] multiple definitions, are abstract and challenging to operationalise, and tend to wax and wane quite quickly over time." One of the earliest and celebrated expositions on "Paradigms of Public Administration" accrues to Henry (1975, 1999) with a characterisation of five paradigms as outlined below.

Paradigm 1: The Politics/Administration Dichotomy (1900-1926); Paradigm 2: The Principles of Administration (1927-1937); the Era of Challenge to the field of Public Administration by some scholars (1938-1950), and the Reaction to the Challenge (1947-1950) are located within this paradigm. Paradigm 3: Public Administration as Political Science (1950-1970); Paradigm 4: Public Administration as Administrative Science/Management (1956-1970); Paradigm 5: Public Administration as Public Administration (1970-?) (Henry 1975, 379-385; 1999, 22-46).

It is pertinent to note that some scholars have broadened, extended or modified the paradigms listed above, with the first three kept intact, while Paradigm 4 spanning the 1950s to 1970s has been re-christened "The New Public Administration Era." Paradigm 5, which is periodised from the 1970s to the 1990s heralded the New Public Management, and Paradigm 6 commencing from the 1990s to date is the Governance period (Uwizeyimana and Maphunye 2014, 94).

There are, however, additions and refinements to the above paradigms which include: Neo-Weberian State from the late 1990s to date (traceable to Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Drechsler 2005 and his Estonian colleagues; Lynn 2008); Governance/New Public Governance (represented by Osborne 2006 and others); New Public Service by Denhardt and Denhardt (2007); Public Value Management and Public Value Failure typified by the separate works of Mark Moore (1995, 2013) and Barry Bozeman (2007). See details in Xu et al. (2015); Rutgers (2015); Katsamunskaja (2016); Turkel and Turkel (2016).

The question that arises logically from the above description or oscillation of paradigms is: Whose interest is served by these narratives? Academics/Scholars? Practitioners or public servants? Or society at large? If the purpose of this education is to "form the mind" or "train the citizen" (Russell in Raadschelders 2012, 1), then we can claim that it serves altruistic interests. It is also noteworthy that Public Administration scholarship derives from a community of interests, "has a multiple personality ... (and) it is attempting to get to different destinations" (Pollitt 2010, 292), and this informs the take that its practice should impact the "true public" through effective and qualitative service delivery. It is predicated on this realisation that this paper explores the rotation between and from Traditional Public Administration to new trends in the management of Public Service (bureaucracy) in Nigeria, with a view to identify the implications and draw lessons therefrom.

2. Method, main argument and limitations of the paper

This is a qualitative study, in which data collection was mainly through secondary sources and internet materials from international and local contexts, with a view to exploring the dynamics inherent in the oscillation of paradigms from the Traditional Public Administration to Emerging Trends in the management of public bureaucracy in Nigeria, and this finds expression in the various Public Service Reforms (PSRs). The adoption of the Neo-Weberian model as a framework for textual analysis of issues invigorated the discussion, conclusion and recommendations of the paper.

The review and discussion of issues in this paper reveal that Nigeria's pre-occupation with PSRs is not fully grounded. They represent half-hearted attempts by a non-committed reformer, and this points to the fact that the leadership requirements of reforms are as critical as the environment and the paradigm tools engaged. This realisation calls for a more comprehensive approach that weaves various issues and goal attainment with Academic-Practitioner synergy as bastions for robust reform outcomes in the public bureaucracy.

Research limitations/implications: The discussion in this paper presents Nigeria's scant experience with very few PA paradigms. The dominance of Weberian practice in the Nigerian federal bureaucracy is patently manifest. Attempts at applying some NPM tools have not yielded impressive results. It is predicated on these that the extensive paradigmatic reviews serve pedagogical purposes, advance frontiers of knowledge (in Nigeria) and re-awaken the consciousness of technocrats and elites (governing and bureaucratic) to the existence of very robust PA paradigms as alternative reform choices for better results. It is particularly noteworthy that this paper is not inclined towards hypothetical propositions. As a qualitative study that seeks to explore and possibly locate Public Service in Nigeria within the paradigms of Public Administration, its reliance on secondary data makes empirical orientation (which it does not lay claim to) quite redundant. Future studies can utilise this approach in order to compare results or research outcomes.

3. Conceptual discourse

The following will receive attention in this section: The Meaning of the Traditional Model in Public Administration; The Concept of Public Service and Pathologies of the Nigerian Public Bureaucracy; the Explanation of Emerging Trends in Public Administration.

3.1 The meaning and trajectory of the traditional model in Public Administration

There is a consensus of opinion and unanimity in the documentation by scholars and writers that the Traditional Public Administration can be traced to Woodrow Wilson's 1887 seminal article on the "Science of Administration" and was largely underscored by Max Weber's ideas on bureaucracy anchored on the principles of hierarchy, meritocracy (Robinson 2015); anonymity, political neutrality (Oyedemi 2016) and impartiality. Thornhill (2006, 797), however, interjects that "although Wilson is considered as the father of the study of Public Administration, he only re-invented the Science that had been developed much earlier in Europe." This remark is a veiled reference to the works of Lorenz von Stein.

Available records present the practice of public administration as being traceable to the history of mankind (Uwizeyimana and Maphunye 2014, 91). This may just be a restatement of the treatise by Olaopa (2012, 27-37) in which administrative practices were traced to the Pharaonic and Moses era in the Bible. Farazmand (2012, 488) is, however, more specific thus: "Public Administration has more than eight millennia of practice and intellectual development." This averment was built on the works of various scholars ranging from 1948 to 1993.

The traditional model of Public Administration can be characterised this way:

... an administration under the formal control of the political leadership based on a strictly hierarchical model of bureaucracy, staffed by permanent, neutral and anonymous officials, motivated by public interest, serving any governing party equally, and not contributing to policy but merely administering those policies decided by the politicians (Hughes 2003, 17).

The theoretical foundations of the above inhere in the pioneering scholarly enterprise of Woodrow Wilson, Frederick Taylor in USA, Max Weber in Germany and the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report in the United Kingdom. Although Weber's research on organisations centred on why people throughout history obey their leaders, and the responses obtained correspond to the three types of authority (traditional, charismatic and legal-rational), the bulk of his theoretisation was on the legal-rational, otherwise known as "ideal type". Building on the works of earlier scholars, Ibietan and Oni (2013, 35) documented the features of Weber's ideal construct as follows:

- Hierarchy which implies structure.
- Promotion based on professional merit and skill as guides for recruitment.
- The development of a career service in the bureaucracy.
- Impersonality of relationships among career professionals in the bureaucracy and with their clientele (Henry 1999, 54-55).
- Specialisation along functional lines.
- Authority and responsibility.
- Documentation or record keeping.

It is perhaps predicated on the above that Pfiffner (2004, 444) affirms that "there is no realistic alternative to bureaucratic organisations," and, with a convergence that "the traditional model of Public Administration remains the longest standing and most successful theory of management in the public sector" (Hughes 2003, 17). It is against this background, therefore, that the ambivalence created by Katsamunka (2012, 75) in alluding to this model as "the most successful theory of public sector management ... although it does not have a ... coherent intellectual foundation" appears quite curious. Pfiffner (2004) cannot understand why recent critics see the model as old, outmoded and inefficient. Ibietan and Oni (2013) align with Gal (2014, 66) that "since its inception, the Weberian model has received a substantial amount of criticism," but Basheka and Sebola (2015, 54) responded that "... it has shown unmatched resilience ... (and) remains alive in most administrative jurisdictions."

The history of the traditional model can also be located within Henry's (1975, 1999) discussion on Paradigms 1 to 4. The systematic study of Public Administration commenced from 1887 with Wilson's celebrated essay. Paradigm 1 therefore spanned 1887 to 1926, and the important features of this era are: politics-administration dichotomy with administration being concerned with policy implementation, not formulation; Frank Goodnow's book on Politics and Administration in 1900, which corroborated Wilson's separation of administration from politics and further elaborated on separation of powers between the Judiciary, Legislature and Executive (Goodnow in Uwizeyimana and Maphunye 2014, 92). Another important development of this period was Leonard Dupee White's book *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, written in 1926 and recognised as the first textbook on the subject (Basu 2009, 16).

Henry (1975, 379-380) captured Paradigm 2 as the epoch of "The Principles of Administration" from 1927 to 1937. Willoughby's book titled *Principles of Administration* was published in 1927 as the second full-fledged text in the discipline. This period witnessed orthodoxy in Public Administration and accelerated the march towards efficiency, which reached a crescendo with Luther Gulick's 1937 publication, wherein he espoused the famous acronym (POSDCORB) meaning: Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting (Ikeanyibe et al. 2017, 4). Lyndall Urwick's papers on the Science of Administration were also published at this time, in which focus gained pre-eminence over locus of the field, as principles were more important to Gulick and Urwick, even as Public Administration scholars were highly

sought after from then till the early 1940s by governments and the industry, because of their managerial knowledge (Henry 1999, 24). It is particularly striking that Gulick and Urwick were invigorated by Frederick Taylor's scientific management and Henri Fayol's theories of (business) administration in their writings.

An extension to Paradigm 2 spanning 1938 to 1950 was christened the "Period of Challenge" by Henry (1975, 380), and widely referred to as an "Era of Conceptual Challenge and Heterodoxy". The assault came from the publication of a classic text in 1938 by Chester Barnard titled the "Executive Functions" and Herbert Simon's "Administrative Behavior" (much later) as a devastating critique of the field. The submissions were that the politics-administration separation cannot be a hard-line issue, and "that the principles of administration were something less than the final expression of managerial rationality" (Henry 1999, 26). Thereafter, many texts appeared and underscored the above position, highlighted further issues (such as values in administration), including a book of Readings titled *Elements of Public Administration*, edited by Fritz Mark in 1946, and "The Proverbs of Administration" by Herbert Simon published the same year in *Public Administration Review*. In this publication, the principles of administration were punctured and relegated to proverbs.

Other important features of this period are: the neo-classical revolution leading to Hawthorne Experiments anchored on human relations and behavioural theories of industrial and social psychology. The reaction to the challenge occasioned by the decimation of traditional foundations of the field also emanated from Herbert Simon (between 1947 and 1950), who suggested a new paradigm of public administration anchored on harmony between a group of scholars developing a pure science of administration pivoted on social psychology and the other concerned with "prescribing for public policy". Simon posits that the two can become mutually re-enforcing components (Henry 1999, 29), for they do not conflict with or contradict each other. Meier (2015, 15) would argue that "Simon's objective of a general theory of public administration was highly ambitious, even by today's standards."

There is an observation of an overlap of features in Paradigms 2 and 3 by some writers/scholars. For instance, Paradigm 3, periodised as 1950 to 1970 by Henry (1975) thus: Public Administration as Political Science, was similarly dated by Uwizeyimana and Maphunye (2014, 94). This was tagged as Stage 4 with the following characteristics recorded in Henry (1975, 1999) as Paradigm 2 and labelled as the era of identity crisis; rejection of both the principles of administration and politics-administration dichotomy. Other notable features of this epoch include Simon's book on *Administrative Behavior* and Robert Dahl's (1940s) essay on "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems"; widening the scope of Public Administration and relating it to other subjects such as Psychology, Sociology, Economics and Political Science.

The above phase was also referred to as the New Public Administration (NPA) era. Lamidi (2015, 5, 21) agrees with the characterisation of this epoch as NPA, and equated it with Postmodernism in Administration, which he subsequently linked to the writings of Dwight Waldo and the first Minnowbrook Conference in 1968, when the concept of New Public Administration was born, courtesy of Waldo. Apart from occasional face-offs and hostilities with Political Scientists, Henry (1999, 31) records that two developments occurred during this period, which are: increasing use of case studies as an epistemological tool, plus the rise and fall of Comparative and Development Administration as subfields of Public Administration. These dovetailed into and fostered an alternative Paradigm 4, which presented Public Administration as Administrative Science.

3.2 The concept of Public Service

The concept of Public Service lends itself to distortions and semantics due to its synonymous or interchangeable use with civil service, which can be viewed as a narrower term. To buttress this point, Ibietan (2013, 55-56) cited two instances based on previous studies. The first is Okoli and Onah (2002, 76), which expressly excluded the "Armed Forces, the quasi-governmental corporations and statutory bodies" from their usage of the term "public service". Secondly, Nwosu in Obi (2007, 14) also omitted "employees of statutory corporations and boards" in his distinction between civil service and public service. These characterisations are not only naive and inadequate, they can be quite misleading.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) in Section 318 illuminates our understanding by its definition of public service as "the service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation," and includes the following:

- Clerk or any other staff of the National Assembly or of each House of the National Assembly;
- Member of staff of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, the Sharia Court of Appeal of FCT, the Customary Court of Appeal of FCT or other Courts established for the Federation by this Constitution and by an Act of the National Assembly;
- Member or staff of any commission or authority established for the Federation by this Constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly;
- Staff of any Area Council;
- Staff of any Statutory Corporation established by an Act of the National Assembly;
- Staff of any educational institution established or financed principally by the Government of the Federation;
- Staff of any company or enterprises in which the Government of the Federation or its agency owns controlling shares or interests; and
- Members or Officers of the armed forces of the Federation or the Nigeria Police Force or other government security agencies established by law.

It is noteworthy that the above constitutional elucidation of Public Service is more comprehensive and explanatory than those offered by Okoli and Onah (2002) and Nwosu in Obi (2007). The same constitution differentiates the civil service from the public service and defines the former as: service of the Federation in a civil capacity as staff of the Office of the President, the Vice-President, a Ministry or Department of the Government of the Federation, assigned with the responsibility for any business of the Government of the Federation. The public and civil service of a state are similarly defined to cover staff in the service of state governments in the same capacities as those of the Federation (Ibietan 2013). A further clarification or simplification of these confused terms is given by Adamolekun (2002, 17-18) thus: civil service "refers to the body of permanent officials appointed to assist the political executive in formulating and implementing government policies." It also refers to ministries and departments within which specific aspects of government work are carried out. Public service on the other hand "usually indicates a wider scope than the civil service [and] ... means the totality of services that are organized under public (i.e. government) authority." It covers ministries, departments, agencies of the central government, its field administration, local government, the military, other security forces and the judiciary. These clarifications converge with the constitutional explications of the terms.

Olaopa (2008, 35-42) cautions that the 1999 Constitution did not recognise the term "the Nigerian Public Service," but Public Service of the Federation and services at the sub-national levels, consisting of all officials of "government at the federal, state and local government levels in the ministries, parastatals, extra-ministerial departments and the paramilitary

organizations." The Nigerian Public Service, otherwise referred to as the Nigerian Public Bureaucracy, is a product of the British colonial public service. In other words, the arrangement of ministries, departments and agencies of government drew heavily from the British system of colonial administration, with the major structural division of personnel aligning with the 1954 Gorsuch (Report) classification: administrative/professional class; technical/higher executive; clerical/artisan; and messengerial/manipulative. Ibietan and Oni (2013, 32) submit that "these categorizations which have been ... modified due to successive reforms explain the academic standards/requirements pursuant to entry into such grades."

The above colonial legacy of public bureaucracy, which has been highly extolled by some scholars (Agagu 2008; Awosika 2014) did not escape incisive analysis by Jreisat (2010, 617) thus: "the colonial regime had no developmental policies of human resources practiced in any African state. There were no positive efforts or policies by the colonizers to create indigenous civil service systems suited to the people ... it is not surprising that the continent's human resources have been and still are either underutilised or maladministered ..." It is perhaps predicated on averments like the above that scholars (Ibietan 2013, 56; Oyedeji 2016) infer that the: "utilization of the public service and its personnel [were] to exploit and expropriate indigenous natural resources to develop the metropole."

Predicated on the notion that no nation can develop beyond the competence and capacity of its public service (Mustapha and Omoredede 2017), Oladipo (2007, 363) chronicles the contributions of the Nigerian civil/public service as an indispensable instrument of governance thus:

- Formulation of government policies and programmes;
- Planning and implementation of government policies and programmes on social services provision;
- Preparation of annual budgets and development plans;
- Revenue collection such as taxes, fines and duties;
- Making by-laws, regulations and orders under powers granted by the Parliament and other quasi-judicial functions;
- Keeping government records and properties;
- Information dissemination and public enlightenment.

Ibietan and Oni (2013, 33) added the following paramount roles of the Nigerian public bureaucracy: provision of social or public goods/services; security, which is being serially punctuated and violated in recent times; acts as agents of and catalyst for development.

3.2.1 Pathologies of the Nigerian Public Bureaucracy

Most Writers on this topic and adjoining themes are wont to creating hypes and consequently over-flogging the discourse, thus creating the avoidable scenario of analysis by paralysis. Peter in Awosika (2014, 85) operationalises bureau-pathology as "negative administrative behaviours of professionals and experts ... which thwart the achievement of public goods and delivery of quality public service ..." It includes "... bureaucratic insensitivity, misuse of administrative power and discretion ... and misuse of monopoly in service delivery." As a matter of fact, bureau-pathology is a disease of the public service. Stretching this point further, Ajibade and Ibietan (2016, 11) posit that "this dysfunctional characteristic of bureaucracy manifests in the Nigerian factor." This (Nigerian) factor is a euphemism and subtle reference to why policies fail in Nigeria, but work elsewhere. This is purely attitudinal or behavioural in nature. Another fallout of or dimension to bureau-pathology is that "bureau-professionalism and its potentials for the service ... [thus] making the MDAs flexible, proactive and performance

oriented is undermined by the acute lack of competencies ..." (Olaopa 2016b, 20) and low capacity readiness and utilisation.

Ibieta and Oni (2013, 44-45) highlighted other issues/problems of the Nigerian public bureaucracy to include corruption, unnecessary and unhelpful politicisation, favouritism, ethnicity, nepotism, lack of transparency and accountability, the unbalanced application of Federal Character principle as well as the tragic role of the Military (and its unitary command structure) with negative effects not only on the Public Service, but on public administration and governance in Nigeria. Besides complementing the aforementioned issues, a similar study invigorated by the Udoji Report added the following: "... elitism, inability of superiors to delegate responsibilities, unreliability of junior staff in executing delegated tasks, failure ... to apply specialized knowledge and training skills in the management of the public service, and failure to appreciate the importance of timeliness or efficiency in the performance of tasks" (Awosika 2014, 86), and with the final verdict "that the entire Nigerian bureaucracy was not results-oriented." Narratives like these validate our assertion on the creation of hypes and over-dramatisation of discourse on this subject without recourse to the instrumental and catalytic roles of the Public Service in national development, and for stabilising the machinery of government in critical times, especially during the thirty-month (1967-1970) Nigerian civil war.

Building on the works of other scholars, Ibieta and Joshua (2015) added these points to the discussion: overstaffing; over-centralisation; apathy; red tape and tardiness, to mention but a few. It is perhaps in a bold move to attenuate these challenges that Adamolekun (2007, 17) suggests a "redefinition of the mission and scope of the public service [and] ... the critical importance of the values that should underpin a public administration system." More recently, the author underscored this point this way: "A fundamental rethinking of governance and ... public service is required – one that is targeted at rebuilding the culture of a merit-based civil service with the ... key elements (of) a professional bureaucracy that has integrity ... intelligence and is committed to the public interest" (Adamolekun and Olowu 2015, 109). He added that to avoid state capture and ensure social embeddedness, such Public Service Institutions must be "functioning as a rational bureaucracy" pivoted on the principles of meritocracy and professionalism.

3.3 Explanation of emerging trends in Public Administration

A meaningful understanding of the discussion on this sub-theme shall necessarily re-connect from where Section 3.1 stopped with the exposition on Paradigm 4. It is also useful to state that this Section will highlight the oscillation of paradigms from New Public Management; through Neo-Weberian State; New Public Service; (New) Public Governance to Public Value Management.

According to Henry (1975, 1999), Paradigm 5 captioned "'Public Administration as Public Administration' [a return to its roots] is periodised from 1970, but was expected to continue ad-infinitum. However, the intellectual conspiracy against the Traditional/Weberian model of Public Administration, rooted in the developments emanating from Thatcher's and Reagan's administration in the United Kingdom and United States of America respectively, in which public bureaucracy was seen as being ineffective, inefficient and largely wasteful" (Basheka 2012, 51), presented the public sector as grappling with problems that only market principles and private-sector methods and techniques could resolve.

The notable features of Paradigm 5 are: No focus yet in the field in the form of pure science of administration; considerable progress made in refining applied techniques of management science; less progress in ascertaining a locus for the field; the traditional and rigid demarcation of the field between the "public" and "private" spheres seems to be waning, even as the new and flexible locus of the field is emboldened. Public Administrationists became increasingly interested in related areas of policy science, political economy, public policy-making process and analysis, to mention but a few. Additionally, there was a marked reduction in the number of Public Administration programmes housed in the Departments of Business Administration or Management, witnessing a gravitation towards an autonomous academic field for Public Administration (Henry 1999, 44-45).

Beyond Henry (1999), our understanding of paradigmatic development and milestones is illuminated by Basheka (2012), who proceeded to identify Period Five (which shall be tagged as Paradigm 6) titled: From Public Administration to (New) Public Management, spanning 1970 to 1990. The landmark event of this period was the emergence of New Public Management (NPM), anchored on Managerialism and ideas arising from new international economics with heavy emphasis on markets and competition. NPM as a global reform initiative or movement started around the 1980s and extended to countries like Sweden, New Zealand, USA and some OECD countries (Olaopa 2008, 54). It is traceable to the works of celebrated Economists like James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Christopher Hood and Mancur Olson among others, with a theoretical anchor on Public Choice theory and Transaction Cost Economics.

The major tenets of NPM are: decentralised decision-making; cost recovery; alternative service delivery; performance-contracting; commercialisation; citizens' charter; and public reporting. Maserumule and Vil-Nkomo (2015, 454) assert that NPM "... trivialised Public Administration. Its ideological context is neo-liberalism, which called for a minimalist state. Its version of re-inventing the state is based on the assumption that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector." The Authors contend further that "the whole concept of NPM was based on what Public Administration is not." The emergence of NPM was traced to the Bretton Woods Institution's Structural Adjustment Programmes.

Meier and O'Toole (2009, 4-22) proceed to develop or identify the following proverbs of NPM: contracting out improves efficiency and performance; the best organisations are lean; get rid of layers of management and trim the bureaucracy; good management benefits everyone; organisations need to be flexible and able to change; organisations are at the mercy of their environments, alternatively organisations must adapt to their environments in predictable ways; prospectors are more effective than defenders, and the effectiveness of prospecting is contingent on resources; when politics is dysfunctional, so will management be; good managers can make all the difference; good management comes in patterns; and managers must choose among competing goals. These could not stop Drechsler (2005); Osborne (2006); Drechsler and Kattel (2008); Drechsler (2010); Osborne et al. (2012); Farazmand (2012); Olaopa (2016b); Ibieta and Ikeanyibe (2017) from criticising the intellectual foundations and applications of NPM. A synopsis of the rebuttal by Drechsler (2010); Farazmand (2012); and Olaopa (2016a) will suffice here.

To be sure, Drechsler (2005, 96) started laying the foundations confronting NPM in an article titled "The Re-Emergence of Weberian Public Administration after the fall of New Public Management: The Central and Eastern European Perspective", in which he accused NPM of not being based on genuine economics and markets. He affirms that the state and its structures are "neither dead nor incapacitated, as is perhaps more visible now than a decade ago." Drechsler and Kattel (2008) resonate with an acerbic title "Conclusion: Towards the

Neo-Weberian State? Perhaps, but certainly Adieu, NPM!" This would reach a crescendo with a 2010 Keynote address, in which he reverberates with a poser thus: "So am I suggesting that people who have pushed NPM should now say they are sorry for doing the wrong kind of PA?" (Drechsler 2010, 19).

Drechsler (2010) seems modest and cautious in his verdict as noted above. Farazmand (2012, 500) appears pungent and assertive in affirming that "NPM has reached its high point and begun to lose its power and appeal in many parts of the world; it will likely die on the altar of its inherent contradictions. Hopefully, it is destined to be just another passing fad in the history of contemporary public administration." He posits that NPM has corrosive effects on public service and administration's intellectual and institutional capacities which are ultimately damaged and paralysed. Olaopa (2016b, 11-12) submits that "the NPM story of managerial revolution is ... one-sided ... in theory and practice." He corroborates that "NPM ends up achieving greater corruption through the discretion it gives the public manager ... facilitated by the unbridled market dynamics ... introduced to the running of the public service ... [and] a 'one-size-fits-all' model which fails to take into consideration the unique administrative context of the third world." The foregoing presents the trajectory and balance sheet of NPM. The next section takes on the Neo-Weberian State and its basic features.

The Neo-Weberian classification as a reform or normative model refers to the application of Weberian principles with "neo elements" to a modern state or organisation. Although Lynn (2008) refreshes our memory with the different usages in political-science, sociology and public-administration literatures, as a reform model, the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) accrues to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). These authors taxonomise countries into groups based on governance as follows: "maintainers;" "modernizers;" and "marketizers." The two groups that are of exceptional interest are: the Anglo-American NPM marketisers and Continental European modernisers, and it is the reform model of these two groups that Pollitt and Bouckaert classify as the Neo-Weberian State (Lynn 2008, 17).

The Weberian elements or tenets include:

- Reaffirmation of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization, technological change, shifting demographics and environmental threat;
- Reaffirmation of the role of representative democracy;
- Reaffirmation of the role of administrative law;
- Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinctive status, culture, terms and conditions. Lynn (2008, 23) summarised the "neo" elements as compromising: citizens' needs; an external orientation and consultation. We shall revisit NWS in greater details in Section 4, which is the Theoretical Framework of this paper.

We now turn attention to the New Public Service (NPS), which Robinson (2015, 10) refers to as "perhaps the most coherent of these approaches." It is pivoted on the fact that the focus of public management should be citizens, community and civil society. The argument stretches further that in this conception, "the primary role of public servants is to help citizens articulate and meet their shared interests, rather than to control or steer society." The major exponents of this model are Janet Denhardt and Robert Denhardt through the book *The New Public Service: Serving Not Steering*, published in 2000 and expanded in 2007.

The major ideas or thrust of NPS are: serve citizens, not customers; seek the public interest; value citizenship over entrepreneurship; think strategically, act democratically; recognise that accountability is not simple; serve rather than steer; value people, not just productivity (Denhardt and Denhardt 2007, 42-43). It is pertinent to note the NPS evolved as a response to a number of critical normative questions about Public Administration as a field and direct repudiation of the NPM orientation with a gospel of running government and public bureaucracy as business, and not democracy or non-profit/social services. Maserumule and Vil-Nkomo (2015, 455) refer to this as the concept of humanitarian public service.

Basheka (2012, 57-63) returns us to the discussion of paradigms with his caption of Period Six: From Public Management to Governance (late 1990s to 2008); Period Seven: From Governance to Global Crisis (2008-2010); Period Eight: From Governance to New Public Governance (from 2010 to date). We shall be constrained to consolidate the above listed phases for discussion based on the averment by Robinson (2015, 9) that "these approaches do not yet form a coherent paradigm and they have different frames of reference." Support for this assertion is typified by the classification of governance as: hierarchically-oriented; market-oriented; and network-oriented in Gal (2014, 74).

Uwizeyimana and Maphunye (2014, 96) traced the first use of governance as a term to the 1989 World Bank Study on "Sub-Saharan Africa – from Crisis to Sustainable Growth". The term according to these authors "describe[s] the need for institutional reform and a better and more efficient public sector ..." The features of (good) governance as highlighted are: improvement of administration and civil services; strengthening of parliamentary oversight; promotion of participatory decision-making; and adoption of judicial reforms among others. The characteristics of New Public Governance (NPG) include: emphasis on dispersion of power; stressing the coordinating role of government and movement away from undue paternalism; forming a complex network that integrates social organisations and individuals; the network formed by public products and services can provide its members abundant social resources to exchange (such as currency, information and technology); governance network relies on trust and stability of the contract; NPG values the role of social public organisations, pays attention to output and the result of the public sector, regards the subjects of public service as customers not citizens (Xu et al. 2015, 14). The convergence or overlap of these features with the market-oriented attributes of NPM is clearly discernible.

The discourse on Public Value Management (PVM) and Public Value Failure (PVF) owes largely to the intellectual excursions of Mark Moore (1995, 2013) and Barry Bozeman (2002, 2007), respectively. Mark Moore made his debut in public-management thinking with a book titled *Creating Public Value* (CPV) in 1995 and a 2013 follow-up monograph on *Recognizing Public Value* (RPV). He would later realise that his undue emphasis on operational capacity-building efforts of focal organisations was too narrow in conception, compared to global trends on the impact of co-production, co-creation (Voorberg et al. 2017) and inter-organisational forms of operational capacity in the contemporary networked world (Alford et al. 2017).

Mark Moore formulates how public managers should analyse values in the public sector, noting that values are rooted in the desires and perceptions of individuals. In addition, he avers that the public sector satisfies two general desires of individuals, like the provision of goods and services that cannot be done through the market; securing individual rights and clarifying responsibilities (Turkel and Turkel 2016, 3). Moore further asserts that public values are based on a reciprocal relationship between administrators and the citizenry. There is a seeming overlap here with the "Whole of Government" approach, which seeks to place citizens at the centre of reforms (Christensen and Laegreid 2007). It is also submitted that

leadership goals based on the strategic triangle must satisfy three criteria thus: they must be substantively valuable; politically sustainable and administratively feasible. When these elements are combined, the public manager using this approach must maximise the value being created (Alford et al. 2017).

The contention, however, in Public Value Failure (PVF) by Bozeman (as cited in Rutgers 2015, 36) is that public values impede private values and consequent actions, even though "only legitimate public values are reducible to individual's [private] values ... [and] concern mere market failure." It is particularly difficult to identify the cogent planks or thrust of these approaches, and this validates Rutger's (2015, 40) curiosity that the "study of PVs is scattered and fragmented ... because it is not a theoretically precise concept, but primarily a pedagogical instrument." Paradoxically, Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011, 244) documents that the PVM paradigm is described as being part of wider networked governance; politics and management go hand in hand; many stakeholders are involved to make good decisions in order to leverage service delivery and implementation. PVM believes in a system of dialogue and exchange in relation to networked governance, plus the reconciliation of democracy with management and their ultimate delivery.

The foregoing review bears eloquent testimony to Pollitt's (2010) observation on the existence of aggravated paradigm wars in Public Administration.

4.1 Theoretical framework: Neo-Weberian State Model

This paper has its theoretical basis laid on the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) model. The NWS model derives from the huge scholarship of Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert (2004). Other notable scholars include Wolfgang Drechsler and Rainer Kattel (2008); Laurence Lynn (2008); Cepiku and Mititelu in Ajibade and Ibietan (2016), to mention but a few. The NWS has clear empirical origins backed by a strong normative meaning for middle-income and less developing countries, and according to Drechsler and Kattel (2008, 96), "the basis of the NWS remains the Weberian structure to which some of the NPM elements have been added [rather than Weberian elements added to NPM]." The fundamental premises of this according to Bouckaert in Drechsler and Kattel (2008, 95) are as follows:

- to keep the state as the primary framework;
- to use the law as the steering instrument of the framework; and
- not to experiment with state, administration and other such important issues.
- The Weberian elements of the NWS model according to Lynn (2008, 27) are:
- Re-affirmation of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization, technological change, shifting demographics and environmental threat;
- Re-affirmation of the role of representative democracy (central, regional and local) as legitimating elements within the state apparatus;
- Re-affirmation of the role of administrative law – suitably modernized – in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen-state relationship including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions;
- Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinctive status, culture, and terms and conditions.

The "Neo" elements include:

- Shift from an internal orientation towards bureaucratic rules in favour of external orientation targeted at meeting citizens' needs and wishes. The primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market mechanisms, but the creation of a professional culture of quality and service;
- Supplementation (not replacement) of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for consultation with, and direct representation of citizens' views;
- In the management of resources within government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a greater orientation on the achievement of results rather than merely the correct following of procedure;
- A professionalization of the public service, so that the bureaucrat becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere of activity, but also a professional manager oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizens/users.

The combination of Weberian and "Neo" elements highlighted above dovetails into the synopsis of five principles of the Neo-Weberian framework identified by Cepiku and Mititelu in Ajibade and Ibieta (2016, 13-14) thus:

- Bureaucracy as external orientation to the fulfilment of citizens' needs;
- The strategic role of professional managers in the implementation of policies;
- Collaboration of public and private sectors;
- Representative democracy which is supported by public consultation and public participation;
- The separation of politics from administration with an emphasis on administration professionalization.

It is arguable that the Weberian bureaucratic model remains a strong pivot of intellectual foundation for continuous and robust thinking about institutions of the state and governance in general, notwithstanding that it has received several knocks and reform attempts directed at it. The NWS logic, therefore, is to uphold the vital features of probity and accountability of the ideal-type bureaucracy and complement same with the efficiency value of the New Public Management. The paper in the next section attempts to situate the five principles summarised above within the operations of the Nigerian public bureaucracy, and further underscoring their relevance or gaps.

4.2 Application or relevance of theory to the Nigerian Public Service

A good starting point in this section anchors on the NWS tenet which hinges on the external orientation of public bureaucracy in meeting citizens' needs. It is common knowledge that from its colonial origin, the Nigerian Public Service rested on the traditional model of Public Administration pivoted on Weberianism, which has suffered several assaults due to its emphasis on command and control in internal orientation (Robinson 2015). In an attempt to overcome the problems associated with internal orientation and make the Public Service more result-oriented, the 1974 Udoji Reform Commission recommended the adoption of proactive management techniques, such as Management by Objectives (MBO); Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) among others. The prominence accorded the wage or salary component, in addition to other omnibus contents/recommendations of this Committee account for its failure in addressing social challenges (Okorie and Onwe 2016).

Another feature of the NWS model as highlighted earlier is the strategic role of professional managers in the implementation of policies. Policy implementation is the domain or responsibility of bureaucracy, and this is anchored on Public Administration (theoretical) orthodoxy, built on Wilson's and Goodnow's works. It is pertinent to note that effective implementation of policies is a function of competent and professionalised bureaucracy. Professionalising the Nigerian public bureaucracy appears to be a work in progress, even as Olaopa (2016a, 81) notes that "... rescuing the profession of public service requires reforming the accountability mechanisms throughout the service, it is accountability that forms the basis of the public service in the first place, it is what tied the public servant to the public s/he is serving." The argument here is that trust is underscored by effective accountability which should earn public servants their places in the bureaucracy. Seteolu (2017, 59) submits that "the 1988 reform was designed to foster professionalisation of the ... service". The attendant politicisation of the workforce which made the Permanent Secretary a political appointee whose tenure became co-existent and co-terminus with the appointing regime eroded the expected gains of this reform. In Nigerian parlance, this development was interpreted as "beheading the civil service" until the 1994/1995 Ayida Panel reversed this to status quo.

The need for collaboration between the public and private sectors as a third plank upon which the NWS model rests, cannot be overemphasised in the current Nigerian economic situation and public affairs. The economy is vulnerable, due to fiscal dependence on oil, which is arguably subject to the vagaries of the OPEC oligopolistic market and global swings. This has reduced government revenue in the face of high cost of governance in Nigeria. This inevitably calls for co-production (Olowu in Ibietan and Ikeanyibe 2017) and other forms of collaboration in the delivery of services to the populace. The 1988 reform anchored on conditionalities of International Monetary Fund induced by the New Public Management/Structural Adjustment Programme failed to address this malaise. Instead, it ushered in an era of bourgeoisie bureaucracy, institutionalised corruption and monumental havoc in public governance (Okorie and Onwe 2016).

Public consultation and participation as platforms for representative democracy based on the NWS model are desiderata in Nigeria's elitist and highly monetised electoral and governance spheres. Ibietan (2010) posits that this explains the gap between the governing elites and the masses. This is due largely to the absence of inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013) which are consultative, participatory, thrive on consensus building, people-centred in goal orientation and policy formulation. The political/governing elite in Nigeria do not seem ready to initiate appropriate reforms that are required to redress this trend and ultimately serve as a bulwark against state failure.

The separation of politics from administration in undertaking bureau-professionalisation as a final tenet of the NWS model derives from the prodigious essays of the academic fathers of the discipline. It must be stated that undue politicisation and interference in bureaucratic activities circumscribe efficiency and professionalism in the Public Service. The Nigerian public bureaucracy is not immune to this, as typified by the mass purge of 1975 and 1984 (Adebayo 2000), and the 1988 Civil Service reforms, which decapitated the public service until the 1994/95 Ayida Review panel changed the situation, bear eloquent testimony to this.

Oyedeki (2016, 12-13) documents the following issues in the politicisation of public service: the very nature of most civil-service functions makes them politically attracted; excessive centralisation of governance which has its roots in military incursion into governance and public administration with their centralising tendencies; monetisation of politics; and other sundry issues. Olaopa (2016b, 12), however, underscores the relevance of the NWS model in

the Nigerian public bureaucracy this way: "it is therefore the function of public administration research to formulate research models that will articulate the synthesis of ... 'Theta-type core values' of the Weberian public administration and the private managerial values of the NPM. One of the beautiful results of this synthesis is neo-Weberianism, a creative blend of several administrative models, especially the NPM and traditional administration." This is partly realisable by forging a community of practice built on Academic-Practitioners synergy, and this highlights the imperative of resuscitating the Nigerian Association of Public Administration and Management (NAPAM) to play roles akin to that of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM). The journal of this association (*JOPA*) is very robust. The *Journal of Public Administration* and the annual conferences of SAAPAM offer a necessary interface between Academics and practice, with the ultimate goal of advancing governance and leveraging bureaucratic effectiveness within the Southern African countries/region.

5. Public administration paradigms and the management of public service in Nigeria: An evaluation

The Nigerian public bureaucracy as an offshoot of British colonial administration is arguably one of the strongest legacies nurtured on the traditional Weberian structure and principles of anonymity, neutrality and impartiality. It is trite to add that civil-/public-service architecture and frameworks were pivoted on the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report in Britain (Olaopa 2014). It is particularly striking to note that public service reforms (PSRs) in Nigeria inhere in the impinging nuances and requisites of Development Administration (DA). In other words, just as the evolution of DA in developing countries can be deconstructed to be largely prescriptive (Ibieta 2014), the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) induced NPM reforms commencing from the 1980s have exogenous origins that are traceable to the Bretton Woods and global capitalist institutions (Omoyefa 2008; Fatile and Adejuwon 2010). Attempts or efforts at administrative development (improving skills/managerial capacity and institutional capabilities) as a cardinal plank of DA in Nigeria witnessed the institution of administrative reforms in the public bureaucracy.

A synopsis of the various reform panels, commissions/committees are: 1934 Hunt Commission; 1941 Bridges Commission; 1945 Tudor Davies Commission; 1946 Harragin Commission; 1947 Miller Commission; 1948 Whitley Commission (Anyim et al. 2011, 64-65); 1948 Foot Commission (Okorie and Onwe 2016, 16); 1954 Gorsuch Commission; 1958/59 Newns Committee; 1959 Mbanefo Commission; 1963 Morgan Commission; 1966 Elwood Grading Team; 1968 Wey Panel on Public Service Management and Salary Administration; 1971 Adebo Commission (Okafor and Onuigbo 2015, 339); 1972-1974 Udoji Commission; 1975 Williams & Williams Commission (Olaopa 2014, 67); 1976 Falae Committee (Ehiyamen 2017, 45); 1981 Onosode Commission (for Parastatals); 1981 Cookey Commission (for Universities); 1981 Adamolekun Commission (For Polytechnics, Teachers' Training Colleges and Technical Colleges) (Anyim et al. 2011, 65).

Others include: 1985 Dotun Philips Panel; 1988 Civil Service Reform (Koshoni Report) Decree No 43 (Oyedeji 2016, 7-8); 1990 Damachi Commission (Anyim et al. 2011); 1990 Fatai Williams Committee; 1991 Longe Commission; 1994 Ayida Panel; 1997 Vision 2010 Committee Report; 1998 Committee on Harmonisation of Remuneration in the Public Service (Olaopa 2014, 67); 1999 Minimum Wage Commission; 2002 Ekaette Presidential Committee on Monetization of Fringe Benefits in the Public Service; 2004 Pension Reform and Allied Civil Service Renewal Initiatives; 2004 Edozien Relativity Panel; 2005 Shonekan Presidential Committee on Consolidation

of Emoluments in the Public Sector (Olaopa 2014, 184); 2009 Onosode Commission for Universities (Anyim et al. 2011); 2012 Oronsaye Public Service Panel (Ikeanyibe 2015); and 2013 Fika Committee (Okorie and Onwe 2016, 22).

From the foregoing, one can deduce that the majority of the commissions/panels on PSR had their terms of reference and activities solely devoted to wages, salary administration, improvement in motivation and other conditions of service. It is also observable that in some circumstances where the recommendations of panels covered the expansive (areas of) strategies for raising productivity in the public service through better training/retraining techniques, adoption of technology, and robust managerial methods, the expected gains were sacrificed on the altar of salary increment, which has never been quite satisfying. This is, however, in sharp contrast to the state of affairs in Central and Eastern European countries, where civil servants are "paid far too well ..." (Randma-Liiv and Drechsler 2017, 597).

It is therefore expedient to focus the attention of this section on the few reform panels/committees that are predicated on the sound philosophy of PA paradigmatic orientation, which are taxonomised into three phases by Olaopa (2011, 184-186) thus: the first is SAP-induced reforms of the 1980s, which was succeeded by series of reforms in the 1990s, pivoted on the need for capacity development with a thrust on better policy formulation and implementation through the public bureaucracy. Thirdly, there were waves of reform commencing from the year 2000 anchored on improved service delivery to the citizens.

It is proper to preface our discussion with the landmark contributions of the Udoji Commission (1972-1974) report. This panel's work was modeled on the 1968 Fulton report in Britain, and was mandated to examine the organisation, structure and management of the public service, evaluate methods of recruitment, pension legislation, carry out job evaluation and establish salary scales corresponding to each grade. It proposed a "New Style Public Service" based on the adoption of management styles like MBO, PPBS among others (Anazodo et al. 2012, 23). The commission in its recommendations further highlighted the issue of manpower development through effective planning, training and retraining, which would lead to professionalised civil/public service (Omitola 2012).

Additionally, the commission made far-reaching suggestions on enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in the public bureaucracy; design for an improved open performance evaluation reporting system; recommended a unified grading and salary structure covering all cadres (Ehiyamen 2017). The controversies that greeted the salary component of the report and the half-hearted attempts at implementing the provisions robbed the federal public bureaucracy of an opportunity to recalibrate and reinvigorate itself as an effective institution for service delivery. This situation was exacerbated by the mass purge of 1975, in which over ten thousand public servants were dismissed (Adebayo 2000) from the public service on various allegations. The attendant human capital losses from this experience has remained too heavy to recover from.

The 1981 Onosode Commission (on the review of parastatals) in its report introduced the neo-liberal/capitalist lexicon of privatisation and commercialisation into the Nigerian public affairs. Apart from endorsing earlier reports, the panel raised a fundamental issue concerning public-sector efficiency compared to the private sector. The public enterprises were construed as loss leaders and huge drains on national resources, hence the suggestions that they would be more efficiently managed as privatised entities (Ibietan 2014). It is therefore not surprising that scholars (Amuwo 2008; Omoyefa 2008; Fatile and Adejuwon 2010) posit that reforms in Africa suggest neo-liberal terms or concepts, but these led to the "destruction of public

administration institutions without putting in place any viable alternative to them" (Olaopa 2011, 184). The privatisation process which was consummated during the Obasanjo presidency between 1999 and 2007 has not yielded the desired results in most sectors. For instance, in the power sector, despite the unbundling of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) into Distribution and Generation Companies (DISCOs and GENCOs) with one Transmission Company, the Federal Government continues to fund/subsidise the operations of these companies.

The above situation raises a big query on the genuineness or credibility of the purported privatisation exercise. This validates Farazmand's (2012) view that despite attempts to shrink the public sphere and de-legitimise public administration via sweeping global capitalism and neo-liberal reforms, the state apparatus ultimately rescues private capital from collapse as it did during the 2008 global melt down. To further buttress this point, Drechsler and Randma-Liiv (2015, 5) resonate that "... NPM [as] that lesson might not exactly be the optimal advice, [and] for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such a recommendation makes even less sense". On the strength of the foregoing issues and analyses, and bearing in mind the questions raised in the Introduction section of this paper, it is doubtful if the NPM paradigm serves the interest of the Nigerian populace or public servants. Perhaps, scholars and technocrats are simply entertaining themselves with these highfalutin and esoteric concepts/ideas.

The 1988 civil service reforms, besides being SAP-induced, has been described as warehousing NPM-related issues of decentralisation, professionalism and privatisation of public enterprises, arising from non-performance and unwieldiness of government (Ikeanyibe 2015), although there is an earlier contention that "... African bureaucracies are not as large as it is often depicted" (Amuwo 2008, 47). These arguments were invigorated and located in the imperial motives of the Bretton Woods institutions (Agagu 2008; Fatile and Adejuwon 2010). Ibieta (2014) documents that the 1988 reforms made three innovations calculated at enhancing public service performance, namely: improved remuneration through Elongated Salary Structure (ESS); Professionalisation along career paths and the operationalisation of team/democratic management. This reform has the unenviable and strange record of decapitating the civil service by making the position of Permanent Secretary to be political and the tenure co-terminus and co-extensive with the appointing administration.

The above provisions were aimed at neutralising the roles of Permanent Secretaries, which hitherto had been preponderant. The reform also scrapped the office of Head of Service of the Federation – the occupant of this office technically speaking is the Chief Public Servant of the country. These pitfalls and other misgivings against this reform led to its unimpressive impact, notwithstanding its lofty aspirations. Predicated on these and many other facts, scholars (Jreisat 2010; Olaopa 2011; Basheka and Sebola 2015) were unanimous in their submissions that the SAP/NPM reforms decimated public-administration institutions and left them prostrate and famished.

The Ayida Panel was inaugurated on 10 November 1994 to review the 1988 reforms among other issues. It dispassionately re-examined the major provisions of the 1988 reforms and reversed the acrimonious matters (including those highlighted above) to status quo. There was also a recommendation for the repeal of Decree 17 of 1984, which promoted impunity via arbitrary abbreviation of tenure and employment of civil/public servants (Oyededeji 2016).

The President Obasanjo administration's Service Renewal Initiatives spanned 1999 to 2007 and were targeted at managerialism, service delivery through SERVICOM and professionalism as reincarnated effigies of NPM, but they produced limited results. The main components

of PSRs during this administration are: pension reform with an emphasis on a contributory saving scheme as a departure from the hitherto non-contributory one which placed heavy burden on governments; monetisation policy in which fringe benefits and allowances in kind were converted to cash in an attempt to reduce cost of governance. Other aspects of the reform include restructuring of pilot Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) through the establishment of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms in September 2003 (Oyedemi 2016, 9) to ensure the re-organisation and re-assignment of all MDAs and units of the federal government.

The SERVICOM (Service Compact with Nigerians) was targeted at a smooth execution of government decisions with the underlying motive of enhancing efficiency and optimal service delivery. As canvassed by Barabashev (2016), supplementing service delivery with co-production by individuals and groups enhances service quality, and this underscores the new public governance (NPG). However, research shows that the governance paradigm as precursor to the NPG is not yet practiced in Nigeria, let alone the NPG paradigm (Ikeanyibe et al. 2017). Additionally, the downsizing of human resources in MDAs and payroll reform anchored on Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS) aimed at addressing the ghost-workers syndrome, and illicit payroll practices/fraud are cardinal planks of this PSR. There was also a review and update of Public Service Rules, Financial Regulations and the introduction of the Due Process Act.

The above lofty initiatives notwithstanding, the expected results diverged from the aspirations; it is therefore not surprising that Jreisat (2010, 623) submits that "reform for Nigeria ... was equated with de-regulation, privatization and commercialization. The direct effects on public administration were retrenchment, downsizing, and the sale of public enterprises". The lackluster performance of NPM reforms in Nigeria has been attributed to conception-reality gaps attending implementation and the role of basic institutional frameworks in assessing reform projects (Olaopa 2011). Although, the NPM reforms were necessitated by the supposed obsolescence of the traditional Weberian administrative practice, Olaopa (2014, xxxiii) affirms that, "... [it] was essentially not an attempt to root out the Weberian system, but to rehabilitate its service delivery modalities." This has not worked because productivity and service delivery have consistently been at low levels, as measured by institutional reports contained in Ikeanyibe et al. (2016), and this explains why SERVICOM's utility to PSRs is suspect and questionable. The implication of this is that economic philosophy pivoting PSRs was on the market, and as previous studies (Agagu 2008; Drechsler 2010; Sanusi and Abdullahi 2011) show, this is a very wrong thing to do.

The PSRs of Presidents Yar'adua and Jonathan's administrations were foregrounded on the previous (President Obasanjo) administration's service renewal initiatives with a special focus on the Seven-Point National Restoration Programme and Transformation Agenda as the operational mantra, respectively. The PSR efforts of these successive administrations according to Olaopa (2014, 256) had a "significant dose of [the] NPM paradigm". The Oronsaye Committee, which was inaugurated in 2010 but re-christened in March 2011 as Presidential Committee on the Rationalisation and Restructuring of Federal Government Parastatals, Commissions and Agencies, had the mandate of reviewing the structure of public institutions. As one of the recent reform efforts in Nigeria which aimed at deepening the neo-liberal/NPM reform process that characterised Obasanjo's presidency, its numerous recommendations seem unappreciated, as they were not implemented, thus validating the take by Adamolekun (2005) that Nigeria is a hesitant reformer.

Resulting from the failings of NPM/SAP-induced administrative reforms in Nigeria, and being mindful of the fact that the Nigerian state as led by the political and bureaucratic elites seems deficient in political will and alertness to contemplate and tap into the robust benefits of the governance paradigm as documented by scholars (Olaopa 2011; Ikeanyibe 2015; Farazmand 2017), the Neo-Weberian State theoretical anchor of this paper is considered suitable. This model has the tendency to capacitate the developmental agenda of Nigeria through a professionalised and re-calibrated public service targeted at qualitative service delivery to the populace.

6. Oscillation of public administration paradigms: Lessons for the Nigerian public bureaucracy

It is axiomatic from the reviews highlighting the trajectory and milestones in the development of Public Administration that there is an unsettled debate which underlines Public Administration scholarship, and this feeds into paradigmatic oscillation. This possibly results from the multiple personality and community of interests in the discipline as underscored by the various paradigms. In light of these, this section attempts to respond to the following questions: is it beneficial to the Nigerian public service to run on oscillating paradigms in Public Administration, and what lessons can be learnt from this? Answers to these questions are presented in the discourse below on the basis of studies on this theme and ancillary issues.

Haque (1996, 316) identifies the role of culture and different contexts as planks for bureaucratic performance, affirming as follows:

With regard to the political context, state bureaucracy in Western nations is compatible with advanced and stable political institutions, division between politics and administration, bureaucratic neutrality and accountability, and a liberal democratic atmosphere, whereas such bureaucracy in Third World societies is often incongruent with their weak and unstable political systems, politicized administrative apparatus and relatively undemocratic ideological orientation ... the normative features of modern bureaucracy ... have been compatible with Western cultural values ... bureaucratic norms are often contradictory with Third World cultures.

The above averment was reinforced by Olaopa (2010, 5, 8), who calls for a deconstruction of the public service after many years of independence and its subsequent reconstitution in tandem with the local trajectories of African history and culture. Other requirements for bureaucratic effectiveness include: a supporting socio-economic and political infrastructure; a properly functioning state; and a democratically ordered polity among others. This author would later corroborate this with an allusion to the NPM model "which fails to take into consideration the unique administrative context of the third world" (Olaopa 2016b, 12).

Stretching further the argument on non-suitability of the NPM model, SAP-induced reforms and the invention of several reforms to the Nigerian bureaucracy, Agagu (2008, 248) posits that "there are some flaws in using market and market competitiveness as model for public administration." This, he affirms, has led to the erosion of confidence and the loss of prestige in the public service, which remains a custodian of rules/regulations and an engine of national development. Jreisat (2010, 63) notes that "reform for Nigeria and many other states,

was equated with deregulation, privatization, and commercialization. The direct effects on public administration were retrenchment, downsizing and the sale of public enterprises." He underscores that "the shrinking of the public sector in Africa was not limited to Nigeria; it was a pervasive policy throughout the Continent."

The above submissions converge with the views of several authors, namely: Agagu (2008); Sanusi and Abdullahi (2011); and Farazmand (2012). Sanusi and Abdullahi (2011, 78) affirm that "the reforms ... were primarily aimed at making the state or governmental institutions market friendly, lean, managerial, decentralized and customer-friendly ..." Farazmand (2012, 494) sees the effects of these reforms (managerialism in particular) as "paralyzing the state and its institutional capacities; taking over the public sector via sweeping privatization and the de-legitimization of public administration; shrinking the public sphere ... degrading the state and public administration ..." He alludes to the stabilising and protective roles of the state and bureaucracy in the event of market and privatised system collapse as typified by the 2008 Wall Street meltdown. Perhaps, his identification of a "hybrid or mixed model of public administration based on indigenous values, traditions and cultures supplemented ... [with] ... models of organization, management, rationality, bureaucracy ..." (Farazmand 2012, 510) can leverage and bolster public administration and governance systems in Nigeria for people-centred service delivery and development outcomes.

It is also noteworthy that reforms anchored on these oscillating paradigms are oblivious to the "incompatibility between ... African value system and the Western values" (Basheka and Sebola 2015, 65) upon which these paradigms are predicated. It is based on this realisation that these authors advocate a re-launched public service anchored on African values. This is in tandem with Haque's (1996) and Farazmand's (2012) averments on this issue. There is also a convergence of opinion among some writers (Fatile 2008; Omoyefa 2008; Olaopa 2010) that the bane of public-sector reforms pivoted on these paradigms and neo-liberal policies inhere in their suggestion and imposition on African countries by donor nations, multinationals, and the Bretton Woods institutions. Omoyefa (2008, 25, 27-28) adds poignantly that "... not all developing countries as known in Africa ... necessarily require reform of their public sectors." He cautions on wholesale acceptance of the proposals by these donor agencies and financial institutions, concluding with a counsel "to exploit indigenous knowledge in carrying out any required reform in the public sector."

Jreisat (2010, 619) observes that "reform strategies failed to advocate accountability and democratization as objectives," even as Olaopa (2016b, 24) echoes on "challenges of re-professionalization," with Ibietan and Ikeanyibe (2017, 6) being "doubtful if public sector reforms in Nigeria underscored by Managerialism at central and sub-national units have yielded many results, especially in this Fourth Republic." Olaopa (2016b) locates the revitalisation of the community of practice for public administration at an intersection between theory and practice. Hopefully, the Nigerian Association of Public Administration and Management (its resuscitation) will make it sit comfortably at this coveted intersection.

7. Concluding remarks

The paper discussed milestones/epochs in the development of Public Administration as a field of study, and this partly illuminates our understanding on the dynamism inherent in the discipline's scholarship. The foundation for the discourse was laid on Henry's (1975, 1999) conventional narrative and the exposition by several authors, up to the current debate or contention on PVM as paradigm or academic movement. The multiple personality of Public

Administration and its community of interests underline the discipline's status, with a tendency to circumscribe it as a self-conscious field of study. Notwithstanding these, the paper argues that the practice of public administration must recognise the context/environment in which it operates, and it takes a well-capacitated public bureaucracy, calibrated on bureau-professionalism and robust accountability mechanisms to deliver qualitative and people oriented services.

It is worthy of emphasis to state that Nigeria has not been able to experiment with or re-calibrate its federal public bureaucracy along the lines and tenets/tools of many PA paradigms. The narrative shows an allure with the orthodoxy of Weberian practice, even the haphazard attempts or engaging temptation with SAP-induced/NPM reforms were targeted at rehabilitating its service delivery abilities and techniques. It is therefore not surprising that NPM reforms outcomes have not been quite satisfactory, and this submission finds numerous bases in literature and the discourse in this paper. This informs the adoption of the NWS model as theoretical framework and textual analysis of secondary data which invigorated the discussion of various themes of the paper and the recommendations. The paper therefore calls for better-informed political will or robust leadership of reform exercise/process that can capacitate the requisite institutional frameworks. Doing this will in no small measure reverse the dismal reform results and re-position the Nigerian public bureaucracy for optimal service delivery. Public Administration Scholars and Researchers should be concerned about the future of the discipline, especially in the face of rapidly encroaching predatory capitalism and globalisation tendencies against the discipline. They should also be alert enough to wean the discipline from the onslaught and annexation by rivals from Business Administration, Economics and Political Science.

A re-discovery of the values of Public Service in Nigeria built on the tenets (professionalism and co-production) of the NWS model is seriously canvassed by this paper. Additionally, the Nigerian Public Service cannot afford to be oscillating with Public Administration paradigms, it should rather operate on any model that is productive or result-oriented, which satisfies the yearnings or desires of the citizens. The governing elite should endeavour to reverse the current anti-intellectual culture in the public domain by translating from consumers of knowledge to creation and application of same. This would necessitate Academic-Practice synergy, which makes the resuscitation of the Nigerian Association of Public Administration and Management an imperative. The South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM) is a model in this respect. The Nigerian government should make efforts to solve social problems through the research approach; thus creating special funds for this purpose. The culture of research for development, not research and development should be encouraged.

There is also a continuous need for the entrenchment of civilian administration predicated on democratic ethos and governance, in order to curtail democratic reversals, impunity, unnecessary politicisation, and centralisation tendencies which constrain bureau-effectiveness and tenure in the Nigerian Public Service. Training and re-training of civil/public servants must be taken seriously to imbue them with necessary skills and expertise to deliver people-oriented services. Consistent ethical and moral re-orientation and enlightenment should be mounted by agencies (National Orientation Agency, Code of Conduct Bureau) saddled with this mandate and moral rectitude in public service/affairs, in order to reduce the incidence of bureau-pathology in the Nigerian public bureaucracy. As a corollary, the accountability mechanisms should be invigorated to curb potential or real resource plunder, mismanagement and conversion of public wealth to private gain.

Periodic review (in line with the prevailing economic realities) in remuneration and motivational packages in the public bureaucracy, devoid of a combative/adversarial industrial relations process, is advocated. The objective implementation of the Federal Character Principle that upholds merit, while seeking to achieve proportional geo-political representation, will engender competence and efficiency in the Nigerian Public Service, which ultimately galvanises development through qualitative service delivery.

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